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THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS: BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE
ON ARTICLE 9(1)*
PARVEZ HASSAN**
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF "ARBITRARY" AND THE RELEVANCE OF Travaux
Preparatoires
Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights' (the "Covenant") provides:
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as
are established by law. [Emphasis added.]
It is self evident that the content of this article would, to a large
extent, turn on the meaning of the word "arbitrary." Does it mean
"illegal" or "unjust" or both? For if it merely means "illegal," all
despotic acts and oppressive laws of a government would be unassail-
* The author gratefully acknowledges the guidance of Professors Louis B. Sohn
and Richard R. Baxter in the preparation of this article which is related to the author's
two studies, The Word "Arbitrary" as Used in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights: "Illegal" or "Unjust"?, 10 HARV. INT'L L.J. 225-62 (1969), and The Interna-
tional Covenants on Human Rights: An Approach to Interpretation, 19 BUFFALO L.
REV. 35-50 (1968-69). The importance of determining the meaning of the word "arbi-
trary" used in art. 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
in other international human rights articles has been highlighted in both these articles.
** LL.B., Punjab University (Pakistan); LL.M., Yale University; S.J.D., Harvard
University; Member of the Pakistani Bar.
1. For an exhaustive summary of the drafting of the Covenant, see Sohn, A Short
History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights, EIGHTEENTH REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 39, 101-20 (1968). The various stages up to 1954 when the Commission com-
pleted the drafting of the Covenant are recorded in Secretary-General, Annotations on
the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, 10 U.N. GAOR,
Annexes, Agenda Item 28 (Part II), at 2-7 (1955), U.N. Doc. A/2929 (July 1, 1955). In
this connection, see also Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Tenth Session,
18 ESCOR, Supp. 7, at 3-7, U.N. Doc. E/2573 (1954).
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able so long as these legislative enactments are in accordance with
municipal laws. If, on the other hand, "arbitrary" is synonymous
with "unjust," governments would have to respond to a higher stan-
dard.
Prescribing the rules for the interpretation of treaties, Articles 31
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 concede
(1) that a special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established
that the parties so intended, and (2) the relevance, as a supplemen-
tary means, of the travaux preparatoires, to the determination of the
treaty content. Whether the parties intended that a certain term shall
have a special meaning can generally be only established after re-
viewing the travaux. Accordingly, this is a study of the preparatory
work of Article 9(1) to determine the understanding behind the adop-
tion of the word "arbitrary" used therein.
A comprehensive drafting history of Article 9(1), however, pres-
ents many complex problems. In addition to the unusually long pe-
riod of over two decades during which it was drafted, this article was
referred back and forth in the United Nations to various sessions of
the Commission on Human Rights (the "Commission"), the Eco-
nomic and Social Council (the "Council") and the General Assembly.
Within these bodies, the article was referred to their various commit-
tees; sometimes special subcommittees and drafting groups were
established. Even when the article was not being debated in any
organ of the United Nations, it was constantly being commented
upon by several governments, specialized agencies, and individuals.
Moreover, because of the increase in membership of the United Na-
tions from 51 to 122 States during the period under review, the
participants involved in the drafting continually varied.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF "ARBITRARY" IN ARTICLE 9
A. The Origins (1945-1947)
The beginnings of the arrest and detention article in the Cove-
nant can be found in the declarations of human rights submitted by
Cuba 2 and Panama 3 at the San Francisco Conference. 4 The Cuban
2. 3 UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION ORGANIZATION, DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, SAN FRANCISCO, 1945, at 500-02
(1945).
3. Id. at 264, 266-69.
4. The origins of this article are also perceptible in some pre-San Francisco Con-
ference declarations. The Declaration of the International Rights of Man (1929), the
first international bill of human rights, provided in its art. 1 that it "is the duty of
every State to recognize the equal right of every individual to . . . liberty . . . and to
accord to all within its territory the full and entire protection of this right." See 35
AM. J. INT'L L. 663, 664 (1941). Also relevant is a Bill of Rights included in a 1942 U.S.
draft of the U.N. Charter. Its arts. 3 and 9 declared that "no person shall be deprived
of. . .liberty. . . except in accordance with humane and civilized processes provided
VOL. 3:153
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"Declaration of the International Rights and Duties of the Individ-
ual" emphasized the right of every individual to "security of his
person. "5 The Panamanian "Declaration of Essential Human Rights"
was more elaborate on the subject and dealt with "freedom from
arbitrary detention" in its Article 8:
Every one who is detained has the right to immediate judicial deter-
mination of the legality of his detention.
The state has a duty to provide adequate procedures to make this
right effective.'
A "Statement of Essential Human Rights"' submitted later by
Panama to the first session of the Council explained that this Article
8 implied that no one could be subjected to arbitrary arrest or be
detained except pursuant to law. It also pointed out the "statement
of the right does not include a statement of the grounds on which a
person may be taken into custody and held for trial; that will depend
upon the laws and legal system in the particular state."'
At its first session, the Council also had before it another Cuban
"Declaration on Human Rights."' This Declaration sought to assure
to every human being the "right to . . . liberty, to personal security
and to respect of his dignity as a human being" and the "right to
immunity from arbitrary arrest and to a review of the regularity of
his arrest by ordinary tribunals."10 All these declarations of human
rights were, however, not discussed" and the first debate on the sub-
stance of the international bill took place after the establishment of
the Commission.
by law" and that the "right of people to be secure in their persons ... from. . . arrest
and detention shall not be denied or abridged except by orderly process determined
by law and upon the establishment of probable cause." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
POST-WAR FOREIGN PoucY PREPARATION 1939-1945, at 483-84 (1950). From among the
numerous contemporary bills of human rights prepared by private bodies and individ-
uals, only a few had comprehensive articles on arrest and detention. Art. 1 of a bill
prepared by Hersh Lauterpacht provided, inter alia, that there shall be protection from
"arbitrary and unauthorized arrest." See H. LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
THE RIGHTS OF MAN 70, 93-97 (1945). Art. 15 of the International Bill of Human Rights
prepared by the Committee on Human Rights of the Commission to Study the Organi-
zation of Peace also included the provision that "every person has the freedom from
arbitrary arrest or detention." See COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE,
DRAFT INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 10 (1947).
5. Supra note 2, at 500.
6. Id. at 267.
7. U.N. Doc. E/HR/3 (Apr. 26, 1946).
8. Id. at 7-8.
9. U.N. Doc. E/HR/1 (Apr. 22, 1946).
10. Id. See arts. 1 and 19.
11. The nuclear Commission did discuss, very briefly, the Cuban "Declaration on
Human Rights" and the Panamanian "Statement of Essential Human Rights," U.N.
Doc. E/HR/8, at 4 (1946); and U.N. Doc. E/HR/13 (1946), but finally decided to leave
the drafting of the bill to the Commission, U.N. Doc. E/HR/15, at 5 (May, 1946).
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During its first session, the Commission began its discussion on
the bill with a debate about the rights that should be included in such
a bill.12 The United States suggested some categories of rights which
"persons of differing national, legal, economic and social systems
would regard as the human rights and fundamental freedoms to be
promoted and respected by the United Nations.' 1 3 Among such cate-
gories were included:
(b) procedural rights, such as safeguards for persons accused of crime."
The United Nations Secretariat's "International Bill of Rights'
' 5
appears to have contained a similar provision 6 and also included the
right to liberty and security. 7 An Indian draft contained a reference
to the "right of liberty, including the right to personal freedom."' 8
Another draft before the Commission was the "Declaration of the
International Rights and Duties of Man"'" formulated by the Inter-
American Juridical Committee. Article XI of this Declaration related
to the "Right to be Free from Arbitrary Arrest" and included the
provision that:
every person accused of crime shall have the right not to be arrested
except upon warrant duly issued in accordance with the law, unless the
person is arrested flagrante delicto.20
All these documents and proposals were considered very gener-
ally at some meetings. 2' They were eventually overshadowed by de-
bates regarding the creation of a drafting group,2 2 the "form" of the
12. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.7 (Jan. 31, 1947).
13. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/4, at 2 (Jan. 28, 1947).
14. Id.
15. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/W.4 (Jan. 13, 1947). This working paper was a restricted
document and its text is not available. Other restricted comments of relevance appear
to be U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/W.8, W.16, and W.18 (1947). See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/20 (Feb.
26, 1947) which contains a complete list of documentation at this session.
16. See opening remarks of the Chairman, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 7, at 2 (1947).
17. See remarks of Malik, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.9, at 2 (Feb. 1, 1947).
18. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/11, at 1 (Jan. 31, 1947).
19. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2 (Jan. 8, 1947). This Declaration was submitted by the
delegation of Chile.
20. Id. at 7. A commentary on this article may be found in COMMISSION TO STUDY
THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, DRAr DECLARATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS AND
DUTIES OF MAN AND ACCOMPANYING REPORT 40-41 (1946). It must be noted that, as in
this article, the word "arbitrary" was used in most of the arrest and detention articles
in contemporary draft declarations. It had been used, as we saw, in the draft declara-
tion submitted by Panama at San Francisco and at the first session of the Council;
see supra notes 6-8. Cuba had used it in its "Declaration" submitted at the first session
of the Council; see supra notes 9-10. "Freedom from arbitrary arrest" was also used in
a draft declaration submitted by the American Federation of Labor; see U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/AC.1/3/Add.1, at 46 (June 2, 1947). See also art. 1 in H. LAUTERPACHT, supra
note 4.
21. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.7-10, SR.13-14 (Jan. 31-Feb. 5, 1947).
22. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.10-12 (Feb. 3-4, 1947).
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bill, and the measures of implementation. 23
The Drafting Committee, entrusted by the Commission with the
preparation of a preliminary draft of an international bill of human
rights, had several proposals before it at its first session. Two ap-
proaches were suggested with regard to the drafting of an article on
arrest and detention. The Secretariat draft24 and the United States
draft2 both referred to rights against "arbitrary arrest" and "unau-
thorized arrest" while the United Kingdom 2 enumerated several spe-
cific exceptions to the "no deprivation of liberty" rule in a detailed
article. The beginning of what was later to become an almost bitter
dispute between those who preferred a general article and those who
advocated an article with enumerated exceptions was already in the
air, but a head-on collision of the two approaches was avoided, at
least for the time being, by the utilization of both approaches for
different purposes. Thus, while the "general" approach may have
been the inspiration behind the arrest and detention article in the
proposed draft Declaration, 27 the more detailed articles in the United
Kingdom draft formed the basis for a general examination of the
possible substantive contents of a draft Convention.
2
1
The Drafting Committee decided to submit the United Kingdom
draft as a working paper for a Convention, which the Commission
might wish to consider and elaborate. 29 Accordingly, Article 10 of the
United Kingdom draft was incorporated as Article 4 in Annex G
("Draft Articles on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to be
considered for inclusion in a Convention") of the Report of the First
Session of the Drafting Committee
2 0
23. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.14-16 (Feb. 5-6, 1947).
24. The text of arts. 5, 6, and 7 may be found in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3, at 2-
4 (1947). For a documented outline of these articles, which includes comments and
proposals made at the first session of the Commission and related provisions in Consti-
tutions of member States, see U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3/ Add.l, at 25-58 (1947).
25. U.S. art. 7 read: "No one shall be subiected to arbitrary or unauthorized arrest
or detention." For text of arts. 6 and 7 proposed by the United States, see U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/AC.1/8, at 1-2, and Rev. 1, at 1 (June 11-19, 1947).
26. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/4, at 9-10 (June 5, 1947). It was pointed out by the
U.K. representative that the U.K. draft articles did not represent the final views of
his Government but were merely intended as a basis of discussion. U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.10, at 7 (June 20, 1947).
27. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the First Session of the Drafting
Committee, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/21, Annex F, art. 8, at 73, 74-75 (July 1, 1947).
28. Id. at 4-5, paras. 14, 18.
29. Report, supra note 27, at 5, para. 18. Eleanor Roosevelt, as Chairperson,
pointed out that, with regard to the U.K. draft, there had been general approval in
principle only. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.11, at 14-15 (July 3, 1947).
30. Report, supra note 27, at 82, 83.
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B. The Opening of Pandora's Box: The Second Session of the Com-
mission (1947)
The Working Party on the Convention appointed by the Com-
mission considered, as the basis of its work, Annex G of the Report
of the First Session of the Drafting Committee. As the United States
was not represented on the Working Party, it was decided that its 18-
article "Proposal for a Human Rights Convention" be presented and
explained, on its behalf, by an observer31
The United States "Proposal" included a two sentence article on
arrest and detention that began with the provision that "No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention." 2 The United Kingdom,
on the other hand, suggested additions to what was already a detailed
Article 4 of the Drafting Committee's draft Convention.
3
1
The text of Article 8,31 dealing with arrest and detention pro-
posed by the Working Party, adopted both the "arbitrary arrest"
sentence of the United States and the enumeration of exceptions as
originally proposed by the United Kingdom. This article, which was
probably the first article on arrest and detention ever to be drafted
by an international group, with resulting legal obligations in mind,
foreshadowed Article 5 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.1
5
31. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Working Party on the
Convention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/56, at 3, para. 4 (Dec. 11, 1947). The U.S. "Proposal"
is in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/37 (Nov. 26, 1947).
32. Art. 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/37, at 4 (1947).
33. Among them was the proposal to add the provision that "no person shall be
convicted of, or punished for, crime save by judgment of a competent tribunal and in
conformity with the law." Other additions related to "fair trial" provisions. See para.
2 of U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/39 (Nov. 26, 1947).
34. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/56, at 7-8. The relevant first two paragraphs of the five-
paragraph art. 8 proposed by the Working Party provided:
1. No person shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention;
2. No person shall be deprived of his liberty save in the case of:
(a) the arrest of a person effected for the purpose of bringing
him before a court on a reasonable suspicion of having committed
a crime or which is reasonably considered to be immediately
necessary to prevent his committing a crime;
(b) the lawful arrest and detention of a person for noncompli-
ance with the lawful order or decree of a court;
(c) the lawful detention of a person sentenced after conviction
to deprivation of liberty;
(d) the lawful detention of persons of unsound mind;
(e) the parental or quasi-parental custody of minors;
(f) the lawful arrest and detention of a person to prevent his
effecting an unauthorized entry into the country;
(g) the lawful arrest and detention of aliens against whom de-
portation proceedings are pending.
35. For text of art. 5 of the European Convention, see EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF
VOL. 3:153
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With regard to the first paragraph, the adoption of the "arbitrary
arrest" sentence by the Working Party is significant. This was the
first occasion when the word "arbitrary" was discussed in connection
with an arrest or detention article. Although, as we saw, "arbitrary
arrest" had been used in several international bills of human rights
submitted to the Council and the Commission, 36 it had never been
debated earlier. Equally important was the fact that the Working
Party adopted the word "arbitrary" in preference to "unlawful."
The acceptance in principle of the need for a second paragraph
to contain exceptions to the right against arrest seems to have opened
a Pandora's box. Discussions on the arrest and detention article in
the Working Party were dominated by several proposals to include
more, or modify existing, limitations.3 7 In the final text of Article 8,
the Working Party suggested a list of seven exceptions. 38 There were,
however, already some doubts that a list of exceptions could be ex-
haustive.
3 9
The active cooperation of the U.S. observer, Plaine, stands out
as the most noteworthy feature in the discussions of the Working
Party in the formulation of the exceptions. 0 Later on, as we will see,
the United States strongly opposed the enumeration of exceptions.
On December 13, 1947, when Article 8 of the Draft of the Work-
ing Party on the Convention was considered by the Commission,
41
Malik, Rapporteur of the Working Party, explained that paragraph
2 was "certainly not intended to be exhaustive. It represented the
restrictions which had occurred to members of the Working Group,
and representatives were free to suggest others based on the internal
HUMAN RIGHTS, DOCUMENTS AND/ET DECISIONS 8-11 (1955-57). The European Conven-
tion may also be found in 213 U.N.T.S. 221; UNITED NATIONS YEARBOOK ON HUMAN
RIGHTS FOR 1950, at 418 (1952); and in 45 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 24 (1951). Generally
speaking, and keeping in mind the deletion of "arbitrary" in the European Convention,
it might be fair to remark that art. 8 of the Working Party on the Convention antici-
pated art. 5 of the European Convention. Compare particularly the enumerated excep-
tions to the right against arrest and detention in both articles.
36. See supra note 20. See also the earlier discussion of drafts before the first
session of the Drafting Committee.
37. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.3/SR.6, at 10-15; SR.7, at 2; and SR.9, at 3-5 (Dec.
9-10, 1948).
38. For these exceptions, see text of para. 2, in supra note 34.
39. See, e.g., the comment of the Egyptian representative in U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/AC.3/SR.6, at 13 (1948).
40. Plaine suggested "parental custody of minors" to replace "lawful custody of
minors," a proposal which, with an addition, was accepted. U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/AC.3/SR.6, at 12-13 (1948). At the ninth meeting, he suggested the addition
of a limitation to cover the case of civil arrest. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.3/SR.9, at
3-4 (1948).
41. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.36, at 6-8 (Dec. 13, 1947).
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laws of their countries." 2 The representative of the Soviet Union,
however, opposed the enumeration of exceptions on the ground that
they were the subject of different legislation in each country and that
the Commission was not empowered to take any decision regarding
them.13 Chile was also of the view that it was unwise to make too
many exceptions which might render the text valueless. 44 The United
States, on the other hand, agreed to the text of Article 8, but for a
minor reservation on the sufficiency of one of the limitations to cover
all cases of civil arrest, and endorsed paragraph 2. 45 Subject to a
minor modification, France also seemed to agree with paragraph 2.46
While in the Commission, therefore, there was some reaction to
paragraph 2, paragraph 1 containing the word "arbitrary" escaped
criticism. Article 8, as recommended by the Working Party on Con-
vention, was adopted by 11 votes to 0, with 7 abstentions47 and was
incorporated as Article 9 in the draft Convention proposed by the
second session of the Commission.8
C. The Draftsmen's Dilemma: Brevity versus the "Limitations"
(1948-1952)
1. Plethora of Limitations: The Second Session of the Drafting
Committee
In response to the request by the Secretary-General,49 several
governments submitted their comments on the draft Convention pro-
posed by the second session of the Commission.
From these comments on Article 9, it was clear that the biggest
issue likely to emerge before this session would relate to the "limita-
tions" in paragraph 2. While previous drafting stages had seen no
42. Id. at 7.
43. Id. at 4.
44. Id. at 6.
45. Id. at 7. The reservation was regarding 2(b) of art. 8 which the United States
felt did not adequately cover all cases of civil arrest.
46. Id. at 6. Cassin suggested that the word "crime" in 2(a) be changed to "crimi-
nal offense." With this change, he pointed out, the article will cover minor offenses.
47. Id. at 8.
48. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Second Session, 6 ESCOR,
Supp. 1, U.N. Doc. E/600, Annex B, Part I, at 26 (1948). See also comments on art. 9
in Annex B, Part II, at 32; Uruguay felt that the text should be drafted in a less detailed
form. India suggested an addition to paragraph 2(b). The United States repeated its
reservation made before the Commission; see supra note 45.
For an appraisal of the work of the second session of the Commission, see Hen-
drick, An International Bill of Human Rights, 18 DEP'T STATE BULL. 195, 208 (1948);
and Lockwood, Drafts of International Covenants and Declaration on Human Rights,
42 AM. J. INT'L L. 401-05 (1948). Lockwood concludes that the principles in the Cove-
nant covered the right not to be deprived of one's life or liberty without due process of
law. Id. at 402.
49. Report of the Second Session, supra note 48, at 3-4, para. 13.
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more than a general discussion on this issue, the second session of the
Drafting Committee was to witness the first detailed articulation of
the two opposing points of view regarding the desirability of enumer-
ating limitations.
The difficulty in drafting a list of limitations acceptable to all
the parties was already becoming apparent. While some governments
suggested additions 50 to the already long list adopted at the second
session of the Commission, others pointed out several of their na-
tional laws that allowed arrests and detentions in cases not seemingly
covered by paragraph 2. 5' The result was that as many as 40 suggested
limitations were before the Drafting Committee.
Anticipating the inherent difficulties in the formulation of an
exhaustive list of limitations, there gradually evolved, under the lead-
ership of the United States, opposition to the enumeration of excep-
tions in the article. Commenting generally on the draft Covenant in
its reply to the Secretary-General, the United States had argued that
"the attempt to define in detail all the limitations permissible under
each article is unnecessary and probably impossible '5 2 and pointed
out that "technological developments, whose nature cannot be fore-
cast in any way, are bound to arise . . . . [elven existing contingen-
cies cannot all be mapped out . . . . [tihe only type of document
on which general agreement can possibly be secured is one of a gen-
eral nature. '53 Accordingly, the article proposed by the United States
did not contain any limitations. Instead, it provided that "no one




In the Drafting Committee,55 reacting against the possibility of
a too detailed and yet possibly an inexhaustive list of limitations,
Chile, China and the Soviet Union joined the United States in oppos-
ing the enumeration of exceptions. Favoring the principle of enumer-
ating limitations were Malik (Lebanon) and Wilson (United King-
50. See, e.g., replies of the Netherlands, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/82/Rev. 1, at 9 (1948);
Brazil, id. Add.2, at 9; and Norway, id. Add.5.
51. See, e.g., replies of South Africa, id. Add.4, at 14; Norway, id. Add.5; and
Sweden, id. Add.11, at 2.
52. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/82/Rev.1, at 20 (1948).
53. Id. at 21.
54. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.23, at 5 (May 10, 1948); and U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/AC.1/19, at 9 (May 3, 1948). The approach against enumerating exceptions
was also adopted in a contemporary draft prepared by Professor H. Lauterpacht,
Human Rights, The Charter of the United Nations, and the International Bill of Rights
of Man, and presented to the International Law Association, Brussels Conference,
1948. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/89, at 35, 37 (May 12, 1948). See also H. LAUTERPACHT,
AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 70, 93-97 (1945).
55. The arrest and detention article was discussed at three meetings of the Draft-
ing Committee, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.23, at 4-9; SR.30, at 6-7; and SR.32, at
11-13 (May 10-26, 1948).
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dom) who felt that, in the absence of enumerated restrictions, States
may arrogate to themselves the widest possible powers over the indi-
vidual. They felt that the Drafting Committee should concern itself
less with brevity and more with precision. 58 The preference for this
approach was also implicit in the texts of articles proposed by
France51 and New Zealand."8
The Drafting Committee, therefore, was faced with, on the one
hand, proposals to delete the limitations and, on the other hand,
equally forceful suggestions that they be retained. However, even
those who wanted to enumerate exceptions did not seem to be able
to agree on an acceptable list of limitations. Attempts at compromise
seem to have failed and the Drafting Committee was at a dead-end.59
Helplessly, therefore, the Drafting Committee, unable to take any
decisions on this issue, had to refer the whole matter to the Commis-
sion. 60 Forwarded to the Commission were:'
(a) a slightly amended text of Article 9 originally forwarded by the
second session of the Commission,
(b) a list of limitations before the Drafting Committee,
(c) the text proposed by the United States and
(d) the text proposed by the Soviet Union. The Drafting Committee did
indicate, however, that it preferred the Commission text.2
While the deadlock on the issue of limitations may be the most
notorious aspect of the second session of the Drafting Committee,
another potentially explosive issue, which was soon to dominate the
entire debates on this article, began to shape up. The United King-
dom had proposed the deletion of paragraph 1 of the Commission text
on the ground that the word "arbitrary" was "imprecise, indefinite
and vague" and, as such, did not add anything to the rest of the
article . 3 It was also pointed out that, while such a "subjective" word
might be suitable for a Declaration, it was totally inappropriate for
a Covenant. 4 Although, during the debates of the Drafting Commit-
tee, active opposition to the word "arbitrary" came forth only from
the United Kingdom, it must be noted here that none of the several
alternate texts for Article 9 submitted at this session contained the
word "arbitrary." The texts proposed by France 65 and New Zealand 6
56. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.23, at 4-6 (1948).
57. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/82/Add.8, at 9-10 (1948).
58. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/82/Add.12, at 11-12 (1948).
59. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.32, at 11-13 (1948).
60. Id. at 13.
61. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Second Session of the Drafting
Committee, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/95, Annex B, art. 9, at 20-26 (May 21, 1948).
62. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/95, at 20 (1948).
63. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.23, at 4 (1948).
64. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/82/Add.4, at 3-4 (1948).
65. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/82/Add.8, at 9-10 (1948).
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contained the limitations but omitted paragraph 1. The shorter arti-
cles of the United States 7 and the Soviet Union"8 also avoided "arbi-
trary."
Yet, the formal proposal to delete paragraph 1 was resisted by
the representatives of Lebanon and Chile on the ground that it con-
tained the central idea of the article.69 Malik felt that "arbitrary" was
the most important word in the entire article and preferred it to "due
process of law" because under the latter the "notion of law was left
entirely to the subjective interpretation of the state."7 0 When put to
a vote, paragraph 1 of the Commission text was adopted by a vote of
four to none, with two abstentions. 7' Thus, by the time Article 9 had
been discussed before the second session of the Drafting Committee
and was referred to the Commission, both the issues of "arbitrary"
and "limitations" were ripe for exploitation.
72
2. The Triumph of Brevity: The Fifth Session of the Commis-
sion
When the first two paragraphs of Article 973 were discussed at the
fifth session of the Commission, 7  three principal approaches were
suggested and debated:
66. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/82/Add.12, at 11-12 (1948).
67. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/19, at 9 (1948); and U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.23,
at 5 (1948).
68. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/31 (1948).
69. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC-1/SR.23, at 4-7 (1948). See also statement of Malik
quoted at U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.23, at 4 (May 10, 1948).
70. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.23, at 6 (1948).
71. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.23, at 7 (1948).
72. It has been remarked that the principal issue raised at, and left unresolved
by, the second session of the Drafting Committee, related to "limitations." Numerous
limitations each were suggested for several articles, including the one on arrest and
detention. For a discussion of the controversy over short or detailed articles at this
session, see Hendrick, Progress Report on Human Rights, 19 DFP'T STATE BULL. 159,
160-62 (1948); Simsarian, Third Session of United Nations Commission on Human
Rights, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 879, 881-32 (1948).
73. As the third session of the Commission did not consider the draft Convention
proposed in Annex B of the Report of the Second Session of the Drafting Committee,
supra note 61, this draft Convention, unamended, was incorporated in Annex B of the
Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Third Session, 7 ESCOR, Supp. 2, U.N.
Doc. E/800, at 12 (1948). Regarding art. 9, see id. at 15-20. The draft Convention was
also not considered at the fourth session; this time, however, it was not included in
the Commission's Report of the Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. E/1315 (Apr. 15, 1949). The
fifth session, therefore, had before it the draft Convention as incorporated in the
Commission's Report of the Third Session.
74. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.95 and SR.96 (May 31-June 1, 1949). Amendments
relevant to paras. 1 and 2 are in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/170 and Add.4, 188, 203, 206, 231,
and 235 (May 6-23, 1949). Recapitulation of some of these amendments may be found
in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/212 (May 19, 1949).
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(a) deletion of paragraph 1 with "arbitrary" and the retention of the
limitations;
(b) retention of both "arbitrary" and the "limitations";
(c) adoption of a short article with "arbitrary" and without the limita-
tions.
Although it was the third approach that was eventually adopted at
this session, this choice did not come easily to the Commission.
a. The "Arbitrary Arrest" Paragraph
While opposition to this paragraph by the United Kingdom could
have by now been anticipated, what may have surprised some was
the change of heart in the Lebanese position. 5 It was Malik who, as
we noted, championed the retention of this paragraph before the
second session of the Drafting Committee. Now, he preferred to do
without it. He pointed out that the law could not be its own master
in deciding what was just, and that, by the use of the word "arbi-
trary," Article 9 to some extent established a law above the law."6
Members supporting the retention77 of paragraph I contested this
"law above the law" interpretation of "arbitrary" and pointed out
that "arbitrary" could have "no other meaning but that of non-
compliance with the law,"78 that it "had an exact legal meaning and
offered sufficient guarantee against any illegal arrest, ' 79 that it un-
doubtedly meant "contrary to the law"8 and "illegal."', Sensing the
majority feeling in favor of paragraph 1 and perhaps in the hope that
both "arbitrary" and "limitations" could be incorporated in the final
article, the representatives of Lebanon and United Kingdom joined
in the unanimous adoption of paragraph 1.82
75. Para. 1 was omitted in texts of art. 9 submitted by the U.K., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/188 (1949), and Lebanon, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/206 (1949). Representatives of
both these countries also initially opposed this paragraph at the meeting held on May
20, 1949, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.95, at 2-4 (1949).
76. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.95, at 5 (1949).
77. Representatives of India, Egypt, United States, Philippines, France, Guate-
mala, and Soviet Union, for example, made express statements in favor of para. 1. See
id. at 3-6. The paragraph was also included in a new text proposed by Australia. Id.
at 4. Yet, in the Report of this session of the Commission, Australia and France are
listed as having joined Denmark, Lebanon and the U.K. in opposing para. 1. See
Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Fifth Session, 9 ESCOR, Supp. 10 U.N.
Doc. E/1371, Annex II, at 31-33 (1949).
78. From remarks of Mehta (India), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.95, at 3 (1949).
79. From remarks of Eleanor Roosevelt, id.
80. From remarks of Cassin (France), id. at 5.
81. From remarks of Pavlov (Soviet Union), id. at 6. Representatives of Guate-
mala and Philippines also agreed that "arbitrary" meant "illegal" or "contrary to the
law" was "unrealistic" and "not universally accepted." Id. at 5-6.
82. Id. at 7.
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b. Retention of both "Arbitrary" and the "Limitations"
Initially favored by Australia and France, 3 this approach was
formally put forth in a text proposed by Belgium. The formula pro-
posed in this Belgian text was that after providing that "no one shall
be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention," the article should enu-
merate the limitations which "shall be deemed to be arbitrary and
therefore prohibited. '84 Although both the United States and the
Soviet Union received this proposal favorably, 5 the problem of for-
mulating an exhaustive list of exceptions seems to have obscured the
attractiveness of this approach. An opportunity to define "arbitrary
arrest and detention" presented at this session was, therefore, passed.
c. The Limitations
Conscious of the fact that the "yet incomplete" list of limitations
before the second session of the Drafting Committee had included
about 40 exceptions, the United States realized that it would be
difficult to formulate a concise, exhaustive and acceptable set of
exceptions. It, therefore, recommended that a short article, providing
against "arbitrary arrest" but without the limitations, be adopted.86
Eleanor Roosevelt pointed out that the presence of the word "arbi-
trary" made a list of exceptions quite unnecessary. 7
The opposite point of view, regarding the necessity of including
the limitations, was advocated by the representatives of the United
Kingdom, Lebanon, France, Denmark and Australia." They felt that
Article 9 would not be complete without a full list of exceptions.
Addressing herself to the criticism that it would be impossible to
formulate an unwieldy and exhaustive list, Bowie (United Kingdom)
pointed out that the list proposed by her delegation had not only
reduced the exceptions to a reasonable number, but that it also "cov-
ered the vast majority of cases in which an individual could justly be
deprived of his liberty," including all exceptions brought up before
the second session of the Drafting Committee. 8
83. Id. at 4-5.
84. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/235.
85. Eleanor Roosevelt felt that this proposal might provide the means of finding
a solution to the various approaches suggested at this session. U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SR.96, at 5. Pavlov found the proposal "interesting," but while the Belgian
representative pointed out that it was essential that the list of limitations be "exhaus-
tive," Pavlov was prepared only to accept it as illustrative. Id. at 7.
86. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/170/Add.4, at 1.
87. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.95, at 9. Garcia Bauer (Guatemala) was of the same
view. See id. at 8.
88. See generally their statements in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.95 and SR.96. See
also the U.K. and Lebanese alternative texts of art. 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/188 and U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/206, respectively. Related is the Belgian proposal, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/235.
All these alternate texts enumerated the exceptions under 7-8 subclauses.
89. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.95, at 9 and SR.96, at 5.
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After considerable controversy and despite some severe opposi-
tion, the Commission finally not only adopted the "arbitrary arrest"
paragraph, but also voted the "limitations" out. 0 The representa-
tives of Australia, Denmark, France, Lebanon and the United King-
dom, however, joined to record their "minority position"', against the
Commission decisions.
The issue of "limitations" and the use of the word "arbitrary"
at the fifth session also aroused considerable interest among commen-
tators outside the Commission. Hersch Lauterpacht, after a penetrat-
ing survey of the disadvantages of excessive elaboration, strongly
favored the exclusion of limitations and urged the adoption of a
briefer article with the word "arbitrary."92 It was generally conceded
that the drafting of the article on arrest and detention was one of the
most difficult tasks faced by the Commission. 3
The acceptance of the word "arbitrary" by the Commission was
explained as a compromise between the positions taken by the United
States and the United Kingdom. 4 "Arbitrary" was generally under-
stood to mean "due process of law,"9" and it was pointed out that it
should provide an effective safeguard against bad and oppressive
laws."
3. Another Unsuccessful Attempt to Include the Limitations:
The Sixth Session of the Commission
In the Commission, another attempt was made to broaden the
participation in the drafting of the Covenant by inviting comments
90. The text of 1 and 2 of art. 9 adopted at this session:
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.
2. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and
in accordance with such procedure as established by law.
In favor: Chile, China, Guatemala, India, Iran, Philippines, Ukraine, Soviet
Union, United States and Yugoslavia.
Against: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Egypt, France and U.K.
See, Report of the Fifth Session of the Commission, 9 ESCOR, Supp. 10, U.N. Doc.
E/1371, Annex I, at 19 (1949).
91. The "minority position" will be found in id., Annex II, at 31-33. For an effec-
tive refutation of the "minority position" and of the "minority" article, see H. LAuTER-
PACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTs 327-33 (1950). See particularly id., at
328-29 n.6.
92. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 91, at 314, 327-33.
93. See Simsarian, supra note 72, at 780.
94. C. MALIK, THE COVENANT ON HUMAN RIGHTs 7-8 (1949).
95. Holcombe, The Covenant on Human Rights, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 418
(1949); E. FERNANDO, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 17 (1948). But see
Simsarian, supra note 72.
96. See Fawcett, A British View of the Covenant, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 438,
442-43 (1949). C. MALIK, supra note 94, at 8, seems to admit that "arbitrary" limits
the freedom of action of governments.
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of governments on the draft prepared at its fifth session." Of the
twelve governments" that responded to the Secretary-General's let-
ter, nine had some comments on Article 9, and as was expected, many
of these related to its paragraphs 1 and 2."
The governments, it will be recalled, had before them not only
the short text of paragraphs 1 and 2 adopted at the fifth session, but
a "minority text," detailed with limitations, proposed by the repre-
sentatives of Australia, Denmark, France, Lebanon and the United
Kingdom at that session. The comments received from the govern-
ments indicated that while the United Kingdom'" would continue to
feel strongly about the inclusion of the limitations, Denmark', and
France 0 2 might reconcile themselves to a shorter article. Although the
United Kingdom must have been disheartened by this "defection,"
it probably found some comfort in the support for the "minority text"
by the Philippines, '03 particularly when, at the fifth session, the Phil-
ippine representative had supported the United States position
against the limitations. 0 Also, a statement of preference for the
"minority text" came forth from the Government of Norway.'"0
But when paragraphs 1 and 2 were considered at the sixth ses-
sion,'10 any real "comfort" that the representatives of the United
Kingdom might have sought, they probably found in the most elo-
quent support for the limitations by Malik (Lebanon). Realizing,
perhaps, that they were outnumbered, Bowie and Hoare (later Sir
Samuel Hoare) of the United Kingdom and Malik joined to make a
most determined effort to have the limitations incorporated. If sheer
97. See Report of the Fifth Session of the Commission, supra note 90, at 7-8, para.
16.
98. Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom, Philippines, Israel, Yugosla-
via, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, India, Australia, and Norway. U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/353 and Add. 1-11 (Dec. 29, 1949-Apr. 22, 1950). Besides the Netherlands,
Israel and Norway, all the other governments were represented on the Commission.
Thus the objective of broadening the participation base, through comments of govern-
ments, may not have been all that successful at this date.
99. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/365, at 30-32 (Mar. 22, 1950) and U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/353/Add.10, at 7 (1950), and Add.ll, at 1.
100. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/365, at 30 (1950).
101. Id. at 31.
102. Id. at 32.
103. Id. at 30-31.
104. For the Philippine position at the fifth session see U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.96,
at 9 (1950).
105. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.144, at 9-17; SR.146, at 3-15; SR. 147, at 3-12; and
SR.154, at 6-7 (Apr. 12-21, 1950). Relevant documents and proposals at this session;
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/397, 400, 401, 402, 405, 405/Rev.1, and 409 (Apr. 3-5, 1950).
106. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.144, at 9-17; SR.146, at 3-15; SR.147, at 3-12; and
SR.154, at 6-7 (Apr. 12-21, 1950). Relevant documents and proposals at this session:
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/397, 400, 401, 402, 405, 405/Rev.1, and 409 (Apr. 3-5, 1950).
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unrelenting determination and effort were the sole arbiters of success,
the victory, perhaps, should have been theirs, but they lost primarily
because they could not convince the other members of the Commis-
sion that it was possible to draft a comprehensive, exhaustive and
universally acceptable list of limitations.
Dissatisfaction with lists of limitations, a perennial problem, was
not confined to only those members who, on principle, favored a short
article. Even those who favored the inclusion of a list of limitations
found it difficult to agree on any one list. Thus, both the United
Kingdom 0 7 and the Philippines 18 sought to amend the "minority
text" by suggesting some modifications and additions to the list in
that article.
The United States, leading the opposition against the limita-
tions, 0 9 argued that no list could be complete as it is "scarcely possi-
ble to foresee all possible exceptions." ' 0 Concern was also expressed
that the enumeration of exceptions would turn the Covenant "into a
document of limitations rather than a document of freedoms.""'
While the difficulties in formulating a list of limitations provided
the main argument for those who favored a short article, on the posi-
tive side these "generalists" pointed out that the word "arbitrary" in
paragraph 1 of the Commission text constituted a real safeguard
against arbitrary action. Most of these representatives interpreted
"arbitrary" to include the idea of "injustice" and argued that, as
such, it was an effective deterrent against any possibility of abuse."'
When all these proposals regarding deletion of "arbitrary," re-
tention of limitations, and the merging of the first two paragraphs
were voted upon on April 5, 1950, they were rejected most deci-
sively."' Adopted by substantial majorities were paragraphs 1 and 2
as recommended by the fifth session of the Commission." '
Thus, despite concerted efforts by some delegations to change
107. For change suggested by the United Kingdom, see U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/397
(1950).
108. The position of the Philippines is to be found in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/365, at
30-31 (1950).
109. The U.S. position on limitations at this session may be found in its memoran-
dum on the subject, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/401 (1950), and in statements of Mrs. Roosev-
elt, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.144, at 10-11, paras. 42-44; SR.146, at 3; and SR.147, at 7,
paras. 22-23 (1950).
110. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/401, at 2 (1950).
111. Id. at 1.
112. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.144, at 14, para. 57; SR. 146, at 10, 12, paras.
32, 42; SR.147, at paras. 24-25 (1950). Those opposed to "arbitrary," on the other hand,
were unable to agree that it provided any real safeguards against abuse. See, e.g.,
statement of Whitlam (Australia), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.146, at 14, para. 54 (1950).
113. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.147, at 9 (1950).
114. Id. at 9-10.
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paragraphs 1 and 2 as adopted at the fifth session of the Commission,
the sixth session rejected all proposals to delete, modify or elaborate
these paragraphs and adopted instead, by substantial majority, the
text of these paragraphs as recommended by the fifth session. It dealt
what was, perhaps, the most decisive defeat to the "enumeration-
ists."
While this defeat of the "enumerationists" could be explained,
as has been noted previously, by the growing realization that if limi-
tations were listed, it would be impossible to be concise and exhaus-
tive, it must also be emphasized here that on the positive side, the
word "arbitrary" seemed to many to provide against the kind of
abuses that the "enumerationists" sought to prevent by the listing of
limitations. It was thus clear that the fate of the limitations was
inextricably tied up with the interpretation of the word "arbitrary."" 5
Accordingly, when paragraph 1 was adopted, the representatives of
Greece, the United States, Chile, India and France explained that
they had voted for it on "the clear understanding that the word
'arbitrary' conveyed the idea of injustice.""' 6 It was pointed out that
the word "arbitrary" had been "purposely chosen in order to cover
all possible cases in which an arrest or detention should not take
place.""
7
In response to the criticism that "arbitrary" was vague, and
following the opinion of the representative of Uruguay that the word
"essentially meant 'illegal' and did not necessarily include the idea
of 'injustice',""' s Eleanor Roosevelt, as Chairperson, suggested that
the Commission formally record its opinion that "'arbitrary' meant
both 'illegal' and 'unjust'.""19 Unfortunately, this was not done and
the Commission lost an excellent opportunity to resolve, unequivo-
cally, that the word "arbitrary" meant more than "illegal." Had the
Commission acted on Roosevelt's suggestion, the drafting history of
the article on arrest and detention would have been much less com-
plicated and the unending discussions regarding the vagueness of the
word "arbitrary" that followed in the future could have been avoided.
115. In this connection, see U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.147, at 3-12 (1950). The Greek
representative, for example, inquired if Lebanon would withdraw its text with limita-
tions if the words "and unjust" were added after the word "arbitrary" in paragraph 1.
Malik preferred not to withdraw his amendment but agreed that the suggestion of the
Greek representative "would certainly considerably improve the original text; it would
be better to say 'or unjust.' " Id. at 8, paras. 29-30.
116. Id. at 9-10, paras. 36-37, 41-42.
117. Id. at 11, para. 51. [Emphasis added.]
118. Id. at 10, para. 39.
119. Id. at para. 43.
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4. A Post-Mortem of the Draft Commission Article: Reactions
of the International Community
The article on arrest and detention adopted at the sixth session
of the Commission was not further revised until the eighth session of
the Commission. But between these two sessions, the Covenant was
reviewed generally by the Council and the General Assembly.
When, during the eleventh session of the Council, its Social
Committee considered the draft Covenant in detail, 20 it marked the
first opportunity when the provisions of the Covenant were discussed
by an international body other than the Commission. So far, the
drafting of the Covenant had been the primary concern of the 18-
member Commission and, although on a few occasions the Commis-
sion had sought to widen the participation in such drafting by invit-
ing comments of governments, the Social Committee afforded the
first chance for some members of the United Nations, not represented
on the Commission, to comment on the various provisions of the
Covenant before a United Nations committee. In addition to the
governments of Australia, Belgium, Chile, China, Denmark, France,
India, the United Kingdom and the United States, which were repre-
sented on the Commission, the Social Committee also had repre-
sented on it the governments of Brazil, Canada, Iran, Mexico, Paki-
stan and Peru. The participation in the drafting of the Covenant was,
therefore, gradually widening.
In the Social Committee, while several other articles were singled
out for severe criticism, Article 6 seems to have escaped much hostil-
ity. Of course, the word "arbitrary" troubled some delegates. Bel-
gium, 12' Canada 112 and the United Kingdom- u objected to it for lack-
ing precise meaning and for its inability to provide any protection
against abuses. To the United States, however, the word was "per-
fectly well understood" and was "unlikely to be misinterpreted.'
'2
Brohi (Pakistan) thought that it would be easy to define the expres-




The justification for general articles, in view of the fact that it
was sometimes impossible to arrive at complete definitions, was also
120. Meetings of the Social Committee generally relevant were: U.N. Doc.
E/AC.7/SR.146-149 and SR.153, at 16-19 (Aug. 3-14, 1950).
121. U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR.147, at 9 (1950). The ambiguity of "arbitrary" was also
referred to by the World Jewish Congress. See U.N. Doc. E/C.2/259/Add.1, at 4 (July
19, 1950).
122. U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR.148, at 13 (1950). Agreeing with the Canadian delegate
was Sen of India, U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR.149, at 6 (1950).
123. U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR.148, at 4-5.
124. U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR.153, at 16. See also U.N. Doc. E/AC.17/SR.148, at 17.
125. U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR.148, at 10.
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pointed out by France' 2 and the United States.'2 7 Defending the sub-
stantive provisions of the Covenant as drafted by the Commission,
Cates (United States) explained that the Commission
had to reconcile at least three different legal systems; that of the Euro-
pean continent, based on a detailed code of law; that of the United
Kingdom, which rested largely on precedent; and that of the United
States of America and certain other countries which was founded on
certain broad basic principles subject to interpretation. Failure to meet
all the views of any particular delegation did not mean that the draft
Covenant was ineffective; it was admittedly a compromise, representing
the widest possible area of agreement." '
Thus, while even those who strongly supported "arbitrary" im-
plied that the drafted article was not perfect but the best compromise
possible, what must have gratified the drafters of Article 6 was the
limited nature of the criticisms made against this article in the Social
Committee.
The draft Covenant, after the rigorous drafting sessions in the
Commission, in its drafting committees and subcommittees and
working groups, and after this rather general study by the Council,
was next presented to the larger international community repre-
sented in the General Assembly. Although the principal legal systems
may have been adequately represented in the earlier drafting efforts,
this was the first occasion when the provisions of the Covenant were
discussed before a body representing all the countries which were, at
that time, members of the United Nations. The importance of the
reactions of the General Assembly, therefore, could hardly be exag-
gerated. ,
29
When given the chance to express their views, only a handful of
delegates out of the 60-member Third Committee, declared, explic-
itly, their displeasure with the first two paragraphs of Article 6. '"1 The
representatives of the United Kingdom, Lebanon, New Zealand and
Yemen shared in common the anxiety over the inadequacy of the
definition of "arbitrary arrest." Some representatives expressed dis-
appointment with the first 18 articles of the Covenant on the ground
126. Id. at 15-17.
127. Id. at 17-18.
128. Id. at 17.
129. For a discussion on the "general adequacy of the first eighteen articles" in
the General Assembly, see 5 U.N. GAOR, Third Comm. 197-31 (1950). A good account
of the comments on paras. 1 and 2 of art. 6 in both the eleventh session of the Council
and in the fifth session of the General Assembly will be found in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/528,
at 38-40 (Apr. 2, 1950).
130. It must be pointed out that although sixty governments were represented on
the Third Committee, only about thirty participated in the four-meeting discussion
on the eighteen articles of the Covenant. See generally 5 U.N. GAOR Third Comm.
107-31 (1950).
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that they were imprecise and used vague words, 31 while others
pointed out that greater precision would be harmful as, with different
countries with different legal systems, undue rigidity may prevent
universal acceptance.1 3 1 Savut (Turkey) spoke for the latter group
when he emphasized that the Covenant should be drafted in "terms
sufficiently general and pliable to render it acceptable to all nations,
whatever their stage of development.
13 3
Another point that need be made in connection with the fifth
session of the General Assembly is that it was agreed that the draft
Covenant was "not a law-making agreement but simply an agree-
ment which declared already existing law' '3 4 and that in "drafting
the covenant no new rights were being established; the rights con-
cerned were already guaranteed in civilized countries. 1 3 5 Some dele-
gates went further and expressed disappointment that the first 18
articles guaranteed less than what constitutions of most countries
guaranteed to their peoples."' This is significant because it indicates
that the substantive provisions of the draft Covenant, including Arti-
cle 6, were accepted, generally speaking, as representing the mini-
mum "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
1'3 7
On the whole, however, the General Assembly found that the
first 18 articles of the Covenant needed improvement. It, therefore,
instructed the Commission to revise them by defining the rights and
the limitations contained in them with the "greatest possible preci-
sion."'
3
The invitation of the seventh session of the Commission to com-
ment on the draft Covenant, and the referral of the draft Covenant
to the General Assembly by the thirteenth session of the Council
provided another opportunity for the response of the international
community to Article 6. But on both these occasions, Article 6 ap-
131. See, e.g., comments of the Canadian delegate, id. at 112-113.
132. See remarks of the Ethiopian delegate, id. at 130. Other delegates who found
the first eighteen articles generally satisfactory included the representatives of the
United States and Egypt, id. at 109; Brazil, id. at 113; France, id. at 119; and El
Salvador, id. at 129.
133. Id. at 130.
134. See remarks of the U.K. delegate, id. at 108.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., remarks of Menon (India), id. at 129. Earlier, in the eleventh
session of the Council, Belgium had also criticized the draft Covenant on the ground
that it "was well below the average level of the constitutional law of Member States."
11 U.N. ESCOR 15 (1950).
137. See art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. See also in
this connection, Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International
Law, 41 Barr. Y.B. INT'L L. 275, 297-298 (1965-66).




pears to have been approved by default. Thus, from among the sev-
eral governments 39 and specialized agencies' that commented on
the draft Covenant, only two had specific observations on some as-
pects of Article 6 and even these did not concern the first two para-
graphs of the article.' Moreover, while the general debate at the
sixth session of the General Assembly was primarily concerned with
other issues of the Covenant, it also included several comments on
the first 18 articles. Most of these comments concerned either criti-
cism of the article on religion or proposals for additional civil and
political rights articles, and Article 6, it must be emphasized, was not
singled out for criticism. Generally, however, the necessity of a pre-
cise definition of rights and limitations emphasized at the fifth ses-
sion of the General Assembly, was again stressed at the sixth session
of the General Assembly.4 2
5. The Final Commission Article: The Eighth Session of the
Commission
We have noted the several opportunities made available to gov-
ernments and specialized agencies to comment on the arrest and
detention article drafted by the sixth session of the Commission. The
observations invited by the Secretary-General and the discussions in
the Council and the General Assembly had indicated that only a few
governments objected to the article on the ground that the term
"arbitrary arrest" was vague.' Particularly in view of the several
opportunities offered for criticism, the lack of a more significant pro-
test could fairly be interpreted as an implicit endorsement of the
article by the majority of the international community.
If there were any doubts as to such an interpretation of the reac-
tions of the international community, they were dispelled by the
139. See U.N. Doc. E/2059 and Add. 1-8 (July 26-Aug. 27, 1951).
140. See U.N. Doc. E/2057 and Add.1-5 (July 24-Aug. 27, 1951), and U.N. Doc.
E/2085/Add. 1, at 2 (1951).
141. See remarks of the Danish Government, U.N. Doc. E/2059/Add. 8, and those
of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. Doc. E/2085/Add. 1, at 2.
142. For the general debate on the draft Covenant held in the General Assembly's
Third Committee, see 6 U.N. GAOR, Third Comm. 77-105, 107-110, 113-150 (1951-52);
Report of the Third Committee, U.N. Doc. A/2112 (Feb. 3, 1952), 6 U.N. GAOR,
Annexes, Agenda Item 29, at 37 (1951-52). Of relevance is id., Sec. I1, at 39-44. Note
particularly the comments on the first eighteen articles, id. at 41, para. 24.
143. With regard to the "general adequacy of the first eighteen articles" and, in
particular, to the article on arrest and detention, drafted at the sixth session of the
Commission, a comprehensive account of the reactions of various governments and
specialized agencies, expressed between the sixth and eighth sessions of the Commis-
sion, will be found in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/528, at 38-42 (Apr. 2, 1951); U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/528/Add.1, at 14-16, 27-29 (Mar. 20, 1952) and U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/660 at 9, 11
(Apr. 9, 1952). These documents include comments made at the fifth and sixth sessions
of the General Assembly, at the eleventh thru thirteenth sessions of the Council and
at the seventh session of the Commission.
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eighth session of the Commission which adopted the article with the
term "arbitrary arrest" and without the limitations,"' and subse-
quently by the General Assembly which finally confirmed this deci-
sion of the Commission.'
For the arrest and detention article, the eighth session of the
Commission is perhaps the most important for several reasons. First,
the article drafted at the sixth session had, by now, been discussed
in the Council and in the General Assembly. The Commission, there-
fore, had the first opportunity at this session to take into account, in
drafting the article, the reactions of the international community.
Second, this was the final drafting session of the Commission with
regard to this article. Third, Article 9 of the Covenant adopted by the
General Assembly in 1966 is very similar46 to the one drafted at the
1952 session of the Commission.
During this session, when Article 6 was considered on May 28,
1952,147 the "enumerationists" staged what was their last effort to
have the limitations included in this article. Citing in their support
the resolution of the fifth session of the General Assembly, which
stressed the need for the "greatest possible precision" and obviously
encouraged by the developments in the Council of Europe, they fa-
vored a United Kingdom proposed amendment 4 ' which sought to
replace paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 6 with a new paragraph 1, with
limitations, similar to paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. The familiar arguments for and against
both "arbitrary arrest" and limitations which were raised in the Com-
mission on several occasions before were again repeated.149 Opposing
144. For the text of the arrest and detention article adopted at this session of the
Commission, see art. 8, in Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Eighth
Session, 14 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. 4 (E/2556), at 48 (1952). See also the relevant sum-
mary with regard to the adoption of this article, id. at 27-28, paras. 180-81.
145. See Report of the Third Committee, U.N. Doc. A/4045 (Dec. 9, 1958), 13 U.N.
GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item 32, at 6-10 (1958-59). See also art. 9 of the Covenant
as finally adopted by the General Assembly in 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966).
146. The only difference between art. 8 as adopted at the eighth session of the
Commission and the final art. 9 of the Covenant is in para. 5 where "unlawful arrest
or deprivation of liberty" was changed to "unlawful arrest or detention." See citations
in supra notes 144 and 145.
147. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.313, at 12-13; and SR.315, at 5-14 (May 28, 1952).
Documents at this session related to the "arbitrary arrest" paragraph were: U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/L.137 (May 19, 1952), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.183 (May 28, 1952), and U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/668/Add.3 (May 29, 1952). See also U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/NGO/39, at 3-4 (May
20, 1952).
148. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L. 137 (1952). This U.K. amendment with limitations,
was supported by Lebanon and Australia. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.314, at 8-10 (1952).
149. Of those who expressed an opinion on this subject, the following seems to be
the pattern of support for, and opposition to, the limitations at this session:
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the limitations, most delegates pointed out the impossibility of
drawing up an acceptable and exhaustive list of lawful exceptions to
the right to liberty.
A Polish amendment to the United Kingdom amendment was,
however, better received. Poland took the first two paragraphs of
Article 6 drafted at the sixth session of the Commission and joining
them as the second and third sentences, proposed a new paragraph 1
which read:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be de-
prived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedures as are established by law.'"
This paragraph accomplished the merging of paragraphs 1 and 2 into
one single paragraph, something that many members had suggested
earlier. But the opening sentence, taken from Article 3 of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, attempted to introduce something
new to the article and was resisted by a few members.
When voted upon, the first sentence of the Polish amendment
was adopted by 7-5, with 5 abstentions, the second sentence by 10-2,
with 5 abstentions and the third sentence by 10-2, with 5 absten-
tions. The Polish amendment to paragraph 1 and 2, as a whole, was
adopted by 7-6, with 4 abstentions.
1 51
With the adoption of the Polish paragraph 1, the "enumeration-
ists" lost in their final attempt to have the limitations in the article.
Having been defeated so many times, they gradually changed their
strategy. When the article next went through a drafting session in the
General Assembly in 1958, the attempt was no more to introduce
limitations, but mostly to define and qualify the term "arbitrary
arrest." 5 ' Already, this resignation seemed to be taking shape in
1952, for when the Report of the Eighth Session of the Commission
appeared, the "enumerationists" did not take the opportunity, as
they had done in the past, to register their strong protest against the
term "arbitrary arrest" used in Article 8 adopted at this session.515
D. The Commission Article: Relevant Developments (1952-1958)
Although the next drafting effort with regard to the article on
In favor: United Kingdom, Lebanon, and Australia.
Against: France, Poland, United States, Soviet Union, Chile, Yugosla-
via, and India.
See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.313, at 12-13 (1952); SR. 314, at 5-14.
150. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.183 (1952).
151. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.314, at 10-11 (1952).
152. See Report of the Third Committee, supra note 145, at 6-8.
153. See Report of the Eighth Session, supra note 144. Note that its Annex IV, at
63-64 has no comments on art. 8.
1973
176 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
arrest and detention (Article 8) was not to take place until 1958, there
are a few related developments between 1952 and 1958 that must be
noted. First is the renumbering of this article by the Commission. It
now became Article 9 in the draft Covenant completed at the tenth
session of the Commission. 154 The second concerns the several com-
ments on the draft Covenant received from various governments 55
and specialized agencies'56 in response to resolutions of the Council
57
and the General Assembly.' 8 Of these, only Australia, Canada, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom had any specific comments on
the first paragraph of Article 9. Australia,'59 the Netherlands'" and
the United Kingdom 6 1 found the term "arbitrary arrest" vague and
imprecise. The Canadian Government, on the other hand, appeared
reconciled with "arbitrary" but indicated that it would be helpful to
define it.162
An event of equal importance during this period concerns the
general discussion 3 on the draft Covenant during the ninth session
of the General Assembly. While this discussion was dominated by
such issues as the right to petition, self-determination, reservations,
federal and colonial clauses and measures of implementation, it also
included comments on some substantive articles. Article 9, however,
did not evoke any significant criticism. 4 The lack of a general disap-
proval of Article 9 is also illustrated by the fact that, though a few
amendments were proposed regarding some articles, none of these
concerned Article 9. It could be said, therefore, that on the whole, the
154. See art. 9 in Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Tenth Session, 18
U.N. ESCOR, Supp. 7 U.N. Doc. E/2573, Annex I B, at 67 (1954). See also art. 9 in
Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Ninth Session, 16 U.N. ESCOR, Supp.
8 U.N. Doc. 3/2447, Annex I B, at 43 (1953). A memorandum of the Secretary-General
prepared for the ninth session of the Commission included some comments on this
article. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/674, at 13 (Feb. 2, 1953).
155. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/694 and Add. 1-7 (Dec. 2, 1953-Mar. 23, 1954); U.N. Doc.
A/2910 and Add.1-6 (June 30-Oct. 13, 1955).
156. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/702 and Add.1-6 (Feb. 2-Apr. 9, 1954); U.N. Doc. A/2907
and Add.1-2 (June 6-30, 1955).
157. ECOSOC Res. 501 (B) (XVI), Aug. 3, 1953; 16 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. 1, at 10
(1953).
158. G.A. Res. 833 (IX), Dec. 4, 1954; 9 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 21 (A/2890), at 20
(1954).
159. U.N. Doc. A/2910/Add.2, at 13-15 (1955).
160. Id. Add. 3, at 11-12.
161. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/694/Add. 2, at 6; and A/2910/Add.1, at 9-10 (1955).
162. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/694/Add. 6, at 3-4 (1955); and id., Annex, at 1.
163. 9 U.N. GAOR, Third Comm. 93-121, 123-57, 163-78 (1954).
164. For comments on art. 9 during this session, see remarks of the delegates of
the United Kingdom, id. at 96; Brazil, id. at 111; United States, id. at 124; Czechoslo-
vakia, id. at 130. The United Kingdom's objection to the term "arbitrary arrest," id.




ninth session of the General Assembly found Article 9 well-drafted.1 5
E. Consideration by the Third Committee (1958)
The importance of the consideration of Article 9, at this final
stage of its drafting, by the Third Committee can hardly be over-
emphasized.' 6 Although on previous occasions, as we observed, the
General Assembly had discussed this article as part of a general dis-
cussion on the adequacy of the first 18 articles or, later, on the draft
Covenants, this was the first occasion when this article was taken up
separately and dealt with thoroughly by the Third Committee. It is
no mean tribute to the drafting skill of the Commission that Article
9, which it completed drafting in 1952, was accepted, with a very
minor change in paragraph 5, by the Third Committee in 1958.167 Not
only did the Third Committee adopt, by a vote of 70-0, with 3 absten-
tions, the article drafted by the Commission, but even more signifi-
cantly, it agreed with the basic approach in drafting followed by the
Commission and also reinforced the interpretations of the Commis-
sion on the several issues inherent in this article. "' This is all the
more remarkable in view of the substantial increase in the member-
ship of the United Nations over the preceding four years. Since 1955,
when governments had the most recent opportunity to comment on
Article 9,166 membership of the United Nations had increased from 60
states to 81 states.7 0 Thus, over 20 new Member States, which never
had any opportunity to comment on Article 9 during its drafting by
the Commission, now explicitly endorsed the work of the Commis-
sion.
Particularly with regard to paragraph 1, this session is important
for several reasons. While it is significant that this paragraph, as
drafted by the Commission, was adopted by the Third Committee
without a negative vote,"' the debates of the Third Committee are
165. See Report of the Third Committee, U.N. Doc. A/2808 (Nov. 29, 1954), 9
U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item 58, Sec. III, at 9-12 (1954). Note particularly, id.
at paras. 37, 39, 45-52.
166. For the crucial importance of the discussions in the Third Committee regard-
ing the interpretation of various articles, see N. ROBINSON, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 99-100 (1958).
167. For a summary of the discussions on art. 9 in the Third Committee, see
Report of the Third Committee, U.N. Doc. A/4045 (Dec. 9, 1958), 13 U.N. GAOR
Annexes, Agenda Item 32, at 6-10 (1958-59). Note in particular, id. para. 42.
168. See generally id.
169. The last opportunity was when observations of governments were solicited
pursuant to the resolution adopted by the ninth session of the General Assembly in
1954. See supra note 158. These observations may be found in U.N. Doc. A/2910 and
Add. 1-6 (1955).
170. For a list of the States admitted as members of the United Nations during
1955-58, see UNITED NATIONS, EVERYMAN'S UNITED NATIONS 12 (8th ed. 1968).
171. The vote was 64-0, with 5 abstentions. See 13 U.N. GAOR, Third Comm. 157
(1958).
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an invaluable source regarding the interpretation of this paragraph
because, in addition to the overwhelming vote on its adoption, as
many as 36 delegations explicitly stated their views on this para-
graph."2 Most of the issues that had, over the years, been discussed
in the Commission were now raised again and the Third Committee
adopted the same attitude with regard to them as had been done by
the Commission.
73
The decision of the Commission with regard to the non-inclusion
of the limitations was now beyond challenge. Although some dele-
gates continued to feel that an article with a list of specific limitations
would have been ideal, they realized the difficulties in formulating
such a list. Even the greatest protagonist of the "enumerationists" for
about twelve years, the United Kingdom, now finally conceded that
"in practice it would be very difficult to agree on the list, and the
possibility would always remain that it would be incomplete.'
' 74 It
was, perhaps, because of the realization of the inevitability of defeat
that the Netherlands decided not to present formally its earlier
suggestion of replacing paragraph 1 with a new paragraph which
would include limitations similar to those in Article 5 of the European
Convention.
75
A yet more significant aspect of the Third Committee's delibera-
tions was its endorsement of the Commission's work and interpreta-
tion with regard to the second sentence of paragraph 1 which pro-
vided against "arbitrary arrest or detention." We saw that in the
drafting of Article 9, the single most important issue related to the
controversy over the word "arbitrary." In spite of consistent and de-
termined opposition by some members on the ground that the word
was vague and imprecise, and in spite of the considerable confusion
172. Art. 9 was discussed in seven meetings of the Third Committee. See id. at
128-60. The views of the 36 delegations will be found at the following paginations in
these Records: Afghanistan at 159; Australia at 156; Belgium at 138; Brazil at 154;
Bulgaria at 148; Burma at 153; Cambodia at 142; Chile at 128; China at 156; Czecho-
slovakia at 131 and 153; Ecuador at 156; France at 139; Greece at 148; Guatemala at
153; India at 141; Indonesia at 150; Iraq at 149; Ireland at 135 and 145; Israel at 135
and 159; Italy at 147; Japan at 144; Liberia at 136 and 150; New Zealand at 160; Peru
at 131 and 137; the Philippines at 142 and 155; Poland at 144; Portugal at 150; Ro-
mania at 147; Saudi Arabia at 150; Spain at 154; Tunisia at 149; Soviet Union at 138;
United Kingdom at 129, 142, and 156; United States at 137; Venezuela at 155; Yugosla-
via at 147.
173. See Report of the Third Committee, supra note 161, at 6-10, paras. 32, 34,
42-49 and 66-67.
174. From the remarks on Sir Samuel Hoare, supra note 171 at 129. For the same
view, see also the remarks of the delegates of Chile and Czechoslovakia, id. at 128 and
131.
175. See the remarks of the Irish delegate, id. at 135. The Netherlands earlier
suggestion will be found in U.N. Doc. A/2910/Add. 3, at 11-12 (1955).
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as to its interpretation, 7 ' the Commission had time and again voted
against its deletion. The clear reason for the retention of this sentence
was that the majority of the members of the Commission had consid-
ered that "the rule of law did not provide adequate safeguards against
the possible promulgation of unjust laws""' and that accordingly, by
using the word "arbitrary," the requirement would be added that all
legislation must conform to the "principles of justice.
' ' 
17
If there were any doubts as to "arbitrary" offering protection not
only against "illegal" acts but also against "unjust" acts, the Third
Committee must have dismissed them. In assessing the precise signif-
icance of its discussions what is relevant is not only what the Third
Committee did in fact accomplish on the final vote, but also what it
could have done, but chose not to do.
Due to the long standing controversy over the interpretation of
the word "arbitrary" and the repeated reminders during its debates,
the Third Committee was fully aware of the possibility that "arbi-
trary" may be interpreted to refer to the principles of natural justice.
Accordingly, if it did not agree with this interpretation, all it had to
do was to act on any one of the suggestions before it: delete the second
sentence, or replace "arbitrary" with "illegal," or collectively record
that "arbitrary" did not mean "contrary to natural justice."
Third Committee support of the Commission's concern that the
article should provide guarantees against unjust laws is confirmed by
the general tenor of the discussions. A great majority of the delegates
who participated in the discussion on paragraph 1 seemed to agree
that its cumulative effect was to impose obligations concerning the
"just" content of laws. Many of the delegates thought that this obli-
gation resulted from the use of the word "arbitrary" in the second
sentence.'79 But others, even from among those who felt that "arbi-
trary" meant "illegal" and could not be applied to acts committed
in execution of the law, 0 found the guarantee against unjust laws to
176. For a summary of the different interpretations of the word "arbitrary" during
the Commission debates, see the U.N. Secretariat Annotated Study, A/2929 (July 1,
1955), 10 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item 28 (Part II), at 35 (1955).
177. See, e.g., remarks of Sir Samuel Hoare (United Kingdom), summarizing the
work of the Commission, supra note 171, at 129.
178. Id. at 142-43.
179. The view that "arbitrary" was broader than "illegal" and compelled con-
formity with principles of justice was explicit or implicit in the remarks of the delegates
of Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Ecuador, France, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iraq,
Italy, Japan, Liberia, Philippines, Poland, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United
States, and Venezuela. See supra note 172 for the paginated references to the remarks
of these delegates.
180. The view that "arbitrary" does or should merely mean "illegal" or "unlaw-
ful" was explicit or implicit in the remarks of the delegates of Belgium, Israel, New
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be in the first sentence. It was argued that the general statement
there which provides that "everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person" could not be infringed by national laws. 8 '
From the discussions in the Third Committee, therefore, it could
be concluded that the cumulative effect of paragraph 1 is to provide
not only against "illegal" acts but also against "unjust" acts. An
analysis of these discussions indicates that, out of the 36 delegates
that commented on paragraph 1, as many as 25 delegates expressed
the opinion that this paragraph, by itself or supplemented by other
provisions of the draft Covenant, did not refer to conformity with the
law alone but also concerned itself with the content of the law.
Another clarification that needs to be made here is that the
reference to twenty-five delegates does not imply that the remaining
eleven delegates felt that paragraph 1 does not provide protection
against unjust laws. The statements of some of these eleven delegates
do not either deal with, or are at best ambiguous on, this issue.',,
F. Final Adoption by the General Assembly (1966)
Article 9 of the 1958 Third Committee was included in the Cove-
nant finally adopted by the twenty-first session of the General As-
sembly in 1966.83 With regard to Article 9, however, the general de-
bate at the time of the adoption of the Covenant is significant for
certain specific reasons. The over forty "new" States which had
joined the United Nations since 1958 when Article 9 was last consid-
ered by the Third Committee, now endorsed Article 9. Such endorse-
ment is implicit either in their general remarks on the Covenant or
in not criticizing Article 9 when several of them singled out various
other articles and issues for comment. This complete immunity from
hostility enjoyed by Article 9 during the twenty-first session of the
General Assembly suggests that even the "new" States found it com-
pletely acceptable. 4
Zealand, Peru, Romania and Spain. See supra note 172 for the paginated references
to the remarks of these delegates.
181. See, e.g., the remarks of the Belgian delegate, id. at 138.
182. The comments of the following twenty-five delegations could be construed
as suggesting the requirement of "just" laws: Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burma, Cambodia, Czechoslovakia, China, Ecuador, France, Greece, India,
Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union,
United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela. For the paginated references to the
remarks of these delegates see supra note 172. Non-committal remarks on this subject
included those of the delegates of Chile, Guatemala, Portugal, Tunisia, and Yugosla-
via. See id. for paginated references to the remarks of these delegates.
183. 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 16 (A/6316), at 54 (1966).
184. The "new" States appear to have found the substantive provisions of the
Covenant satisfactory. For a majority of these, the only disappointment related to
measures of implementation. See, e.g., remarks of the delegates of Togo, Niger, Tanza-
nia, Mauritania, Guinea, Congo, Sierra Leone, Upper Volta, Chad, Cameroon, Mongo-
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III. CONCLUSIONS ON THE DRAFTSMEN'S INTENT WITH REGARD TO
"ARBITRARY"
From the above account of the origins, development and final
adoption of the first paragraph of Article 9 of the Covenant, it is clear
that its draftsmen had generally intended the word "arbitrary" to
have a "special meaning." To most of the members who voted for its
adoption in both the Commission and in the General Assembly, "ar-
bitrary arrest or detention" implied an arrest or detention which was
incompatible with the principles of justice or with the dignity of the
human person irrespective of whether it had been carried out in con-
formity with the law.'8 5 Intended, thus, to provide safeguards against
both "illegal" and "unjust" arrests or detention, the incorporation
of "arbitrary" can be explained in the context of the desire of the
draftsmen to prevent the exercise of absolute powers by governments
in a despotic and tyrannical manner.'
Reviewing the drafting history of Article 9, one finds that the
word "arbitrary" appeared in most of the articles on arrest or deten-
tion submitted at, or adopted by, the United Nations. It appeared in
most of the pre-1947 texts and it is found in the very first article
adopted at the United Nations by the second session of the Commis-
sion in 1947. "Arbitrary" is also present in the five earlier texts of
Article 9.17 Thus, no article on arrest or detention adopted at the
United Nations was ever without the word "arbitrary." Moreover,
whenever "arbitrary" was included in the article, it was made clear
by most of those who favored it that they were voting for it on the
understanding that it would be an effective safeguard not only
lia, Dahomey and Algeria, 21 U.N. GAOR Third Comm. 476, 479-81, 483-86 (1966);
and Jamaica and Guinea, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1496 at 3, 43 (1966). Among the "new"
States applauding the Covenant without any reservations were Cyprus, U.N. Doc.
A/PV. 1495, at 72 (1966) and Nigeria, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1496, at 56 (1966). Madagascar
was the only "new" State that singled out some substantive articles of the Covenant
for criticism, but such criticism did not include art. 9. See 21 U.N. GAOR, Third
Comm. 482 (1966).
185. See remarks of Van Heuven (United States), 13 GAOR Third Comm. 137
(1958). Avramov (Bulgaria), during the debates in the General Assembly in 1958,
contended that there was "consensus" that "arbitrary" meant "unjust" and "unlaw-
ful." He added that it "therefore" covered not only unlawful treatment but unjust
treatment under the cover of law. Id. at 148.
186. See remarks of Rossides (Greece), id.
187. Although art. 9 was discussed and commented upon on numerous other occa-
sions, its earlier texts were adopted at the following sessions only: second session of
the Commission (1947); second session of the Drafting Committee (1958); fifth (1949),
sixth (1950), and eighth (1952) sessions of the Commission; and the thirteenth session
of the General Assembly, Third Committee (1958). While the second session of the
Drafting Committee could not agree on the adoption of one of the several texts before
it, it indicated a preference for the text adopted by the second session of the Commis-
sion.
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against "illegal" acts, but "unjust" acts as well.
With regard to the drafting of the article by the Commission, it
was generally conceded that the "intent" of the Commission in using
the word "arbitrary" was to introduce the requirement that all legis-
lation conform to the principle of justice. Even the United Kingdom,
the most persistent adversary of the word "arbitrary," admitted that
the discussions in the Commission indicated that the intention in
using this word was not merely to impose a requirement that the
action should be in accordance with the law, but that the action
should also not be "arbitrary."'' 8 Most of the delegates at the Third
Committee in 1958 also agreed with this interpretation of the Com-
mission's intention. 88 As far as the "intent" of the Third Committee
itself is concerned, analysis of its debates indicates that it confirmed
and reinforced the Commission intent.
To refute those that would still insist that "arbitrary" refers only
to the legality, and not the justness, of an arrest and detention, one
need only point to the several unsuccessful attempts to have the word
"unlawful" or "illegal" replace "arbitrary," or to the equally futile
attempts to define the word "arbitrary" in such a way so as to totally
exclude the possibility of its being interpreted as "unjust." Surveying
the historical development of Article 9, we notice that its first text
drafted by the second session of the Commission contained the word
"arbitrary," although it had been suggested during the same session
that the word "unlawful" be substituted for "arbitrary." A similar
proposal, for example, during the General Assembly's consideration
of the article in 1958, met the same fate. Ignored in similar fashion
were the numerous attempts to agree on a restricted definition of
"arbitrary." Thus, the failure of the Belgian effort to define "arbi-
trary" at the fifth session of the Commission and of the United King-
dom attempt to have the Third Committee record, in 1958, its collec-
tive opinion that "arbitrary" did not mean "contrary to natural jus-
tice" lend support to the argument that both the Commission and the
General Assembly did not want the word "arbitrary" to be inter-
preted narrowly.
Finally, in view of the bitter controversy and the determined
opposition aroused by the word "arbitrary" for so many years, it may
only be fair to ask why this word was eventually retained in Article
188. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/694/Add.2, at 6 (1958). See also remarks of the U.K.
delegate before the Third Committee in 1958, supra note 185, at 129 and 142-43.
189. See generally supra note 185, at 128-60. Practically all the writers, including
Hersh Lauterpacht, Charles Malik, James Simsarian, John Lockwood, Arthur Hol-
combe, and Sandford Fawcett, who commented on the various drafts of the Commis-
sion, emphasized the necessity to interpret "arbitrary" in a liberal manner. Their views
have been noted during the discussion of the drafting history of art. 9.
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9. First, and on the positive side, the greatest appeal of "arbitrary"
lay in its hopeful potential to provide against "unjust" laws.As to its
being "vague" and "undefined," it was pointed out that in an instru-
ment like the Covenant, which is endeavouring to break new ground,
the use of certain broad concepts was inevitable. Magna Carta and
Bills of Rights in many countries have mostly lacked precise defini-
tions; yet these instruments have greatly promoted the development
of liberty. 90 the possible difficulties in implementation which could
result from using vague language did not bother the draftsmen either.
They were confident of the fact that the term "arbitrary arrest or
detention" could be interpreted by reference to generally accepted
principles of justice.
The second main reason for the incorporation of "arbitrary" has
to do with the "limitations." The indispensability of "arbitrary" was
actually assured as soon as it was realized that it would be impossible
to agree on a list of limitations that would be acceptable to all the
legal systems. From the very beginning, various attempts were made
to formulate a comprehensive list. Where, as in the European Con-
vention of Human Rights, the treaty members represent a smaller
geographical group and subscribe to approximately similar legal
standards, it has been found possible to enumerate certain exceptions
to the right to personal liberty. But the Covenant reflects a much
wider participation. As has been pointed out, it is well to keep in
mind that theCovenant is not the product of a single mind, conceived
and executed within the framework of a definite philosophy; it is the
expression of many creeds and many philosophies."9 ' Because of the
diverse cultures, and the different levels of economic, social, legal,
and political development of the various members of the United Na-
tions, it was soon apparent that any one list of limitations would
conflict with several national legal systems. The futility of these at-
tempts at "enumeration" was, in due time, realized and they were
eventually abandoned.
Article 9, as it presently stands, if properly interpreted and ap-
plied, could provide better safeguards against governmental oppres-
sion of its peoples than any article with a detailed list of limitations.
190. See U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR.148, at 17 (1950).
191. See Moskowitz, The Covenants on Human Rights: Basic Issues of Substance,
53 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 230 (1959).
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TREATY ACCEPTANCE IN THE AFRICAN STATES
A. PETER MUTHARIKA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Treaty-making has become the most important norm-creating
process in the contemporary international legal order. Like most new
countries, the African states' view their participation in this process
as a symbol of their equality with their erstwhile colonial masters and
as the end of Western monopoly over the international legislative
process .2
This attitude seems to suggest that once the principle of equal
participation is realized, the next step, acceptance and implementa-
tion of the treaties, would follow without much ado. The African
treaty record does not seem to reflect this logic, however. The fate of
particular treaties has often been determined by factors unrelated tu
the African states' general attitude toward treaty making.
This article looks at the problems of treaty acceptance' and
treaty implementation in these states.4 On the basis of this examina-
tion, it proposes strategies which could be adopted to improve the
African treaty record.
Differences in colonial and post-independence experiences have
resulted in some basic internal differences in the constitutive and
value structures of the various African states. Admittedly, their atti-
tudes toward some international problems reflect these differences;
but they nevertheless show a fairly common pattern of behavior with
respect to certain basic issues, for example, freedom and independ-
ence, non-alignment, and economic development. 5 This common atti-
tude extends to acceptance and implementation of today's vast com-
plex of multilateral treaties.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University. LL.B., London University;
LL.M., J.S.D., Yale University.
1. The term "African States" used in this paper does not include Rhodesia and
South Africa.
2. See generally Detter, The Problem of Unequal Treaties, INr'L & CoMp. L.Q.
1069-89 (1966). See also Abi-Saab, The Newly Independent States and the Rules of
International Law: An Outline, 8 How. L.J. 95-127 (1962); Anand, Attitude of the
Asian-African States Toward Certain Problems of International Law, 15 Int'L & COMP.
L.Q. 55-75 (1966).
3. The term "acceptance" refers in this paper to any manner by which a state
expresses its consent to become a party to a treaty.
4. It should be mentioned at the outset that one problem in a study of this kind
is the scarcity of relevant materials and documentation. Statements which accompany
acceptance or non-acceptance of a treaty may sometimes not clearly articulate the
reasons behind the particular decision.
5. Nkrumah, African Prospect, 37 FOREIGN AFFAms 46 (1958).
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The relevant multilateral treaties can be roughly divided into
three main categories. The first group includes the so-called constitu-
tive treaties, for example the U.N. Charter, the Articles of Agreement
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Strictly speaking, these
treaties do not raise problems of acceptance, because accession to
them automatically creates membership obligations entailing altera-
tion of any aspect of the municipal legal system inconsistent with the
treaty obligations.
Falling into the second category are treaties of a non-political,
technical nature in which international co-operation is desirable to
safeguard standards or procedures which are enforceable inter partes.
This group includes treaties dealing with privileges and immunities,
the Law of the Sea, and economic matters. These treaties generally
create obligations of an external nature. For example, accession to the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes results in in-
ternational obligations which run from the adopting state to other
states which are parties to the convention. Disregard of these
obligations amounts to an international delinquent act, and the of-
fended state may bring an international claim.
Treaties in the third category create obligations of a completely
different nature. These require some fundamental structural change
in the adopting state's internal legal order. Human rights treaties and
ILO Conventions fall within this category. States party to such treat-
ies usually undertake to create a legal regime within the municipal
legal order which gives effect to the treaty obligations. Duties arising
from treaties of this sort are generally owed to persons residing within
the municipal legal system. Breaches of this type of treaty obligation
do not, as a rule, give other parties to the treaty a right to bring an
international claim; but the breach may give a local resident the right
to bring a municipal cause of action.
These different types of treaties raise different problems of im-
plementation. The decision whether to accede to or ratify a particular
treaty will, therefore, be influenced by the implications accession or
ratification may have for the internal legal order of the accepting
state.
II. ACCEPTANCE OF TREATIES CONSTITUTING MEMBERSHIP IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Treaties under the first category have not raised significant prob-
lems of acceptance. In a majority of cases, the decision to join a
particular organization has been based on whether membership in
the organization is beneficial to the national interest, and whether
membership will not compromise the state's political independence.
Most African states have become parties to such treaties as the U.N.
Charter, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the OAU
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Charter, and the Articles of Agreement of the African Development
Bank. They have, however, shown reluctance to become parties to
other constitutive treaties if membership would compromise or ap-
pear to compromise their political independence.'
The common attitude of the African states toward acceptance
and implementation of constitutive treaties appears in their position
on the compulsory jurisdiction clause of the International Court of
Justice. As of December 31, 1971, only one-third of the members of
the United Nations had made declarations recognizing the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the Court.' With the exception of Europe, the
African states had the highest number of declarations.' The African
states are committed to the judicialization of international disputes
and will, therefore, support the creation of norms which define a clear
legal policy in this direction. Lacking military and economic power,
they have consciously worked for the transformation of traditional
international law into a law of protection, that is, a law which will
protect weaker states against the overwhelming might of stronger
ones. This attitude was reflected in their resort to the International
Court of Justice over the Namibia issue and to the United Nations
Security Council over the Rhodesia issue.
III. TECHNICAL COOPERATION TREATIES OF A NON-POLITICAL NATURE
With the exception of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees,' African states have shown more willingness to accede to
or ratify non-political technical cooperation treaties than those fall-
ing into the third category. Indeed, the African states' record of ac-
cepting technical treaties is slightly better than the record of the
Asian or Latin American states. 0
6. This is the position which a majority of the former British colonies have in the
past taken to their relationship with the European Economic Community. The East
African countries, for example, have adopted a policy of signing periodic agreements
with the E.E.C. dealing with specific aspects of international trade rather than com-
mitting themselves to associate membership. Most of the former French colonies have,
however, for reasons which may have to do with their relationship with France, chosen
a more formal relationship with the E.E.C.
7. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties in Respect of Which the Secretary-
General Performs Depositary Functions 10-24, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. D/5 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Status of Multilateral Treaties].
8. Id.
9. 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
10. The following figures on accessions as of December 31, 1971 are illustrative of
this point:
(1) 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations; African
States: 30; Asian States: 22; Latin American States: 20.
(2) 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; African States: 34; Asian
States: 22; Latin States: 20. Status of Multilateral Treaties, supra note 7, at 33-37,
47-53.
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This fact leads to the central goal of this paper; to determine
what are the main factors influencing the national decision-makers
in the African states in deciding whether to accede to a particular
treaty. More specifically, this paper seeks to discover whether the
decision-making process is more influenced by the substance of the
treaty or by the complexities of the procedural requirements neces-
sary to give a particular treaty domestic legal force.
A recent United Nations Institute for Training and Research
(UNITAR) study on treaty acceptance" suggested that one of the
main factors militating against wider acceptance of U.N. multilateral
treaties is the problem of procedure. The study noted that the highly
technical nature of some of these treaties and the lack of legal person-
nel in most developing countries have slowed down the process of
treaty acceptance and implementation. Although the African states
suffer from this disability, some of them have been quick to accede
to certain types of treaties irrespective of their technical nature. For
example, the rather complex treaties dealing with economic coopera-
tion and development have been widely accepted. 2
The explanation frequently given this writer in his discussions
with a cross-section of African treaty officers was that a state's atti-
tude toward a particular treaty hinged upon the national interest of
the acceding state. A treaty which tends to maximize a particular
state's value position has a great chance of acceptance regardless of
the procedural difficulties it entails. Specifically, three reasons were
given for the relatively common acceptance of technical treaties.
First, these treaties generally deal with matters which are of benefit
and interest to the African states. Second, given the non-political
nature of these treaties, acceptance usually does not compromise a
particular state's political position. Third, most of these treaties do
not involve extensive structural changes in the municipal legal struc-
ture, and the African states are correspondingly more willing to
accede to them than to those treaties which entail extensive
structural changes. 3
11. UNITAR, TOWARD WIDER ACCEPTANCE OF U.N. TREATIES (1971) [hereinafter
cited as UNITAR STUDY].
12. As of December 31, 1971, 22 African states had acceeded to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Status of Multilateral Treaties, supra note 7, at 195.
13. An exception to this suggestion is, as stated elsewhere, the wide acceptance
of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. This has primarily been
due to the role which the Organization of African Unity played with respect to this
particular treaty. Under Resolution AHG/RES. 26(11) of 1965, the African Heads of
State and Government requested ". . . member states of the Organization of African
Unity, if they have not already done so, to ratify the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and to apply meanwhile the provisions of the said
convention to refugees in Africa." REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY-GENERAL
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The substantive aspects of the particular treaty and its overall
impact on the state's value position substantially influence its pros-
pects of being adopted. The acceptance pattern to the 1965 Conven-
tion on the Transit Trade of Land-locked Countries provides a good
illustration of this point." Of the ten African states' which had rati-
fied or acceded to it as of December 31, 1971, nine were land-locked.
Apparently, the decisions to ratify were made primarily because the
provisions of this convention were of direct interest to those states.
Contrast that record with the attitude of the same ten states toward
the Law of the Sea Conventions, to which only three of the ten have
acceded."
IV. TREATIES NECESSITATING STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN MUNICIPAL LAW
The third category of treaties raises special problems of accept-
ance. In the first place, accession to treaties falling under this cate-
gory create obligations of an internal nature. The state party to the
convention undertakes to accord a certain standard of treatment to
persons within its national jurisdiction. Such an undertaking may be
seen by the national decision makers as a challenge to the concept of
national sovereignty.
Secondly, acceptance of these treaties usually implies that the
accepting state must alter some aspects of its municipal legal system
in order to carry out its obligations under the treaty. The decision to
accede to such a treaty may, therefore, be seen as a surrender of some
amount of sovereignty. In most of these treaties though, especially in
the human rights field, measures for giving effect to the treaty are left
to the discretion of the particular state. Others, however, like the
Genocide Convention, require party states to enact the necessary
legislation to give effect to the provisions of the convention. Under
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination, for example, party states undertake to ensure,
among other things, that all public authorities will act in conformity
with the goals of the convention. They must further undertake to
change any laws contrary to the spirit of the convention. Such
treaties, therefore, create obligations whose execution may lead to
political and legislative difficulties in the municipal legal order.
The African states have generally been slow to accept treaties
falling under this category. With the exception of the 1951 Conven-
FOR MEETING OF THE OAU COMMISSION ON REFUGEES HELD IN ADDIS ABABA 17-23 June
1968.
14. 597 U.N.T.S. 3.
15. Burundi, Chad, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Swaziland,
and Zambia. Status of Multilateral Treaties, supra note 7, at 206.
16. Malawi has acceded to all the four conventions, Nigeria to three, Swaziland
to one. Id. at 371-91.
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tion Relating to the Status of Refugees, their acceptance record is not
spectacular. The plight of refugees in Africa had been of particular
concern to many African states. Most were faced with complex prob-
lems of integrating these refugees; and acceptance of the 1951 conven-
tion was seen as an inducement to create machinery to integrate the
refugees and also to facilitate the flow of aid from international hu-
manitarian agencies.
The prevalence of this national interest approach is accentuated
by the fact that no single African state has signed the 1961 Conven-
tion on the Reduction of Statelessness.'5 Since the goal of the conven-
tion is to prevent the adoption of national measures which lead to loss
of nationality and to oblige parties to the convention to grant nation-
ality to certain stateless aliens, its acceptance may appear to endan-
ger the internal value structure of the accepting state by adding to
the already complicated ethnic composition of most of the African
states.
V. MEASURES TO INCREASE TREATY ACCEPTANCE
Widespread acceptance of a particular treaty depends on its
structure and substance, on the municipal legal order of the accept-
ing state, and on the role of the international organization under
whose auspices it is adopted.
A. Structural and Substantive Provisions of the Treaty
The structure of a treaty and its substantive provisions ordinar-
ily influence the response it is accorded by national decision makers.
Consequently, care should be taken during the negotiating and draft-
ing stages of preparing a treaty to ensure that the final text is drafted
to leave no doubt as to the treaty's scope and the implications of
acceding to it.
Several measures to widen treaty acceptance have been sug-
gested elsewhere and will not be repeated here. 9 In addition to these
measures, it is suggested that treaties, like domestic statutes, ought
to be drafted in such a manner that they can be more readily under-
stood. A brief abstract of the main provisions of the treaty and its
legislative history might be useful. In some countries, the question of
treaty acceptance may lead to considerable political controversy
within the municipal political order. Even where treaty acceptance
does not require legislative approval, the executive may find it politi-
cally necessary to submit the treaty to the legislature for discussion.
This is usually the case where the treaty calls for extensive change
17. General Assembly Resolution 2106 (XX) of December 21, 1965. Text of the
convention may be found in 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
18. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.9/15 (1961). Status of Multilateral Treaties, supra note 7,
at 107.
19. UNITAR STUDY, supra note 11, at 41-92.
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in municipal law or where it creates municipal causes of action. In
such a situation, the executive ought to be able to explain fully the
meaning and implications of the treaty.
Moreover, a system of weighted obligations ought to be intro-
duced in multilateral treaties, providing that obligations under a
particular treaty ought to be measured against the ability of countries
at various levels of administrative and economic development to
carry out their treaty obligations. While it is true that most multilat-
eral treaties have attempted to meet this problem by allowing states
to make reservations to those provisions of a treaty they are unable
or unwilling to carry out, these reservations generally relate to the less
important provisions of a treaty. 0
B. National Measures to Facilitate Acceptance
Generally speaking, the African states do not face problems of
acceptance peculiar to Africa. Although the decision to accept a
treaty is based on maximization of the particular country's interna-
tional position, it may additionally be influenced by a realization
that a reputation of constant non-acceptance of treaties can weaken
a country's international position and undermine its credibility in the
eyes of other members of the international community.
As the UNITAR study noted, the question of administrative ar-
rangements in the municipal legal system, the question of implemen-
tation legislation, and the problem of the absence of specialized per-
sonnel all may determine a state's ability to arrive at an early deci-
sion on whether to accede to a treaty. This decision becomes even
more difficult when acceptance of the treaty requires changes in the
municipal legal order, imposes financial obligations on the state, or
creates municipal causes of action.
In most former English colonies, for example Tanzania, a treaty
must be given domestic legal force by means of legislative enactment.
20. In the past the State Department has observed that:
It is the express policy of the United States in its current FCN treaty
program to follow two basic models of treaties, one designed for devel-
oped or semi-developed states and the other for states at a low level of
administrative and economic development.
Hearings on Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with Israel, Ethiopia,
Italy, Denmark, Greece, Finland, Germany, and Japan Before the Subcommittee of
the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). The
State Department approach suggested here could be applied to the structuring of
multilateral treaties. Such an approach would provide a high level of predictability
with regard to the chances of a particular treaty gaining wide acceptance and would
ensure that heavy burdens would not be imposed on states at a low level of develop-
ment. A treaty regulating exploitation of ocean resources beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction might, for example, allow a coastal state at a low level of economic devel-
opment to appropriate a certain percentage of such resources for national development
while denying a developed coastal state such a right.
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In a country where there is a strong opposition element in the na-
tional legislature, this requirement may negatively effect the execu-
tive in deciding whether to accept a treaty. This writer was informed
by a representative of one country that whenever there was a possibil-
ity that the executive would be unable to push implementing legisla-
tion through the national legislature, the executive in most cases
decided not to accede to the treaty, since subsequent inaction would
weaken the country's international standing.
One way of circumventing this problem is to include members
of the opposition element in the delegation to the conference at which
the treaty is negotiated and adopted. If possible, these delegates
should be nominated by the government with the full approval of the
various political groups they represent. Alternatively, the opposition
groups themselves could be invited to nominate conference represent-
atives. The opposition element would then attend the conference
fully briefed on the provisions it would like to see in the treaty. If the
government delegates took the opposition's viewpoint into account,
the government should then be able to convince the oppositon leader-
ship not to impede unnecessarily implementation of the treaty.
The executive may additionally adopt the strategy of wide pub-
licity for the proposed treaty so that the public may express its views
through the mass media. The government would then be in a position
to attend the adoption conference with something resembling a na-
tional mandate. This strategy may be particularly necessary for
treaties which have significant political and economic overtones, for
example, those dealing with the breadth of the territorial sea or the
control of ocean resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
If the outcome of the conference bears close resemblance to the public
position on the issue, the government should be in a strong position
to accept the treaty without the fear of a subsequent rebuff in the
legislature.
In some African countries the legislature has delegated to the
executive the authority to implement treaties, enabling the executive
to accede to treaties more easily. Tanzania offers an interesting case
in point. Tanzanian law provides that any treaty to which Tanzania
becomes a party must be put before the National Assembly to give
it domestic legal force." The executive has developed the practice,
however, of implementing some agreements, for example commercial
and economic co-operation agreements, without legislative approval.
The legislature has retained its competence to examine agreements
which may give rise to municipal causes of action or which call for
extensive local transactions. The legislature also enacts subsequent
21. See generally E. SEATON & S. MALITI, TANZANIA TREATY PRACTICE (1971).
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implementing legislation for this type of treaty.22
In some cases, treaty acceptance has been facilitated by means
of enabling legislation giving the executive power to put a treaty
provision into effect without legislative approval.13 Such legislation
enables the executive to implement its international obligations ex-
peditiously and makes it easier for the state to accede to international
agreements. This practice could usefully be adopted by other African
states, especially in those states where a single political party
dominates the legislature.
C. International Organizations Under Whose Auspices the Treaty is
Adopted
The international organization under whose auspices a particu-
lar treaty is adopted can play a crucial role in the fate of the treaty.
The UNITAR study, referred to above, outlined several methods
which the United Nations employs to facilitate wider acceptance of
multilateral treaties. 4 These techniques have been applied equally to
all members of the United Nations. No special method has seemed
appropriate for African states. However, in view of the relatively
recent appearance of the African states on the international scene
and the obvious preoccupation of Africa's few expert personnel with
other pressing matters of state, a strong case may be made for more
emphasis on the "promotional approach" in Africa. Thus, the De-
partment of Public Information of the U.N. Secretariat, together with
the Treaty Division of the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, could explore
the possibility of establishing a strong regional center in Africa to
disseminate treaty information. The center would be responsible for
regularly disseminating information to African governments on the
status of various treaties for which the Secretary-General acts as a
depositary, as well as informing these governments of the nature of
reservations to treaties and transmitting the accompanying state-
ments on such reservations.
25
22. The 1967 Treaty for East African Co-operation establishing the East African
Community and the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority Agreement were, because
of their far-reaching implications for the domestic legal and political process, submit-
ted to the National Assembly for implementation.
23. Section 12 of the East African Income Tax Management Act 1952 and Section
6 of the Customs Tariff Act 1968 empower the Tanzanian minister in charge of income
tax matters and customs to exempt certain foreign persons from paying income tax
and customs duties without legislative approval. The policy behind these statutes is
to enable the minister to carry out certain international obligations without recourse
to the legislature.
24. Among such methods are promotion, reporting, servicing, and revision of
treaties; see supra note 11, at 15-17.
25. Although the U.N. Secretary-General publishes his annual Status of Multilat-
eral Treaties, supra note 7, this report has a very limited readership and does not reach
many influential opinion leaders in the African states.
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Such a center could be built around the existing Information
Division of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa. The various
sub-regional United Nations information centers in Africa could also
be utilized for the purpose of disseminating the information. More-
over, the United Nations could also explore the possibility of coopera-
tion or joint action with the Legal Office of the OAU Secretariat.
Another method included under the "promotional approach"
could be the convening of more regional seminars of African legal
officers. The UNITAR/UNESCO Seminar for Young African Special-
ists in Public International Law held in Dar es Salaam in 1967 and
the UNITAR Regional Symposium in Internatonal Law for Africa
held in Accra in 1971 were welcome innovations in this respect. At
these seminars care should be taken to select fairly senior legal offi-
cers in foreign ministries or justice departments whose responsibili-
ties include making decisions on treaties.
Finally, the training of legal personnel responsible for treaty
matters and international law in general should be given high prior-
ity. The UN/UNITAR Fellowship Program in International Law,
with its emphasis on a period of practical training in the legal offices
of the United Nations and the other specialized agencies, is a positive
development in this direction. This positive approach could be com-
plemented by the creation of a viable African Institute of Interna-
tional Law, 6 and also by the creation and funding of chairs of Inter-
national Law in Selected African Universities by the United Nations
and UNESCO." Long-term and short-term refresher courses for Afri-
can legal officers could be organized by these universities.
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the various sub-
regional organizations in Africa might also play a useful promotional
role in facilitating wider acceptance of multilateral treaties. The
OAU played a very important role in securing wide acceptance of the
1951 Refugees Convention, for example. The organization could play
a similar role in those treaties which, like the Refugees Convention,
evince a wide community of interest among African states. Wider
acceptance of treaties dealing with economic matters like the 1958
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbital
Awards and the 1966 World Bank Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes could be stimulated by OAU activity in their
behalf.
26. In this connection, more support should be given by the U.N. and other inter-
national organizations to the African Institute of International Law established at
Lagos with regard to both recruitment of teaching staff and research facilities. A
rejuvenated and more active Institute could play a useful role in a number of areas
including the publication of a comprehensive African Yearbook of International Law.
27. Discussion on this question has been going on for a considerable time between
various African governments, universities, and UNESCO.
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These two treaties, especially the latter, are of great importance
to the African states. Because of the implications of the World Bank
Convention, however, some African states have been slow in accept-
ing it. The OAU Legal Office together with the Commission of Afri-
can Jurists could play a useful role in researching the implications of
treaties of this type on national decision-making and could also look
into the possibility of a collective African approach. A state party to
the World Bank Convention, because of the guarantees which the
convention provides to the foreign investor, may be in a position to
attract foreign investment at the expense of a state which is not party
to the Convention. This would consequently appear to be one area in
which the OAU and the African Development Bank together could
play a useful role in promoting some kind of collective approach. It
is, therefore, suggested that the OAU encourage the Commission of
African Jurists to pioneer studies on all aspects of international law
which are relevant to Africa. The Legal Department of the OAU
should also be strengthened. These two institutions might jointly
bring out certain publications, especially an African Treaty Series,
which would provide more information to African governments and
scholars on the status of those treaties which are of interest to African
states.
Sub-regional organizations could also play a part in facilitating
treaty acceptance. The various states comprising these organizations
may find it useful to work collectively, or at least to consult with each
other to discuss the implications on all other member states of one
state becoming a party to a particular treaty. Members of the East
African Community have already found it useful to adopt a common
approach to certain types of treaties.
2 8
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This survey of the problems of treaty acceptance in Africa and
possible solutions to some of these problems indicates that the Afri-
can states desire to play a positive role in the structuring of a new
international legal order. This has been amply demonstrated in their
less than two decades of independence in such arenas as the U.N.
General Assembly, the U.N. Sixth Committee, the International Law
Commission, and in major U.N. conferences on the law of treaties,
trade and development, and the human environment. They will no
doubt participate actively at the coming Conference on the Law of
28. Since 1967, the East African countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have
collectively negotiated their agreements with the European Economic Community.
Tanzania and Zambia have also found it useful to coordinate their negotiations with
China over the Tanzania-Zambia Railway and with the World Bank over the
Tanzania-Zambia Road. A similar approach has also been taken by some of the French
speaking countries in their negotiations with the European Economic Community.
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the Sea and subsequent conferences. 29 Together with the rest of the
developing world, they are seeking the creation of an international
law of protection and cooperation.
The extent to which they are willing to accept the new legal
norms embodied in the various multilateral treaties and make efforts
to implement them in their domestic legal structures depends on
whether they feel that these new norms are founded on values consis-
tent with their national aspirations. Thus, where these states feel that
their aspirations are being recognized, they have been more than
willing to become parties to multilateral treaties. Their acceptance
record with respect to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees is a case in point. Consequently, the developed states may
have to concede that contemporary international law reflected in
these multilateral treaties must reflect values in addition to those
founded on Western Christian civilization.'" They may also have to
concede that the low level of administrative, social, and economic
development of theseAfrican states prevents these states from being
able or willing to meet some international treaty obligations. These
realities must be taken into account in treaty-making.
Pointing out these problems is not to suggest that the developed
countries have a duty to go more than halfway in their dealings with
the developing world. Rather, it is suggested that the international
legal system, as it is presently structured, is too heavily weighted in
favor of the developed countries. By making the minimum conces-
sions suggested here, the developed countries may assist in correcting
the existing imbalance.
Admittedly, the developed countries have, during the past two
decades, made some concessions. They have, however, been rather
slow to make meaningful concessions in basic areas. The history of
the three UNCTAD conferences illustrates the point. Meaningful dia-
logue and proper negotiation over the whole range of international
agreements comprising today's conventional law, with a view to arriv-
ing at principles and policies mutually beneficial to the developed
and the developing countries, is essential. In the final analysis, the
African treaty record will depend primarily on the extent to which
treaty law accounts for the aspirations of the African states.
29. For a more detailed discussion of the role which the African states have played
in the development of contemporary international law, see generally T. ELIAS, AFRICA
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972).
30. The reluctance of the developing states in general and African states in partic-
ular to accept international law as presently structured was one of the most controver-
sial issues at the first U.N. Regional Symposium in International Law for Africa held
in Accra, Ghana in 1971. For a detailed report of the conflicting viewpoints which
emerged at that symposium, see Mutharika, Report on State Succession in Matters
other than Treaties, in UNITAR REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONs REGIONAL SYMPOSIUM
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR AFRICA, 1-14 (1971).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article is designed as a practical guide for U.S. companies
contemplating business in the Federal Republic of Germany. It repre-
sents a brief survey of the law as of September 1973.
As a reference tool it must be emphasized that it is an introduc-
tion only.' It does not replace specific expert advice,' particularly in
1. The following volumes are cited repeatedly; they provide good information in
English: E. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW, VOL. I (2d ed. 1968), VOL. II (2d ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as COHN; citations are to textual paragraphs]; R. MUELLER, E.
STIEFEL, & H. BRUECHER, DOING BUSINESS IN GERMANY (7TH ED. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as MUELLER]; CURRENT LEGAL AsPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN EUROPE (L. The-
berge ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Theberge]; E. STEIN & P. HAY, LAW AND INSTITU-
TIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA (1963) [hereinafter cited as STEIN & HAY]; E. STEIN & P.
NICHOLSON, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET, 2 vols. (1960)
[hereinafter cited as STEIN & NICHOLSON I and II]; R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW
(3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as SCHLESINGER]; C. FULDA & W. SCHWARTZ, REGULA-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT (1970) [hereinafter cited as FULDA]; D.
SPETHMANN, WEST GERMANY IN LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 670-90 (W.
Friedmann and R. Pugh eds. 1959) [hereinafter cited as SPETHMANN]; G. ZAPHIRIOU,
EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW (1970) [hereinafter cited as ZAPHIRIOU]; INTERNATIONAL CHAM-
BER OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO COMPANY FORMATION (1970) (available from
the United States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, New York
10036) [hereinafter cited as ICC GUIDE]; HAMBURG CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CARRYING
ON BUSINESS IN GERMANY (1969) (manuscript available from the German American
Chambers of Commerce in New York, Chicago, or San Francisco) [hereinafter cited
as HAMBURG].
See also U. DROBNIG, AMERICAN-GERMAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972);
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT AND ORGANIZATION, (P. Hay & W. La Fave ed. 1967);
W. BALEKJIAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
(1967); INTERNATIONAL MANUAL ON THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (H. Juncker-
storff ed. 1963); Spier, an Analysis of Legal Forms of Business Organization in West
Germany and the United States, 3 AM. Bus. L. J. 287 (1965); Shartel & Wolff, Civil
Justice in Germany, 42 MICH. L. REV. 863 (1944).
The reader sufficiently versed in German can find concise and accurate informa-
tion in C. CREIFELDS, Rechtswoerterbuch (2d ed. 1970) (C. H. Beck Verlag,
Muenchen/Germany) [hereinafter cited as CREIFELDS]; 0. Model & C. Creifelds,
STAATSBUERGERTASCHENBUCH (12th ed. 1973) (C. H. Beck Verlag, Muenchen/Germany).
A. GOERLrrz, HANDLEXIKON ZUR RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (1972) (Wissenschaftliche Buch-
gesellschaft, Darmstadt/Germany) [hereinafter cited as GOERLITz] is recommended
more for its poignant criticism of the present law's weaknesses than for its informative
value.
On trading with East Germany, see Drobnig & Waehler, Legal Aspects of Foreign
Trade in East Germany, 2 J. WORLD TRADE L. 28 (1968); Supranowitz, The Law of
State-Owned Enterprises in a Socialist State, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 794 (1961);
Grimes, The Changing Structure of East Germany Industrial Enterprises, 17 AM. J.
COMp. L. 61 (1969); Drobnig, Soviet Corporations in Eastern Germany, 17 CENT.
EUROP. AFF. 150 (1957); Wiegand, Business and Finance in Communist Germany, 46
ILL. L. REV. 851 (1952).
2. Cf. Ketcham, When to Use a European Lawyer, in Theberge, supra note 1, at
96; FULDA, supra note 1, at 773 n.1; A. Conard, Organizing for Business, in Stein &
NICHOLSON, supra note 1, at 66 [hereinafter cited as Conard]; Murphy, Investment
in an Offshore Subsidiary: A West German Prototype, 5 INT'L LAW. 690, 704 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Murphy].
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such intricate areas as company law, taxation, or antitrust, to name
only three subjects of obvious and extreme complexity. Therefore, the
following observations will often have the character of generaliza-
tions. It is hoped, however, that they will provide some basic insight
into the problems relevant to doing business in Germany.
Other shortcomings of these comments will relate directly to the
difference, both in language and legal tradition, between the U.S. and
German systems of law. Although it is a matter of common knowl-
edge, it should be emphasized that few legal terms can be translated
literally without losing some or all of their precise meaning.' The
problem is further complicated by the fact that publications on the
subject do not share a common terminology' since some publications
are aimed at British readers and others at U.S. readers. Still, in order
not to make language a barrier, every legal term is followed by a
German translation or approximation of the English term.
II. PRELIMINARY FORMALITIES
Before considering questions directly related to setting up a for-
eign company in Germany, brief mention must be made of prelimi-
nary formalities such as permits and registration.
A. Residence Permit (Aufenthaltserlaubnis)
Section 2 of the Aliens Statute6 (Auslaendergesetz)l requires all
3. Cf. LEGAL ASPECTs OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT ix (W. Friedman & R. Pugh eds.
1959); COHN, supra note 1, at 1., 2.; Conard, supra note 2, at 48 n.67; ICC GUIDE, supra
note 1, at 8; Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 618-22.
4. One particularly discouraging illustration is furnished by the Betriebsver-
fassungsgesetz (see infra note 229) which has been translated as Shop Constitution
Law by MUELLER, supra note 1, at 96; Enterprise Constitution Act by SPETHMANN,
supra note 1, at 673; Law on the Organisation of Enterprises by Fabricius, The German
Law of 1972 on the Organisation of Enterprises, 1972 J. Bus. L. 340; Works Constitu-
tion Act in COHN, supra note 1, at 7.246.; Labor Management Relations Act in M.
PELTZER, LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT (1972).
5. Cf. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 48, 93; HAMBURG, supra note 1, at 1-4; ICC GUIDE,
supra note 1, at 11.
6. Aliens Statute (Auslaendergesetz) of April 28, 1965, [1965] BGB1. I 353; also
in C. SARTORIUS, VERFASSUNGS UND VERWALTUNGSGESETZE 565 (35th ed. 1972).
7. All codes and statutory material are cited by their concise unofficial title used
almost exclusively in legal writing. The official titles, in the rare cases where they do
not coincide with the unofficial ones, are lengthy and are, therefore, avoided.
To be sure one actually has the latest version of a statute, one has to consult the
Federal Legal Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt), abbreviated BGBI. (COHN, supra note 1,
at 87). One has to be careful not to confuse the Federal Legal Gazette (Bundesgesetz-
blatt) with the Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger), which publishes excerpts from the
commercial registers. (MUELLER, supra note 1, at 13, makes a clear distinction between
the two, while COHN, supra note 1, calls both "Official Gazette," although at 81. he
talks about the Federal Legal Gazette and at 7.24. and 7.204. about the Federal Ga-
zette).
For virtually all purposes it is sufficient to consult one of the unofficial but widely
used looseleaf collections of statutory law by C. H. Beck Verlag, Muenchen/Germany.
These collections are updated one or more times a year. Throughout this article, four
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aliens planning to enter and stay in the Federal Republic of Germany
to apply for a residence permit (Aufenthaltserlaubnis). Initial con-
tacts with the German diplomatic or consular services nearest the
applicant's domicile should prove helpful, as will inquiries to one of
the three German-American Chambers of Commerce in New York,
Chicago, and San Francisco. The diplomatic or consular authorities
will advise the applicant and obtain the residence permit from the
appropriate German authority. The permit authority cooperates, in
turn, with the local chamber of commerce (Industrie und Handel-
skammer) and the local labor authority (Arbeitsamt).
In the case of a first application, the permit is usually granted
for three to twelve months. After five years of residence an unre-
stricted permit (Aufenthaltsbewilligung) may be granted.
Upon arrival, the alien is required to register with the local aliens
authority (Auslaenderbehoerde). Its offices are either with the local
police or the local administration: county administration (Kreisver-
waltung) in rural areas, and the city administration (Stadtverwal-
tung) in urban districts. Nationals of member states of the European
Economic Community and tourists are exempt from these regula-
tions.
Evasion of the Aliens Statute may be prosecuted as illegal entry.
On the other hand, administrative authorities are generally liberal in
their policy of admission. Other than the residence permit, foreigners
must comply with but a few additional procedures.
B. Labor Permit (Arbeitsgenehmigung)
Section 19 of the Labor Support Law (Arbeitsfoerderungsgesetz)
requires prospective employees to apply for a labor permit. Only
holders of residence permits are eligible, and because of the prior
checks made in connection with the residence permit, the labor per-
mit is granted as a routine matter by the local labor authority (Ar-
of these collections will be referred to in order to make the job of finding the law easier:
H. SCHOENFELDER, DEUTSCHE GESETZE (47th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
SCHOENFELDER]; C. SARTORIUS, Verfassungs und Verwaltungsgesetze (35th ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as SARTORIUSI; H. NIPPERDEY, ARBEITSRECHT (11th ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as NIPPERDEYI; STEUERGESETZE (24th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
STEUERGESETZE]. See also COHN, supra note 1, at 85. on how to find the law.
English translations of statutes-if known to exist-will be pointed out, but the
danger of obsolescence is obvious; see also COHN, supra note 1, appendix H in vol. I,
at 310, (5.); id. at 86.-90.; J. HARTMANN, BIBLIOGRAPHY OF TRANSLATIONS OF LAWS AND
REGULATIONS, GERMAN-ENGLISH-FRENCH-SPANISH (1971); Majoros, Zur Krise der inter-
nationalen, Kodifikationspolitik, 6 ZEITSCHRIFT FUER RECHTSPOLITIK 65 (1973); Sprudzs,
Status of Multilateral Treaties-Researcher's Mystery, Mess or Muddle?; 66 AM. J.
INT'L L. 364 (1972); SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 637-39, 656-58, 666-67.
8. Labor Support Law (Arbeitsfoerderungsgesetz) of June 25, 1969, [1969] BGBI.
I 582; also in NIPPERDEY, supra note 7, of 700.
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beitsamt). Numerous exemptions exist, such as for trainees not paid
in Germany, alien officers of German companies, and for non-
domiciled aliens servicing imported equipment for a limited period
of time.'
C. Registration of Business (Gewerbeanmeldung)
Apart from the manufacture of and trade in weapons, which are
prohibited to foreigners,'" all branches of business are as open to
foreigners holding an unrestricted residence permit as they are to
Germans, so long as any special requirements, like professional quali-
fications, are met.
Registration" of the prospective business or trade with the local
commercial or police authority is followed by the issuance of a certifi-
cate of registration (Gewerbeanmeldeschein).' 2 The internal revenue
service is notified of the registration, but it remains every individual's
duty to comply with his obligations as a taxpayer.
Certain trades can be carried on only with a special permit.
These include trades which, if exercised improperly, could endanger
the general public (food, pharmaceutical and medical services, pawn-
broking, and common carriers). Commercial installations which are
inherently dangerous because of noise, vibration, or fumes are subject
to stringent controls and supervision.' 3 Other permits depend on the
applicant's particular qualification or personal reliability, or both."
As to domicile of company partners, German law requires the
company to designate a representative domiciled in Germany who is
responsible to the authorities.
D. Registration of Foreign Corporate Bodies
Section 12 of the Trade Regulation (GewO) provides that foreign
corporate bodies, as "legal persons" (juristische Personen),'
5 must
apply for a permit to either set up business or to participate in one.
9. Ordinance of March 2, 1971, [1971] BGBl. I 152. §§ 5 and 9 of the Ordinance
apply in particular.
10. Section 6 (3) Federal Arms Statute (Bundeswaffengesetz) of September 19,
1972, [19721 BGB1. 1 1797; also in SARTORIUS, supra note 7, at 820; § 6 (2) Statute
on War Weapons (Kriegswaffengesetz) of April 20, 1961, [1961] BGB1. I 444; also in
SARTORIUS, supra note 7, at 823.
11. On registration in the commercial register see infra III (B)(2). On domicile of
a company see Winkhaus and Stratmann, GmbH: The Close Corporation in Germany-
Management and Capitalization Problems for U S. Controlled Subsidiaries, 29 Bus.
LAWYER 1275, 1279-80 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Winkhaus].
12. Sections 14, 15 Trade Regulation (Gewerbeordnung) of July 26, 1900, [1900]
RGBI. 871; also in SARTORIUS, supra note 7, at 800 [hereinafter cited as Trade Regula-
tion/GewO].
13. Section 16 et. seq. Trade Regulation (GewO), supra note 12.
14. Id. at Sections 29-40.
15. On "legal persons," see infra III (C).
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The permit must be given unless the foreign corporate body's activity
is contrary to the public interest, as when reciprocal rights of estab-
lishment are not guaranteed or regulations relating to capital, appli-
cable to German domestic companies, are not met. The authority
competent to grant trade permits is the Ministry of Commerce (Wirt-
schaftsministerium) or its equivalent in each federal state (Bundes-
land)." Foreign corporate bodies, founded in accordance with the
laws of a member state of the European Economic Community are
exempted from the trade permit regulation. 7
Although the formalities of permits and registration necessary to
do business in Germany constitute a considerable amount of "red
tape," the attitude of federal, state, and local authorities is liberal,
so as to render many restrictions insignificant."
IIl. LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF A BUSINESS
German law recognizes many types of legal associations and
companies which differ according to the needs of society in general,
or of the business community in particular. Additional variety results
from the non-mandatory character of considerable portions of Ger-
man law. Moreover, the principle of freedom of contract allows the
parties to create their own particular form of association or company.
There is a sharp distinction in German law between companies
structured like an association, the archetype of which is the personal
association (Verein), and those organized as companies in the strict
sense (Gesellschaft). 9 The legal problems of the two basic types of
business organizations, associations and companies, are examined in
16. Section 12 (3) Trade Regulation (GewO), supra note 12.
17. Id. at Section 12 (a).
18. Cf. Marty-Lavauzelle, Local Law Problems in Acquiring European Corpora-
tions, in Theberge, supra note 1, at 26, 29.
19. The reader must be cautioned against some particularly confusing terminol-
ogy. German company law (Gesellschaftsrecht) usually comprises companies (Gesells-
chaften) only and excludes associations (Vereine). Yet in describing the different com-
panies one takes recourse to the criterion of how many characteristics of a company
(Gesellschaft) or of an association (Verein) a company has. In other words, the test is
whether a given company, in the general sense, is more a company in the strict legal
sense, or more an association. This is not exactly a contradiction because not all
companies are companies in the strict sense, whereas some "companies" strictly speak-
ing are associations. This problem in terminology is further discussed infra III (C) (2)
of this article.
Another misunderstanding may occur in reading SPETHMANN, supra note 1, at 670.
In talking about "personal associations", Spethmann refers to personal companies
which, since his writing, have come to be called person-companies by most writers
including this author (see infra III (C) (4) of this article). Person-companies, of
course, is the literal translation of the German "Personengesellschaften." Spethmann
uses the word "association" in a very broad sense denoting any legally joint group. This
writer, however, uses "company" in the general sense in translating the German (Ge-
sellschaft).
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this article;20 three others, the personal association (Verein), the foun-
dation (Stiftung), and the public corporation, will not be treated here
since they do not lend themselves to foreign investment.
A. Statutory Background
Since German law consists largely of code law, the newcomer is
well-advised to refer to the various codes early in his planning.21 Sec-
tions 742-58 of the Civil Code (Buergerliches Gesetzbuch or BGB)22
contain the general rules applicable to any group holding a legal right
(Gemeinschaft),2 3 unless possession of such right is expressly prohib-
ited by law. However, since many kinds of legally joint groups have
received the legislature's specific attention in different sections of the
Civil Code (BGB), the Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch or
HGB), 24 and other particular codes, 2 Sections 742-58 enjoy only sec-
ondary importance.
26
B. Some Peculiarities of German Commercial Law
Even to gain a fragmentary understanding of the available legal
structures, one must understand a few characteristics of German
20. See infra III (C)(2).
21. See supra note 7.
22. Civil Code (Buergerliches Gesetzbuch) of August 18, 1896, [18961 RGB1. 195;
also in SCHOENFELDER, supra note 7, at 20 [hereinafter cited as Civil Code (BGB)].
SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 371-77, gives a detailed synopsis.
23. COHN, supra note 1, at 191., 355.; A. HUECK, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 51-55 (16th
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as HUECK].
24. Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch),of May 10, 1897, [1897] RGB1. 219;
also in SCHOENFELDER, supra note 7, at 50 [hereinafter cited as Commercial Code
(HGB)]. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 377, gives a synopsis.
25. Notably, the Stock Corporation Law (Aktiengesetz) of September 6, 1965,
[1965] BGBI. 1 1089; also in SCHOENFELDER, supra note 7, at 51 [hereinafter cited as
Stock Corporation Law (Akt G). It is available in two translations, one by R. MUELLER
& E. GALBRAITH, THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION LAW (German-English ed. 1966),
and the other by F. JUENGER & L. SCHMIDT, GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION LAW (1967);
also the Law on Limited Liability Companies (Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften
mit beschraenkter Haftung) of April 20, 1892, [1892] RGB1. 477; also in
SCHOENFELDER, supra note 7, at 52 [hereinafter cited as Law on Limited Liability
Companies (GmbHG)], available in a translation by R. MULLER, GERMAN LAW CON-
CERNING THE COMPANIES WITH LIMITED LIABILITY (1972).
26. In this connection, a similar technique of referring the reader back from spe-
cific codes to more general codes whenever general rules are applicable must be pointed
out. Taking for an illustration the limited partnership [see infra 1I (D) (3)], a deriva-
tive of the partnership [see infra II (D)(2)], which in its turn is a derivative of the
private law company [see infra III (D)(1)], we find that due to the reference in Section
161 (2) Commercial Code (HGB), the rules applicable to the partnership also apply to
the limited partnership except in those respects in which the code specifically provides
otherwise in Sections 161-77 Commercial Code (HGB). Questions not treated in Sec-
tions 161-77 are answered alike for both the partnership and the limited partnership.
Correspondingly, gaps left by Sections 105-60 Commercial Code (HGB) regulating the
partnership are to be filled [Section 105 (2)] by Section 705-40 Civil Code (BGB)
regulating the private law company.
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commercial law, including a number of criteria which serve to distin-
guish the different kinds of companies. These criteria as we shall see
later, have some bearing upon liability, agency, taxation, and other
important matters. Additionally, in examining these criteria, we also
examine the range of company types suitable to varying conditions.
1. Kinds of Merchants
Sections 1-7 of the Commercial Code (HGB) distinguish between
several kinds of merchants (Kaufleute)2 in order to define their du-
ties of registration and bookkeeping, and to make applicable specific
rules different from, and stricter than, those found in the Civil Code
(BGB) .2 Usually it is sufficient that one party to a contract be a
merchant, as defined in those sections, for the diverging or supple-
mentary rules to apply. 5 In rare cases, both parties must have the
status of merchant in order to submit the contract to the stricter
Commercial Code (HGB).:"'
The consequence of this categorization is the application of spe-
cific regulations under certain circumstances. The transaction in
question must be one typically effected in the ordinary course of
business. In short, it must constitute a transaction directly or indi-
rectly promoting business. A direct promotion of business can be seen
in contracts typical for the particular kind of business (e.g., sale of
goods and shipping). An indirect promotion can be a contract which
either renders possible or promotes the typical business transaction
(e.g., employment contracts, leases and purchase of office supplies),
or is a typical transaction entered into in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, or similar to those entered into in the ordinary course of busi-
ness.
Generally speaking, the specific rules are stricter because they
make escape from legally binding relationships and transactions
more difficult; the merchant is assumed to know the law. Thus, he
can bind himself orally in cases where a writing is required for non-
merchants. Stricter rules also apply to: (1) bail and commercial let-
ters of confirmation (a valid contract unless the letter of confirmation
27. See COHN, supra note 1, at 7.9. -7.15.; ZAPHIRIOU, supra note 1, at 41.
28. On the peculiar quality of commercial law as a branch of private law, see
FuLDA, supra note 1, at 775; SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 404; COHN, supra note 1, at
92., 7.1. - 7.8.
29. COHN, supra note 1, at 7.19.; SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 408.
This and all the following citations to code material in section III (B) of this article
are to the Commercial Code (HGB) unless otherwise noted.
30. E.g., section 346 requiring the merchant to respect commercial customs (see
COHN, supra note 1, at 7.8.); sections 377-79 forcing the merchant-buyer to inspect
delivered goods immediately and to notify the merchant-seller of any alleged defects;
otherwise the buyer will forfeit his rights (see COHN, supra note 1, at 7.132.).
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is duly revoked);" (2) the extent of commercial obligations; (3) the
availability of the absence of contract; and (4) the provision of five
percent, rather than four percent, interest as the basic rule.32 Like-
wise, acquisition of title in good faith is easier at commercial law than
at civil law, as is acquisition of a lien in personam, the merchant's
right of retention.3
One who conducts a commercial business (Handelsgewerbe) is a
merchant (Kaufmann) in the legal sense of the word. The law distin-
guishes among the "must-merchant," a merchant by virtue of the
kind of business he conducts, 3' the "shall-merchant" who shall regis-
ter in the commercial register 5 because of his business volume and
thus acquires the status of merchant, the "may-merchant" who may
become a merchant through registration if he so desires, and the
"form-merchant," a merchant by virtue of his form of legal organiza-
tion. 16
Usually, all these are "full-status merchants" (Vollkaufleute),
meaning that all particularities of commercial law, including manda-
tory registration and bookkeeping, apply to them. But, as the anti-
quated scheme also comprises a number of small traders such as
street peddlers, Section 4 of the Commercial Code (HGB) exempts
some of the "minor-status-merchants" (Minderkaufleute) from the
regulations covering bookkeeping, commercial name (Firma), 3 com-
mercial agency (Prokura), 3s and other matters.
3 9
2. Commercial Register
The commercial register (Handelsregister) 4 contains a list of all
full-status merchants and certain facts and legal relationships per-
taining to them. It is kept by the local court of small claims (Amtsge-
richt) as the court of register (Registergericht). Only certain facts are
admissible for publication while others must be published under all
circumstances.'
31. COHN, supra note 1, at 7.86. - 7.96.
32. Id. at 7.108. - 7.111.
33. Id. at 362., 7.113. [regarding section 366 Commercial Code (HGB) and section
932 Civil Code (BGB)]; id. at 210., 7.113. [regarding section 369 Commercial Code
(HGB) and section 273 Civil Code (BGB)J.
34. Enumeration of the kinds of commercial businesses in section 1 (2) Commer-
cial Code (HGB).
35. See infra III (B)(2).
36. See infra III (B)(5) and note 104.
37. See infra III (B)(3).
38. See infra III (B)(4).
39. See supra III (B)(1) and note 32.
40. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 407; COHN, supra note 1, at 7.20. - 7.27.; FULDA,
supra note 1, at 775; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 12.
41. E.g., all of the following companies have to be registered: partnership [section
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The purpose of the register is to inform the public; therefore,
changes are published not only in the Federal Gazette (Bundesan-
zeiger), but also in local newspapers. The task of keeping the com-
mercial register updated belongs to the courts, the district attorney's
office, the police, the local administration, the lawyers and the cham-
ber of commerce. An entry into the commercial register always carries
a presumption of admissibility and accuracy because it is made with
an investigation, albeit a summary one. The registration may have
confirmatory character, or it may have merely declaratory character,
as when it makes visible a legally relevant fact.4"
One very significant aspect of the register is the provision for so-
called "negative publicity" (negative Publizitaet) which allows third
parties to rely on the register's silence. Thus, an unregistered fact,
which should have been registered, is no defense against a third party
unless there is positive proof of the third party's knowledge. There is
also the less important rule of "positive publicity" (positive Publizi-
taet). A registered and published fact is a valid defense unless the
transaction takes place within 15 days after publication or the third
party proves that he lacked knowledge of the published fact through
no negligence of his own. This is an allegation the courts are reluctant
to accept as proof because all merchants are presumed to know the
contents of the commercial register at all times. A final provision
allows a third party to invoke facts correctly published if he had no
knowledge of their incorrectness.
Defenses based on the commercial register are known in German
law as "public faith" defenses (oeffentlicher Glaube), a concept of
clothing certain public registers with a rebuttable presumption of
correctness.13 This principle is even more prominent in the register of
land (Grundbuch) which reflects transfers of title in real property.4
This principle of public faith exists in several branches of the law.
However, customary, uncodified commercial law supplements the
restricted public faith in the commercial register by holding that a
106 Commercial Code (HGB)], limited partnership [sections 161 (2), 162, 106 Com-
mercial Code (HGB)], stock corporation [sections 36 et seq. Stock Corporation Law
(AktG)I, partnership limited by shares [sections 278 (2), (3), 282 Stock Corporation
Law (AktG)], limited liability company [section 10 Law on Limited Liability Compa-
nies (GmbHG)].
42. This provision has been revised by the Law of August 15, 1969, [1969] BGB1.
1 1146. Therefore, COHN, supra note 1, at 7.27. and SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 475
are slightly outdated. See CREIFELDS supra note 1, heading "Handelsregister" at 518-
19; GOERLITZ, supra note 1, at 184, left column.
43. COHN, supra note 1, at 381., 7.27.; SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 466-75;
CREIFELDS, supra note 1, heading "oeffentlicher Glaube" at 776-77.
44. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 466-74; COHN, supra note 1, at 371. et seq. A
model of a register of land (Grundbuch) is reproduced in German by COHN, id.
appendix I in vol. I, at 303-07.
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person who causes an incorrect entry or fails to have one cancelled is
liable to those persons having relied "in good faith" on those incorrect
facts.
45
3. Commercial Name (Firma)
Section 17 (1) defines the commercial name (Firma) as the name
under which a merchant signs and conducts his business." It identi-
fies and projects his image by distinguishing his person, his business,
his products, and his services from others.
There are five legal principles which characterize commercial
names: (1) uniqueness; (2) duty to register; (3) truthfulness in indi-
cating the true owner or legal form of organization; (4) continuity;
and (5) exclusivity. Exclusive use of a commercial name is an abso-
lute right protected as strongly as privacy or property. Anyone imp-
inging upon that right is subject to a penalty by the court of register,
permanent injunction and damages.
4. Commercial Agency
In addition to the different kinds of agencies regulated in the
Civil Code (BGB),47 there are two others in commercial law. These
are the power of procuration (Prokura)48 and commercial authority
(Handlungsvollmacht)."
Power of procuration (Prokura) is the broadest form of agency in
German law. A Prokurist may engage in any business transaction,
including litigation. Appointment as a Prokurist must be entered into
the commercial register. A restriction of the Prokura, although valid
between the Prokurist and his principal, is not binding upon third
parties. The only exception may be in restrictions on the purchase of
land, if expressly stated in the power of procuration.
Under the much more restrictive commercial authority (Hand-
lungsvollmacht), the Handlungsbevollmaechtigte, may carry on only
those transactions typical for the specific type or sector of business.
45. CREIFELDS, supra note 1, heading "Handelsregister" at 519, left column.
46. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 475 (asterisk); COHN, supra note 1, at 7.28.
7.32.; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 51, 72-73; Winkhaus, supra note 11, at 1278-79.
47. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 31-34; COHN, supra note 1, at 165.-172.;
SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 537-42; id. 732 (citing four articles by Mueller Freien-
fels).
On power of agency and authority of management, see III (C)(3) and note 63, III
(D)(1) and note 86, III(D)(2) and note 96, III(D)(3), first textual paragraph, III (D)(5),
III(D)(7) and note 118.
48. COHN, supra note 1, at 7.39.-7.44.; SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 543 * (aster-
isk); MUELLER, supra note 1, at 34; CREIFELDS, supra note 1, heading "Prokura" at 837-
38.
49. COHN, supra note 1, at 7.45. - 7.47.; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 34-35;
CREIFELDS, supra note 1, heading "Handlungsvollmacht" at 522.
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C. Criteria of Companies
To distinguish the different kinds of companies 0 one must rely
on the following criteria."
1. Capacity to Hold Legal Rights (Rechtsfaehigkeit)
Under German law, all natural persons and some corporate enti-
ties, so-called "legal persons" (juristische Personen), 52 have the ca-
pacity to hold legal rights (Rechtsfaehigkeit). 3 Under certain forms
of organization, some associations or companies in the legal sense,
5 4
do not have the capacity.
To provide legal protection for both individual and collective
interests, the law offers two basic schemes of organization, the princi-
ple of plurality (Vielheitsprinzip) and the principle of uniformity
(Einheitsprinzip). s A company formed under the principle of plural-
ity does not, in itself, become an independent legal person having its
own legal rights. Such a company administers the sum of the individ-
ual rights of the partners as exercised by a plurality of the partners.
This kind of organization requires a considerable degree of agreement
among the partners and may be difficult for long-term projects, or
where there is fluctuation of membership, or for activities that re-
quire an uncomplicated decision-making process.
When fast and efficient management is desired, an organization
may be structured according to the principle of uniformity. Such a
company becomes an independent legal person. Thus, it is possible
to carry on legal activities without having in each case to consult the
individual partners. The partners owe the company certain rights and
obligations but the company leads a legal life of its own. Frequently
the personal rights of the partners and rights of the company coincide
with each other.
The type of organization controls the degree to which a partner
can be held liable. Partners of a company without capacity to hold
50. As mentioned supra note 19, this term in its general meaning comprises both
associations and companies in the legal sense, only the latter of which will be discussed
here [infra III (D)].
51. The following analysis M (C) relies heavily on HUECK, supra note 23, at 4-15.
52. COHN, supra note 1, at 111.-117.
53. Capacity to hold legal rights (Rechtsfaehigkeit) [sections 1 et seq. Civil Code
(BGB)] must not be confused with capacity to act, i.e. capacity to evoke legal conse-
quences (Handlungsfaehigkeit). The capacity to act can be divided into the capacity
to enter into legal transactions (Geschaeftsfaehigkeit) [sections 104 et seq. Civil Code
(BGB)] and the capacity to be responsible for delictual behavior (deliktsfaehigkeit,
Zurechnungsfaehigkeit or Verschuldensfaehigkeit) [sections 827 et seq. Civil Code
(BGB)]. See COHN, supra note 1, at 105., 135.-138., 321.; SCHLESINGER, supra note 1,
at 621.
54. See supra note 19.
55. HUECK, supra note 23, at 5.
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legal rights are held personally liable for company debts, while part-
ners of a company with capacity to hold legal rights are not. These
are the extremes, however, and between the two exist many varia-
tions. For example, the partnership, although not a legal person, by
special provision in Section 124 of the Commercial Code (HGB), has
legal standing. The partnership follows the principle of plurality,
more typical of companies without capacity to hold legal rights than
the private law company. In contrast, the limited liability company,
more oriented towards the principle of uniformity, shows some ele-
ments of plurality whereas the stock corporation does not. The pri-
vate law company and the stock corporation represent opposite ends
on the scale of possible business organizations.
2. The Dichotomy Between Company and Association
Another distinction of considerable importance is whether a legal
organization is an association (Verein), or a company in the strict
sense (Gesellschaft). 51 This becomes a problem whenever a specific
code regulating a particular legal organization leaves a question un-
answered. When this occurs, the general rules in the Civil Code
(BGB) in regard to either associations (Vereine) or companies (Ge-
sellschaften) will prevail. These general rules are found in Sections
21-79 and 705-40, respectively.5 7 If these sections fail to give an an-
swer, then Sections 741-58 of the Civil Code (BGB) become applica-
ble. These constitute the most general rules regulating groups jointly
holding legal rights (Gemeinschaften)."
In general, associations have to be organized as a corporate ent-
ity. In an association, personal engagement and continuity of part-
ners seem to enjoy only minor significance in contrast to a company
in the strict legal sense, although this may not be so true in individual
cases. The stock corporation (Aktiengesellschaft), the partnership
limited by shares (Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien), and the lim-
ited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschraenkter Haftung) are
associations, although all of these legal terms contain the component
"company" (Gesellschaft).59 On the other hand, the private law com-
pany (Gesellschaft buergerlichen Rechts), the partnership (offene
Handelsgesellschaft), and the limited partnership (Kommanditge-
sellschaft) are companies in the strict sense. 0
3. Internal and External Companies
Company law labels the relationships between the partners of a
56. Id. 5-7; see also supra note 19.
57. They should not be confused with section 741 Civil Code (BGB). See supra
III (A).
58. See supra note 23.
59. HUECK, supra note 23, at 7; cf. supra note 19.
60. HUECK, supra note 23, at 7.
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company as the internal relations (Innenverhaeltnis) and those be-
tween the company and third parties as the external relations (Aus-
senverhaeltnis). This distinction exists in other areas, such as agency
law. Correspondingly, there are internal companies (Innengesells-
chaften) and external companies (Aussengesellschaften). 1
Companies which have the capacity to hold legal rights necessar-
ily have external legal relations with third parties because only the
corporate entity can exercise the company's rights and obligations.
In contrast, companies not having the capacity to hold legal rights
do not necessarily have external relations. A company may be created
where the partners do not carry on any business under the company's
name. They do not act in the company's name and no external com-
pany exists as a matter of law. Nevertheless, these individuals may
be bound by a contract establishing an internal company subject to
those rules of company law of general applicability. A prime example
of an internal company is the so-called "silent partnership" (stille
Gesellschaft) . 2 Internally the silent partnership is subject to the gen-
eral rules of company law, while externally the company is subject
to no legal external rules.
Apart from reasons of business policy, the distinction between
internal and external companies is legally important. Only external
companies can have a commercial name. Similar restrictions apply
to agency and the authority of management. 3
4. Person-Companies and Capital-Companies
Another distinction on a different level is made between person-
companies (Personengesellschaften) and capital-companies (Kapi-
talgesellschaften), 4 Person-companies (an obsolete term is personal
companies), 65 which include the partnership, the private law com-
pany, the limited partnership and the silent partnership, are strongly
shaped by the individual partners. Usually the partners themselves
are responsible for, and actively engaged in, the company's business.
There is personal liability, and with some exceptions, the member-
ship is neither transferable nor inheritable.
Capital-companies, on the other hand, emphasize capital as the
prime constituent element, thus assuming an investment character.
Only the stock capital (Grundkapital), consisting of a fixed amount,
is subject to liability. Membership in the company is not individually
shaped; shares are transferable and the management is in the hands
61. Id. 7-8.
62. See infra III (D)(4).
63. See supra note 47.
64. HUEcK, supra note 23, at 8-11; SPETHMANN, supra note 1, at 670.
65. See supra note 19.
1973
212 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
of third persons. Examples of capital-companies are the stock corpo-
ration, the limited liability company and the partnership limited by
shares.
In deciding whether to form a person-company or a capital-
company, tax law is often the deciding factor. Person-companies are
not subject to corporation income tax (only the partners' personal
income is taxable), while capital-companies suffer the double burden
of corporation and personal income tax. Naturally, there are offset-
ting benefits to capital-companies.66
5. Ownership of Company Assets
While companies exist which need no assets or which concentrate
their assets in one place, 7 the majority of companies have distinct
assets. Depending on the legal structure of the company, they will be
held in one of three forms of ownership.1
8
a. Fractional Ownership (Bruchteilseigentum)
Under the principle of fractional ownership (Bruchteilsei-
gentum) every member of the so-called fractional group (Bruchteils-
gemeinschaft) is entitled to a fraction of every item of property of
other asset. This of course is on paper, and is called an imaginary
share (ideeller Anteil) in German law.
Fractional ownership is possible in regard to any legal right. The
law regulating fractional groups is found in Sections 741-58 of the
Commercial Code (HGB) with particular regulations applying to real
property found in Sections 1008-11 of the Civil Code (BGB). Real
property fractional ownership is called co-ownership (Miteigen-
tum).6 9 Fractional ownership of non-corporeal assets is described as
common privilege (Mitberechtigung).
As a matter of principle, every member of the fractional group
is free to use his fraction subject only to the other members' interests.
Any transaction of a member contrary to the others' interests is le-
gally valid although subject to an action for breach of contract.
Fractional ownership exists mainly in the ownership of real prop-
erty (Miteigentum). For most kinds of companies this kind of owner-
ship makes assets too readily transferable. Thus, fractional owner-
ship of company assets is rare and requires express agreement. Frac-
tional ownership in a company is typically found where fractional
ownership of real property existed prior to the company's foundation,
for example, where a loose group jointly holding a legal right (Ge-
66. See infra 11 (D) (8), IV (B)(8) and note 180.
67. See infra III (D) (4).
68. HUECK, supra note 23, at 16-19.
69. Id. 16-17; COHN, supra note 1, at 355.
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meinschaft)5 is upgraded to a company. On occasion, groups which
set a significant number of rules may have inadvertently changed
their legal status from that of a group jointly holding a legal right
(Gemeinschaft) to that of some kind of company, most likely a pri-
vate law company.7
Another example of fractional ownership is found in so-called
incidental companies (Gelegenheitsgesellschaften). These are com-
panies which exist for a limited time or purpose only, the most com-
mon of which are groups of banks issuing corporate bonds or securi-
ties (Emissionskonsortium). Unlike the group of real property owners
who, in setting up rules of behavior, may unknowingly form a com-
pany, a group of issuing banks may create fractional ownership only
by express agreement." This is one of the few cases where fractional
ownership is not the exception.
b. Joint Ownership (Gesamthandseigentum)
The most common form of ownership in German company law
is joint ownership ("ownership to the joint hand" or Gesamthand-
seigentum). 73 Under this form no partner can unilaterally transfer his
share of the company assets. Typical examples of joint ownership
include the private law company, described in Sections 718-19 of the
Civil Code (BGB), the partnership, governed by Section 105 (2) of the
Commercial Code (HGB),74 and the limited partnership of Section
161 (2) of the Commercial Code (HGB).75 In other areas of law com-
mon examples are joint ownership between spouses requiring express
agreement, and joint ownership between common heirs before settle-
ment or liquidation.
Although there is some controversy as to whether shares in com-
pany assets exist at all,7 6 the question is moot because in any case
shares are never tangible. Every joint owner (Gesamthand-
seigentuemer) has a claim to the whole of the assets, but this claim
is restricted by the other owners' claims. Title can only be transferred
by all the owners jointly, although one or several owners can act as
agents for the company. Transfer of the position of partner in a com-
pany is only possible under certain conditions. The principle that all
the partners together, as a "joint hand", own the company assets
70. See supra III (A) and note 23 and III (C)(2) and note 58.
71. See infra III (D) (1).
72. HUECK, supra note 23, at 16.
73. Id. 17-18; COHN, supra note 1, at 355.
74. Section 105 (2) Commercial Code (HGB) refers back to sections 705-40 Civil
Code (BGB).
75. Section 161 (2) Commercial Code (HGB) refers back to section 105 Commer-
cial Code (HGB) which in its subsection (2) refers back to sections 705-40 Civil Code
(BGB).
76. HUECK, supra note 23, at 17.
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ensures that the assets are accessible in the company's interest only.
They are safely out of reach of individual partners, and yet this con-
struction does not require the company to have the capacity to hold
legal rights.
c. Ownership By the Legal Person
If a company has the capacity to hold legal rights, its assets are
owned by the company itself, as a legal person." To an even greater
degree than joint ownership, ownership by the legal person prevents
possible undesirable use of the company assets by individual part-
ners. A clear line is drawn between the partners' and the company's
assets. The law gives control of the company's assets to the manage-
ment and the partners have no way of directly interfering. The part-
ners' rights and obligations are set out in the company's contract of
formation."' It usually regulates contribution of capital, payment of
dues, voting rights, and distribution of profits. The legal person is the
only creditor for company debts and likewise it is the legal person,
not individual partners, which, through its officers and agents,'7 con-
ducts business with third parties.
The most common forms of companies having distinct legal per-
sonality and ownership of company assets by the legal person are the
association (although not a company in the strict sense),80 the stock
corporation, the limited liability company, and the limited partner-
ship.
D. Kinds of Companies
Against this background of significant principles of commercial and
company law, the major forms of companies are now considered.,
77. Id. 18-19.
78. While American law distinguishes between charter and by-laws and English
law distinguishes between memorandum and articles of association, German law rec-
ognizes one document only, referred to as the "company contract" (Gesells-
chaftsvertrag). With regard to stock corporations, it is always called "Satzung"; with
regard to limited liability companies, both terms "Satzung" and "Gesells-
chaftsvertrag" are used. See Conard, supra note 2, at 73 n.139; MUELLER, supra note
1, at 50; ZAPHIRIOU, supra note 1, at 107 n.14; ICC GUIDE, supra note 1, at 8; HAMBURG,
supra note 1, at 12; SPETHMANN, supra note 1, at 685 n.6; CREIFELDS, supra note 1,
headings "Aktiengesellschaft" at 24, right column, and "Gesellschaft mit beschraenk-
ter Haftung" at 457, right column, and "Satzung" at 916, right column. Use of counsel
in setting up the "company contract" is always recommended; see infra 11I (D) (7) and
note 117.
79. See supra note 47.
80. See supra note 19.
81. COHN, supra note 1, at 111.-117., 7.216.-7.284.; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 45-
62; SPETHMANN, supra note 1, at 670-85; ZAPHIRIOU, supra note 1, at 85-113; HAMBURG,
supra note 1, at 10-17.
Leading authorities in German are HUECK, supra note 23, at 22-266; H. SUDHOFF,
DER GESELLSCHAFrSVERTRAG DER PERSONENGESELLSCHAFrEN (4th ed. 1973) (treating part-
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1. Private Law Company (Gesellschaft Buergerlichen Rechts)
According to Section 705 Civil Code (BGB), a private law com-
pany can be formed by at least two partners pursuing a common
purpose, as defined in the underlying company contract.2 In many
respects it is comparable to a joint adventure.
The private law company3 has no capacity to hold legal rights,
and its assets are governed by the principle of joint ownership (ges-
amthandseigentum). 4 Its partners are joint and several debtors.
5
With regard to powers exercised by partners of companies, external
relations are known as "power of agency" (Vertretungsmacht), and
international relations as "authority of management" (Geschaefts-
fuehrungsbefugnis)." Valid external and internal agreements of a pri-
vate law company must be made by joint action of all partners or
majority decisions. This arrangement is slow, but safe. It is desirable
when partners are non-merchants or inexperienced in the law.
Private law companies exemplify the typical person-company.
Its partners may sometimes even be unaware of their status, for
ample, members of a car pool. Examples of private law companies
include professional "partnerships,"8 7 groups of businessmen who are
not merchants in the legal sense, groups of underwriting banks or of
issuing consortia, cartels, and holding companies. Temporary ven-
tures and construction projects are often carried out by a so-called
"work-team" (Arbeitsgemeinschaft or ARGE).Ss This consists of inde-
nership, limited partnership, private law company, silent partnership); H. SUDHOFF,
DER GESELLSCHASsVERTRAG DER GMBH (3d ed. 1973) (treating limited liability com-
pany); H. SUDHOFF, DER GESELLSCHAFrSVERTRAG DER GMBH & Co KG (2d ed. 1971)
(treating limited liability company and partner [limited partnership]; see infra LII
(D)(8).
82. See supra note 78.
83. COHN, supra note 1, at 115., 191., 7.216. - 7.217.; SPETHMANN, supra note 1, at
670; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 46-47; HUECK, supra note 23, at 22-54. The private law
company has no common abbreviation in German.
84. See supra III (C)(5)(b).
85. COHN, supra note 1, at 247.
86. See supra note 47.
87. Lawyers and other members of the professions cannot form "partnerships" in
the legal sense (see infra III (D)(2) and note 94) because partnerships presuppose a
commercial business (Handelsgewerbe), which, under German law, is incompatible
with a profession.
However a bill was introduced in 1971 calling for the creation of a particular
partnership for members of the professions which would be called Partnerschaft. Al-
though liability would be limited, this form of partnership would legally be treated as
a person-company in order to retain certain tax privilages (cf. supra III (c)(4) and infra
III (D) (8), IV (B) (8) and note 180). Since the 1971 bill was tabled, a similar bill may
soon be reintroduced. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt/Germany), Au-
gust 17, 1973, at 13, col. 4-5.
88. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 46-47.
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pendent partners, usually legal persons, who join to form a private
law company. Each partner is unrestrictedly liable, but the work-
team (ARGE) cannot register under a commercial name since it is a
private law company."
2. Partnership (Offense Handelsgesellschaft)
A partnership9" conducts a commercial business under a com-
mercial name; 9' all of its partners are personally liable without limita-
tion. If one partner enjoys limited liability it becomes a limited part-
nership.
92
In terms of legal categories, the partnership is a company rather
than an association; there is little emphasis on corporate structure.
It is a person-company, that is, management is in the hands of the
partners themselves.
Although as a matter of doctrine, the partnership is not a legal
person, it can by special provision in Section 124 of the Commercial
Code (HGB) sue, be sued, and acquire rights and obligations. As a
result, the partnership holds an intermediary position in terms of
legal capacity. Its assets are subject to the principle of joint owner-
ship (Gesamthandseigentum),' 3 while its legal structure is modeled
after the private law company, with a few qualifications. The first one
is that a partnership has to pursue a commercial business.94 This
provision ensures that small businessmen who do not conduct a com-
mercial business in the legal sense are protected from the dangerous
unlimited liability; such companies remain private law companies.
Secondly, the partnership must not limit its liability toward third
parties. Thirdly, any single partner can represent the partnership as
an agent unless otherwise provided in the company contract and
registered in the commercial register. And finally, the power of
agency and authority of management cannot be limited, and may be
exercised by any individual partner, subject to modification by the
company contract. 9
89. On commercial name, see supra III (B) (3).
90. COHN, supra note 1, at 7.218. - 7.225.; SPETHMANN, supra note 1, at 670-72;
MUELLER, supra note 1, at 46; HAMBURG, supra note 1, at 14-16; ZAPHIRIOU, supra note
1, at 87-91; HUECK, supra note 23, at 55-94. A. HUECK, DAS RECHT DER OFFENEN HANDELS-
GESELLSCHAFr (4th ed. 1971). The partnership is abbreviated as oHG in German.
91. On commercial name, see supra III (B)(3).
92. See infra III (D)(3).
93. See supra III (C)(5)(b).
94. This requirement of commercial business (Handelsgewerbe) bars members of
the professions from forming partnerships in the legal sense; they can only form private
law companies (see supra III (D) (1) and note 87).
95. On commercial name, see supra III (B)(3).
96. See supra note 78.
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The partnership is the most widely used form of company. It
serves the purposes of small and medium-size businesses, whereas
limited liability companies and stock corporations are more common
for larger businesses.
3. Limited Partnership (Kommanditgesellschaft)
The limited partnership97 is one which has both general partners
(fully liable partners called Komplementaere) and limited partners
(Kommanditisten). Creditors are protected only to the amount of the
general partners' assets plus the limited partners' contributions, an
amount which is limited by the company contract" and published in
the commercial register. The limited partners cannot be managing
directors unless specifically authorized by provision in the company
contract.
Like the partnership, the limited partnership carries characteris-
tics of a company, not an association, and of a person-company (even
though it strongly resembles a capital-company because of the posi-
tion of the limited partners). The limited partners, because of the
capital they bring into the company, often exercise considerable con-
trol by contract over the general partners who usually are internally
responsible for management. This incorporation in the company con-
tract of far-reaching responsibility is often balanced by a claim for
compensation for financial losses suffered through the general part-
ners' precarious position. If this concept is carried through, such a
company is known as the capitalist limited partnership (kapitalis-
tische KG)." Its internal arrangements are not far from an employer-
employee relationship.
4. Silent Partnership (Stille Geselschaft)
The silent partnership 0 normally consists of two partners only.
The silent partner transfers assets to the active partner in return for
a corresponding share in the company's profits. Although the silent
partnership legally is a company because both partners jointly pursue
a common purpose, the company itself holds no assets, only the ac-
tive partner does. Legal relations between the partners exist only
internally; externally the silent partner may remain unknown. °10 Ex-
97. COHN, supra note 1, at 7.226.-7.229.; SPETHMANN, supra note 1, at 671;
MUELLER, supra note 1, at 46; ZAPHIRIOU, supra note 1, at 91; HAMBURG, supra note 1,
at 16-17; HUECK, supra note 23, at 94-104. The limited partnership is abbreviated as
KG in German.
98. See supra note 78.
99. HUECK, supra note 23, at 102-04; CREIFELDS, supra note 1, heading "Komman-
ditgesellschaft" at 613, right column.
100. COHN, supra note 1, at 7.230.; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 46; HUECK, supra
note 23, at 104-12.
101. See supra III (C) (3) and note 62.
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cept for the undisclosed existence of the silent partner, the silent
partnership bears some resemblance to the limited partnership.
5. Stock Corporation (Aktiengesellschaft)
The stock corporation,' ° having the capacity to hold legal rights,
is structured as an association and therefore has fluctuating member-
ship (share holders). Its basic capital (Grundkapital) is divided into
shares 10 3 and the sum of all the assets constitutes the maximum liabil-
ity. The stock corporation is a typical capital-company and, through
its structure, is always a merchant in the legal sense by operation of
law. '0 It is the rough equivalent to the English joint stock corporation
and the French socit anonyme.
The stock corporation is regulated in detail in the 1965 Stock
Corporation Law0 5 which is an enlarged and revised version of earlier
regulations originally contained in the Commercial Code (HGB)."11
Minimum requirements for the foundation of a stock corporation
include at least five partners controlling all the shares, at least
100,000 DM basic capital, and preliminary proceedings.107 During
these proceedings the original members write the corporate charter
(Satzung)0 8 and appoint the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) which
in turn appoints the management board (Vorstand). The compulsory
inscription into the commercial register is not granted by the court
of register until a so-called formation report (Gruendungsbericht) has
been reviewed by members of the management and supervisory
boards, and, under certain circumstances, by auditors appointed by
the court. The functioning of a stock corporation requires three very
distinct bodies: the management board (Vorstand), the supervisory
board (Aufsichtsrat), and the general meeting (Hauptversa-
mmlung). °9 The supervisory board appoints and controls the man-
102. COHN, supra note 1, at 7.244. - 7.282.; Steefel & von Falkenhausen, The New
German Stock Corporation Law, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 518 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Steefell; SPETHMANN, supra note 1, at 672-73; Fabricius, The German Companies Act
of 1965, 1965 J. Bus. L. 274; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 54-62; HAMBURG, supra note 1,
at 11-12; FULDA, supra note 1, at 780-82; Kohler, New Corporation Laws in Germany
(1966) and in France (1967) and the Trend Towards a Uniform Corporation Law for
the Common Market, 43 TUL. L. REv. 58 (1968); ZAPHIRIOU, supra note 1, at 86-87;
HUECK, supra note 23, at 113-135. The stock corporation is abbreviated as AG in
German.
103. Stock Corporation Law (AktG), supra note 25. Citations to code material
within section III (D) (5) of this article are to that law unless otherwise noted.
104. See supra III (B)(1) and note 36.
105. See supra note 103.
106. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 381 nl.
107. Steefel, supra note 102, at 520-26.
108. See supra note 78.
109. Steefel, supra note 102, at 526 et seq.; Bruecher, West Germany's Trade and
Commerce, 1 J. WORLD TRADE L. 511 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Bruecheri; Conard.
supra note 2, at 100 et seq. See also infra III (D)(7) and notes 118, 119.
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agement board which is the policy-making body representing the
company in the business community and courts. The general meeting
elects the supervisory board, subject to qualifications dealt with in
the section on labor law of this paper."10 The shareholders can exercise
their rights in the general meeting."' Either they or the management
board approve the yearly financial report (Jahresabschluss) and the
business report (Geschaeftsbericht). The general meeting also de-
cides how to distribute profits. The corporate charter can be changed
by a three-quarters majority. This may apply to change of capital or
liquidation due to bankruptcy, merger (Fusion) or consolidation
(Verschmelzung) .112
6. Partnership Limited by Shares (Kommanditgesellschaft Auf
Aktien)
In the partnership limited by shares,"3 elements exist of both a
limited partnership and a stock corporation. It is a corporate entity
with its own capacity to hold legal rights, composed of at least one
general partner and of limited partners not personally liable for the
company's obligations. As far as the general partner is concerned, the
law in Section 278 (2) and (3) of the Stock Corporation Law (AktG)
refers back to Sections 161-77 of the Commercial Code (HGB),
whereas the law of stock corporations is applicable in all remaining
matters. The partnership limited by shares is not very common be-
cause it offers limited liability but requires minimum capital of
100,000 DM.
7. Limited Liability Company (Gesellschaft Mit Beschraenkter
Haftung)
The limited liability company 4 was created by the legislature in
110. See infra VI (B) (2).
111. Steefel, supra note 102, at 539; FULDA, supra note 1, at 780-82.
112. See infra III (D) (7) but do not confuse with connected enterprises, infra III
(E).
113. COHN, supra note 1, at 7.283. - 7.284.; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 47;
ZAPHIRIOU, supra note 1, at 106; SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 569; HUECK, supra note
23, at 235-38. The partnership limited by shares is abbreviated as KGaA in German.
114. A most informative analysis has recently become available; Winkhaus, supra
note 11. See also, COHN, supra note 1, at 7.231. - 7.243.; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 50-
54; SPErHMANN, supra note 1, at 673-74; ZAPHIRIOU, supra note 1, at 95-97; HAMBURG,
supra note 1, at 13-15; SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 567, 591-93; Haskell, The Ameri-
can Close Corporation and Its West German Counterpart: A comparative Study, 21
ALA. L. REV. 287 (1969); De Vries & Juenger, Limited Liability Contract: The GmbH,
64 COLUM. L. REV. 866 (1964); Schneider, The American Close Corporation and Its
German Equivalent, 14 Bus. LAWYER 228 (1958); Fabricius, The Private Company in
German Law, 1970 J. Bus. L. 229; McFadyean, Schneider, Houwink, Reverdin, &
Homburger, The American Close Corporation and Its European Equivalent, 14 Bus.
LAWYER 214 (1958); HUECK, supra note 23, at 238-53. The limited liability company is
abbreviated as GmbH in German.
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1892 to provide a form of business organization suitable for medium-
size business which is less complicated and less costly than the stock
corporation, while still retaining limited liability. This was done in
the Law on Limited Liability Companies.'" The limited liability
company is the form of company most widely used by foreigners."'
While the stock corporation needs harsh controls to prevent the
abuse of the wide powers granted to the management board, smaller
companies are often closely-held corporations and do not present the
risk of abuse to the same degree. Yet, partnerships or limited partner-
ship are not always desirable for these people because at least one
partner has to remain personally liable.
The limited liability company is a capital-company with certain
traits of a person-company. It is always a merchant under Section 13
(3) of the Law on Limited Liability Companies (GmbHG), and Sec-
tion 6 of the Commercial Code (HGB) and has the capacity to hold
legal rights. It must be founded by at least two partners in a certified
charter"' with a minimum of 20,000 DM basic capital, the lowest
possible share being 500DM. The limited liability company's name
must carry the appendix "mbH" (with limited liability) and entry
into the commercial register is mandatory. There must be at least one
managing director (Geschaeftsfuehrer), "I and the meeting of the
partners is necessary to conduct serious business." 9 The managing
director occupies the position of the company's agent (Vertreter) who
is wholly responsible for the company's transactions. The appoint-
ment to the position of managing director can be revoked at any time
unless the charter specifically provides otherwise. An additional su-
pervisory board is required for limited liability companies employing
over 500 people.
The partners' meeting enjoys wide powers, including auditing
and the control of management. Change of the charter requires a
115. Law on Limited Liability Companies (GmbHG), supra note 25.
116. Winkhaus, supra note 11, at 1275-76; MUEuE, supra note 1, at 50; LEGAL
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 759 (W. Friedman & R. Pugh eds. 1959); BRUECHER,
supra note 109, at 531; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt/Germany), April
14, 1973, at 17, col. 1-2; Murphy, supra note 2, at 705.
117. Many legal acts require public certification oeffentliche Beurkundung which
is done by a lawyer-notary (Notar) or, in a few cases, by a court. In Germany only a
fully-fledged lawyer can become a notary who is also responsible to his client for
thorough counselling. See Conard, supra note 2, at 69; FULDA, supra note 1, at 775;
SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 15-20, 622-24; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 14; COHN, supra
note 1, at 72; Cohn, The German Attorney - Experiences With a Unified Profession,
9 INT. & COMP. L. Q. 580 (1960) and 10 INT. & COMP. L. Q. 103 (1961). On the terminol-
ogy of charter see supra note 78. On details of the procedure of incorporation see
Winkhaus, supra note 11, at 1277-78.
118. Winkhaus, supra note 11, at 1281-83; STEIN & HAY, supra note 1, at 760.
119. Winkhaus, supra note 11, at 1283-87; see also supra III (D)(5) and note 109.
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three-quarters majority and calls for renewed certification by a
lawyer-notary.'20 A partner may leave the company by transferring,
in certified form, his share in the company, in case of substantial
cause (wichtiger Grund), or by withdrawal or expulsion.
Liquidation is possible for several reasons specified in Sections
60-62 of the Law on Limited Liability Companies (GmbHG), among
which are declaratory judgment, frustration, illegal decisions or acts,
or bankruptcy. A limited liability company can, without prior liqui-
dation, be changed in many ways, for example by merger (Fusion) or
consolidation (Verschmelzung).' 2 ' A change into a stock corporation
is also possible in the reverse direction.
The German Federal Reserve Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) in
a recent report' 2  emphasized the growing significance of the limited
liability company which it said deserved the increased attention of
entrepreneurs, legislators, and bankers alike. It regretted the insuffi-
cient disclosure of financial information due to lenient legislation.
Only about 100 exceptionally large limited liability companies are
obliged to publish substantial financial information.'
22
This form of company has become increasingly popular with
foreign investors. From 1962 to 1972 the number of limited liability
companies has more than doubled to 100,690 while stock corporations
have diminished 11 percent to 2,271.124 In late 1970, 25 percent of the
basic capital of all limited liability companies was foreign-owned
compared to only 15 percent of stock corporations' basic capital. It is
presumed that limited liability companies tend to be created to set
off profits of the foreign mother-company or to carry out operations
burdened with a substantial risk. This is confirmed by the fact that
120. See supra note 117.
121. On merger (Fusion or Umwandlung), see Merger Law (Umwandlungsgesetz)
of November 12, 1956, [1956] BGBI. I 2081; also in Schoenfelder, supra note 7, at 52
a; sections 362-93 Stock Corporation Law (AktG); Merger Tax Law Umwandlung-
steuergesetz of August 14, 1969, [1969] BGBI. I 1163; also in STEUERGESETZE, supra
note 7, at 730; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 48, 114-15; COHN, supra note 1, at 7.279. -
7.281.; HUECK, supra note 23, at 267-74.
On consolidation (Verschmelzung), see sections 339-61 Stock Corporation Law
(AktG); COHN, supra note 1, at 7.279. - 7.281. (It is to be noted that Cohn, like some
other authors, understands the German "Fusion" as a consolidation, whereas this
writer translates "Fusion" as merger); ZAPHIRIOU, supra note 1, at 124.
122. Contents reproduced in Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung (Frank-
furt/Germany), April 14, 1973, at 17, col. 1-2.
123. Disclosure Law (Publizitaetsgesetz) of August 15, 1969, [1969] BGB1. I
1189. Disclosure is required if two out of three criteria apply: 1) balance sheet total
over 125 million DM, 2) sales over 250 million DM, 3) over 5,000 employees. For details,
see Winkhaus, supra note 11, at 1289-93.
124. See supra note 122. Cf. FULDA, supra note 1, at 770 n.14 who quotes 1963
figures.
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during 1966-70 average profits of limited liability companies before
taxes were considerably lower than those of other person-companies
or stock corporations.
2 5
There are discrepancies in the law because the 1892 Law on
Limited Liability Companies, designed to modify the law of stock
corporations, has undergone little change, while the law of stock cor-
porations has often been revised. A proposed reform of the 1892 Law




26 This reform aims to strengthen the positions of minorities within
the limited liability company, and creditors of the company. Minori-
ties are to enjoy increased rights of information. Creditors should be
benefited by four planned alterations of the law: (1) the requirement
to bring in the basic capital completely, rather than at the present
rate of 5,000 out of the required 20,000 DM; (2) mandatory evaluation
of non-monetary capital by court-appointed auditors in case of dis-
pute or doubt; (3) stricter control of the information given about the
company prior to registration; (4) substantial responsibility of the
founders for correct procedures of foundation. The eventual reform of
connected enterprises' will also touch upon limited liability compa-
nies.
8. Limited Liability Company and Partner (Limited Partner-
ship)
One particular kind of limited liability company is called a lim-
ited liability company and partner (limited partnership). This is an
approximate translation of the German name Gesellschaft mit bes-
chraenkter Haftung und Kompagnon Kommanditgesellschaft, al-
most exclusively referred to as a GmbH & Co. KG.' 8
The GmbH & Co KG is a complex legal structure owing its
existence to the different rules of taxation for person-companies and
capital-companies. Partners in a person-company pay personal in-
come tax on their share in the profits, whether distributed or not; the
person-company as such pays no taxes on profits. Capital-companies,
on the other hand, are subject to corporation income tax. In addition,
their partners are taxed for their share of the distributed profits.
A GmbH & Co KG can be formed by a limited liability company
becoming the general partner of the new limited partnership and the
125. See supra note 122.
126. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt/Germany), March 23, 1973, at
17, col. 4-5.
127. On connected enterprises, see infra III (E). These must not be confused with
merged or consolidated enterprises / companies, see supra III (D) (5) and note 112 and
III (D) (7) and note 121.
128. Winkhaus, supra note 11, at 1276; see also, COHN, supra note 1, at 7.229.,
7.243.; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 47, 106, 121; FULDA, supra note 1, at 772 n.17;
SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 569 n.16; HUECK, supra note 23, at 10-11.
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individual partners of the limited liability company becoming the
new limited partnership's limited partners. Thus, advantageous tax-
ation and limited responsibility are coupled together in an ingenious
way. The GmbH & Co KG had been held to comply with civil law
and to be consistent with tax law.' The danger is that for tax reasons
this form of company may be chosen while providing an unsatisfac-
tory vehicle for the company's aims. For this and other reasons the
GmbH & Co KG may be done away with in the upcoming law. Its
usefulness for the foreign investor or partner is doubtful because the
favorable rate of 23.4 percent for corporation income tax on distrib-
uted earnings is forfeited and replaced by the regular rate of 51 per-
cent plus surtaxes. 3 0 Yet, it is reported' 3' that the GmbH & Co KG
has found some followers in the American business community in
Germany.
9. Single Merchant and One Man Company
Under certain circumstances a single person can conduct a busi-
ness or even exist as a quasi-company. No particular rules apply to a
single merchant who runs a business by himself.32 He never can be a
company, and his liability is always unrestricted. In his person all
partners, agents, or similar persons coincide; the single merchant is
like a partnership reduced to one person.
The situation is quite different with regard to one man compa-
nies.1 33 While it is impossible for all person-companies to exist if the
number of partners sinks below two, the stock corporation and the
limited liability company can continue to exist in one person. As long
as a stock corporation or a limited liability company once existed,
these companies do not necessarily fold if all shares ultimately fall
into one hand.
10. Capital Investment Company (Kapitalanlagegesellschaft)
A capital investment company'3 4 must be organized either as a
129. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 47, 106, 121; HUECK, supra note 23, at 10-11.
130. On surtaxes, see infra IV (B) (3); MUELLER, supra note 1, at 121.
131. FULDA, supra note 1, at 772 n.17; M. Laundry, The GmbH& Co Kommandit-
gesellschaft: German Partnership Vehicle for Joint Ventures, 23 Bus. LAWYER 213
(1967/68).
132. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 46.
133. COHN, supra note 1, at 7.252.; Fabricius, The Private Company in German
Law, 1970 J. Bus. L. 229, 233; HUECK, supra note 23, at 48, 226-28, 243; CREIFELDS,
supra note 1, heading "Einmanngesellschaft" at 306; J. BAERMANN, EUROPAEISCHE INTE-
GRATION iM GESELLSCHAFrSRECHT (1970) 201 n.35 [hereinafter cited as BAERMANN]; Cf.
ZAPHIRIOU, supra note 1, at 86.
134. CREIFELDS, supra note 1, heading "Kapitalanlagegesellschaft" at 587-88. Cf.
SPETHMANN, supra note 1, at 677 et seq.; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 62-67; Butler and
Thoma, The Role of the Depotbank for a Mutual Fund Doing Business in Germany,
26 Bus. LAWYER 1601 (1970/71); Mott, Foreign Bond Issues on European Markets, 24
Bus. LAWYER 1285 (1968/69).
1973
224 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
stock corporation or a limited liability company, and must have a
supervisory board.13 1 Its purpose is to invest the investors' capital in
stock or real estate, in accordance with the principle of spreading the
risk (Risikomischung), and to issue shares to the investors. It must
have a minimum capital of 500,000 DM. Its transactions are subject
to the detailed provisions of the Law About Credit Banking.
13 6
The sale and taxation of foreign investment shares are regulated
by the Law on Foreign Investments.' 31 It is mandatory to register with
the Federal Reserve Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank), have an inland
representative, make deposits with an inland depository bank, regu-
larly publish returns, and regulate the sale of shares. Both domestic
and foreign capital investment shares may be returned within two
weeks if the prospectus was incorrect or if the shares were bought
outside the seller's regular office.
E. Connected Enterprises
The problems relevant to mergers and consolidations in German
law'3 must be distinguished from those of connected enterprises (ver-
bundene Unternehmen), also treated under the heading of law of
combines (Konzernrecht).' 39 Belatedly recognizing the fact that today
70 to 80 percent of industrial capital is owned by connected enter-
prises, 4 0 in 1965 the lawmakers for the first time tackled many prob-
lems through Sections 15-22 and 291 et seq. of the 1965 Stock Corpo-
ration Law.' Naturally, this first legislative effort to deal with these
very complex questions did not solve all the problems. The multina-
tional enterprise'42 and the legal consequences of economic concentra-
135. Law About Capital Investment Companies (Gesetz ueber Kapitalanla-
gegesellschaften) of April 16, 1957, [19571 BGBl. I 378, as amended January 14, 1970,
[1970] BGB1. I 127; also in STEUERGESETZE, supra note 7, at 80.
136. Law About Credit Banking (Gesetz ueber das Kreditwesen) of July 10, 1961,
[1961] BGB1. I 881.
137. Law on Foreign Investments (Auslandsinvestmentgesetz) of July 28, 1969,
[1969] BGB1. I 986, also in STEUERGESETZE, supra note 7, at 85. A translation exists
by H. BRUECHER & D. PULCH, THE GERMAN LAW CONCERNING THE DISTRIBUTION OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT SHARES (1970); Mueller, supra note 1, at 64-65.
138. See supra III (D)(5) and note 112 and III (D)(7) and note 121. On mergers
under EEC law, see FULDA, supra note 1, at 643 et seq.
139. Bringezu, Parent-Subsidiary Relations Under German Law, 7 INT'L LAWYER
138 (1973); Haskell, The New West German Law of "Related Business Units", 24 Bus.
LAWYER 421 (1968/69); Bruno, German Law of Affiliated Enterprises, 8 AM. Bus. L. J.
157 (1970/71); ZAPHIRIOU, supra note 1, at 118-24; ICC GUIDE, supra note 1, at 36-37;
MUELLER, supra note 1, at 58-61.
140. Cf. GOERLITZ, supra note 1, at 138, right column.
141. For citation of statute, see supra note 25.
142. See Vagts, Book Review, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 185 (1973); Miller, The Multina-
tional Corporation and the Notion-State, 7 J. WORLD TRADE L. 267 (1973); Troeller,
Multinational Corporations in a Changing Europe, 7 J. WORLD TRADE L. 293 (1973);
Farrell et. al., Mounting Attacks on Multi-National Corporations, 28 Bus. LAWYER 241
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tion"I present continuing difficulties.
Sections 15 et seq. of the Stock Corporation Law (AktG) define
connected enterprises as legally independent enterprises which in
relation to each other are: majority-owned and dominated, depen-
dent and dominating, combines, mutually participating at a rate of
over 25 percent, or partners of contracts between enterprises. The
most significant legal consequence of mutual participation between
enterprises is the duty to disclose both participation and prohibition
of the exercise of any rights beyond the point corresponding to 25
percent ownership of the shares.
Seven kinds of contracts between enterprises are described in
Sections 291 and 292: contract of domination (Beherrschungsver-
(March 1973); Kahn, International Companies, 3 J. WORLD TRADE L. 498 (1969); Lit-
yak and Maule, The Multinational Corporation, 5 J. WORLD TRADE L. 631 (1971);
Caves, Industrial Economics of Foreign Investment: The Case of the International
Corporation, 5 J. WORLD TRADE L. 303 (1971); Tsurumi, Japanese Multinational Firms,
7 J. WORLD TRADE L. 74 (1973); W. FRIEDMANN & J. BEGUIN, JOINT INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1971); Miranda, Problems of Joint Inter-
national Business Ventures, 4 INT'L LAWYER 550 (1970); Vagts, The Multi-National
Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REv. 739 (1970);
Eisenberg, Megasubsidiaries: The Effect of Corporate Structure on Corporate Control,
84 HARV. L. REV. 1577 (1971); Tunc, Multi-National Companies in French Law, in LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 375 (F. Fabricius ed. 1973); J. BEHRMAN, NATIONAL INTERESTS
AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: TENSIONS AMONG THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNTRIES
(1970); Schmitthoff, Multi-National Companies, 1970 J. Bus. L. 177; Schmitthoff,
Multinationals in Court, 1972 J. Bus. L. 103; C. SCHMITrHOFF, THE ROLE OF THE MUL-
TINATIONAL ENTERPRISE IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1972); H.
KOPPENSTEINER, INTERNATIONALE UNTERNEHMEN IM DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT
(1971); M. LUTTER, RECHT UND STEUERN DER INTERNATIONALEN UNTERNEHMENS-
VERBINDUNGEN (1972); Arndt, Jagdruende fuer Elefanten. Gefaehrden die multination-
alen Unternehmen den Wettbewerb und den freien Welthandel ?, Die Zeit (Hamburg/
Germany), March 2, 1973, at 35; Kaps, Multinationale Unternehmen: Die neuen Prue-
gelknaben, Die Zeit (Hamburg/Germany), March 30, at 38, col. 3-5.
On international public enterprises, see C. FLIGLER, MULTINATIONAL PUBLIC ENTER-
PRISES (1967); further references by G. KEGEL, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 236 (3d
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as KEGEL]; BAERMANN, supra note 133, at 22 n.1.
143. Mestmuecker, Concentration and Competition in the EEC, 6 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 615 (1972); 7 J. WORLD TRADE L. 36 (1973); D. McLACHLAN & D. SWANN,
COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1967); Arndt, Basic Problems of
Concentration Policy, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 1107, 1122 (1972); Brown, Recent Develop-
ments, Tendencies and Experiences in Antitrust and Related Government Policy Reg-
ulating Private Enterprises, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 597, 616-21 (1972); R. JOLIET, MONO-
POLIZATION AND ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION (1970); J. RAHL, COMMON MARKET AND
AMERICAN ANTITRUST, OVERLAP AND CONFLICT (1970); FULDA, supra note 1, at 652-53;
Geitner, Die Kontrolle von Unternehmenskonzentrationen im Recht der EWG-
Mitgliedstaaten, 19 WETTBEWERB IN RECHT UND PRAXIS 1 (1973).
On taxes and voting arrangements, see MUELLER, supra note 1, at 108-23; M.
LUTTER, RECHT UND STEUERN DER INTERNATIONALEN UNTERNEHMENSVERBINDUNGEN
(1972); Lutter, Zu einigen Grundsatzfragen der Besteuerung verbundener Unterneh-
men, 27 JURISTENZErTUNG 482 (1972); see also infra V (A) and note 188 and V (B)(3)
and note 212.
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trag), contract of transfer of profits (Gewinnabfuehrungsvertrag),
contract of management (Geschaeftsfuehrungsvertrag), contract to
share profits (Gewinngemeinschaft), contract of partial transfer of
profits (Teilgewinnabfuehrungsvertrag), lease and other use of
enterprise installations (Betriebspachtvertrag and Betriebsueber-
lassungsvertrag). All of these require approval by at least three-
quarters of the share-holders and entry into the commercial
register. Contracts of transfer or partial transfer of profits also need
the consent of the dominated enterprise.
Since the position of the dominating enterprise largely excludes
a distinct economic existence of the dominated enterprise, the law
provides regulations protecting the rights of those share-holders and
creditors with regard to liquidation, compensation, organization and
responsibility of management, and integration of enterprises.
The law further provides that a section or department of a large
integrated enterprise which may internally be completely integrated
may also have a separate legal identity. This procedure usually in-
volves a combination of domination and transfer of profits by con-
tract and is referred to as a contract of integrated organs (Organ-
schaftsvertrag). 144
F. Branch, Subsidiary or Association
The decision whether to establish a company abroad as a branch,
a subsidiary, or an associated company depends upon two major




Branches are generally subject to comparatively high taxes.
They are therefore advisable if a parent-company wants to set off
domestic profits against the branch's losses. Also, some large enter-
prises find themselves opening foreign branches to boost prestige and
good will in advertising and public relations. 41
For the most part, subsidiary or associated companies carry less
144. HUECK, supra note 23, at 281; Karplus, The German Integration Agreement
as Corporate Guarantee, 19 Bus. LAWYER 295 (1963).
145. Winkhaus, supra note 11, at 1275-76, 1293-1300; STEIN & HAY, supra note 1,
at 737 et seq.; ICC GUIDE, supra note 1, at 9, 36-38; HAMBURG, supra note 1, at 17;
MUELLER, supra note 1, at 49, 58, 126-28; C. SCHMITTHOFF, THE EXPORT TRADE 154 (5th
ed. 1969); King, Special Tax Problems Related to the Selection and Acquisition of
Investments in European Countries, in Theberge, supra note 1, at 38-39, 52; Wallace,
The Formation and Operation of Foreign Subsidiaries and Branches, 16 Bus. LAWYER
403-516 (1961); Bruno, German Law of Affiliated Enterprises, 8 AM. Bus. L. J. 157
(1970/71); Bruno, Checklist for Formation of a Foreign Subsidiary, 24 Bus. LAWYER 493
(1968/69); Berens, Foreign Ventures - A Legal Anatomy, 26 Bus. LAWYER 1527
(1970/71); ZAPHIRIOU, supra note 1, at 132-37.
146. Cf. STEIN & HAY, supra note 1, at 743.
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significant tax loads. 47 The advantage of the latter is that the share-
holders' or partners' liability is limited. For entrepreneurs not de-
pending on public financing, the limited liability company has been
a very popular form."'
IV. TAXATION
Foreign investors must, of course, be well acquainted with their
own tax regulations," 9 as well as with German tax law.5 0 A major
revision of German tax law is anticipated, although probably not in
the immediate future.
Currently, taxes are regulated by several bodies of written law.
There are also separate tax courts (Finanzgerichte) and the Federal
Tax Court (Bundesfinanzhof). 15' These tax courts deal with taxes and
tariffs, but certain matters of tax law may incidentally be heard
before administrative or constitutional courts.
A. Sources of Tax Law
The most obvious sources of tax law are several federal codes, the
most important of which are the Levies Regulation (Reichsabgad-
enordnung), the Tax Adjustment Law (Steueranpassungsgesetz),
and the Valuation Law (Bewertungsgesetz) .151
147. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 126-28 calculates the tax burden of a company of
an assumed net income of one million DM before taxes. For a subsidiary with full
distribution but without reinvestment, 45 percent taxes are computed; for a subsidiary
with full distribution and reinvestment, 51 percent; for a subsidiary with full retention
of profit, 59 percent; for a subsidiary with hidden distribution of profit, 83 percent;
and for a branch, 57 percent. This apparently does not take into consideration the
surtaxes presently in force, see infra IV (B)(3).
148. See supra note 116.
149. On U. S. taxation of foreign income and related problems, see STEIN & HAY,
supra note 1, at 762 et seq.; van Hoorn and Wright, Taxation, in STEIN & NICHOLSON
II, supra note 1, at 343, 421 et seq.; SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 625; Slowinski &
Haderlein, U. S. Taxation of Foreign Income: The Increasing Role of the Foreign Tax
Credit, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT AND ORGANIZATION 137, 140 et seq. (P. Hay
and W. LaFave eds. 1967); Harris, Compensation Planning for the Europe-Bound
Executive, in Theberge, supra note 1, at 106; Voegelin, Estate Planning for the Europe-
Bound Executive, in Theberge, supra note 1, at 114; FULDA, supra note 1, at 733 et seq.;
B. SPITZ, SPITZ ON INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING (1972); van Hoorn, Foreign Tax and
Investment Incentives, 1965 U. ILL. L. F. 488. See also infra note 157.
150. Winkhaus, supra note 11, at 1275-76, 1293-1300; MUELLER, supra note 1, at
100; BRUECHER, supra note 109, at 535; J. van Hoorn & L. Wright, Taxation, in STEIN
& NICHOLSON II, supra note 1, at 343, 377 et seq.; HAMBURG, supra note 1, at 4-10;
further references by SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 805 et seq.; H. GUMPEL, TAXATION
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (2d ed. 1969).
German literature: GOERLITZ, supra note 1, at 447-56; W. HARTZ, HANDWOERTER-
BUCH DES STEUERRECHTS, 2 vols. (1972); H. KRUSE, STEUERRECHT, (3d ed. 1973). See also
supra note 143, last paragraph.
151. Hillhouse & Coperman, Tax Courts in Western Germany, 8 PUBLIC FINANCE
259 (1953); COHN, supra note 1, at 58.
152. Levies Regulation (Abgabenordung or Reichsabgabenordnung) of May 22,
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Substantial portions of tax law are also found in Articles 104 (a)
et seq. of the Constitution which is called the Basic Law (Grundge-
setz).' 53 Of the codes, the Levies Regulation (AO) provides rules of
procedures and sanctions, the Tax Adjustment Law (StAnpG) pro-
vides definitions and standards of interpretation, and the Valuation
Law (BewG) provides standards of valuation of objects relevant for
tax purposes. The Basic Law (GG) contains the elements of budget-
ing and of the distribution of revenue for local, state, and federal
spending. Thus the highest court in the country, the Federal Consti-
tutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), 54 often deals with tax
law. The Court has the authority to declare tax laws unconstitu-
tional. It is also often called upon to apply the test of Article 3 of the
Basic Law (GG) which makes the principle of equal treatment before
the law a basic right (Grundrecht).'M
In addition, various other codes exist which deal with taxation
in specific areas. The very number of tax laws has been a matter of
complaint for years.
A second source of German tax law is contained in Articles 95 et
seq. of the Treaty of Rome. They provide for far-reaching harmoniza-
tion of indirect taxes within the European Economic Community.
One example in recent years has been the substitution of the turnover
tax by the value-added tax. For political and technical legal reasons,
however, the process of harmonization is quite slow.'56 Beyond the
Treaty of Rome there exist a number of international treaties dealing
specifically with taxation, most of which are to avoid double taxa-
tion. 
57
1931, [19311 RGB1. I 161; also in STEUERGESETZE, supra note 7, at 800 [hereinafter
cited as Levies Regulation AO)]; Tax Adjustment Law (Steueranpassungsgesetz) of
October 16, 1934, [1934] RGB1. 1 161; also in STEUERGESETZE, supra note 7, at 810
[hereinafter cited as Tax Adjustment Law (StAnpG)]; Valuation Law (Bewertungs-
gesetz) of December 10, 1965, [1965] BGB1. 11861; also in STEUERGESETZE, supra note
7, at 200 [hereinafter cited as Valuation Law (BewG)].
153. Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of May 23, 1949, [1949] BGB1. 1, as amended July
28, 1972, [1972] BGB1. I 1305; also in SCHOENFELDER, supra note 7, at 1, and in
SARTORIUS, supra note 7, at 1 [hereinafter cited as Basic Law (GG)]; see also STEIN &
HAY, supra note 1, at 37; COHN, supra note 1, at 15, 48; Lenhoff, The German (Bonn)
Constitution with Comparative Glances at the French and Italian Constitutions, 24
TUL. L. REV. 1 (1949).
154. STEIN & HAY, supra note 1, at 49; SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 332 nn. 36-
37, 362-63 nn. 65-67 and 411 n.7; Rupp, Federal Constitutional Court and the Consti-
tution of the Federal Republic of Germany, 16 ST. Louts L. J. 359 (1971/72). See also
SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 759-62 for further references and infra XII and note 248.
155. See infra VII.
156. See infra IX.
157. Hadari, Tax Treaties and Their Role in the Financial Planning of the Multi-
national Enterprise, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 111 (1972); Carroll, International Tax Law:
Benefits for American Investors and Enterprises Abroad, Evolution of U.S. Treaties
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B. Kinds of Taxes
One way to differentiate between taxes under German law is to
distinguish between taxes on economic operations, so-called transfer
taxes (Verkehrsteuern)II and taxes on income (Einkommensteuern).
Transfer taxes include the turnover tax (Umsatzsteuer), capital in-
vestment tax (Kapitalverkehrsteuer), stock exchange turnover tax
(Boersenumsatzsteuer), bills of exchange tax (Wechselsteuer), and
real estate acquisition tax (Grunderwerbsteuer). Income taxes in-
clude the corporation income tax (Koerperschaftsteuer), personal
income tax (Einkommensteuer) and trade tax (Gewerbesteuer).
1. Personal Income Tax
Persons who take up permanent residence in Germany are sub-
ject to unrestricted taxation unless otherwise provided by interna-
tional treaty. The tax authorities determine whether there is perma-
nent residence. While a period of six months residence can be taken
as a general guideline, more specific advice must be sought from a
CPA (Wirtschaftspruefer) or a tax counsellor (Steuerberater or
Steuerbevollmaechtigter).'15
No person earning less than 24,000 DM a year is subject to per-
sonal income tax.'5 ° However, they pay a wage tax (Lohnsteuer)
which is automatically withheld by the employer.
Only income from seven specific sources is taxed; however, in the
very unlikely case that a person acquires income from another source,
he must still pay an estimated tax. Different regulations may apply
to foreigners. There can be lump sum taxation (Pauschbesteuerung)
under Section 31 of the Personal Income Tax Law (EStG) and Sec-
tion 10 of the Law on Net Worth Tax (VStG) if a foreign person
having particular skills (such as university professors, scientists, art-
to Avoid Double Taxation of Income, 2 INT'L LAWYER 692 (1968), 3 id. at 129 (1969);
Kalish, Treatment of Intercompany Transactions When Doing Business Abroad
(Avoiding Double Taxation): Section 482, 27 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAXATION 1032 (1969).
158. German tax law arrogantly disregards rules of spelling by leaving out the
additional 's' normally required to connect two words into one. Thus transfer taxes
(Verkehrssteuern) become (Verkehrsteuern), and this "rule" is likewise applied to all
other taxes (Steuern).
159. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 129; HAMBURG, supra note 1, at 5.
160. On personal income tax generally, see Personal Income Tax Law
(Einkommensteuergesetz) of December 1, 1971, [1971] BGB1. I 137; also in
STEUERGESETZE, supra note 7, at 1 [hereinafter cited as Personal Income Tax Law
(EStG)]; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 129; HAMBURG, supra note 1, at 5-6; CREIFELDS,
supra note 1, heading "Einkommensteuer" at 303-05.
On inheritance tax, see Inheritance Tax Law (Erbschaftsteuergesetz) of August
22, 1925, [1925] RGB1. I 320 as amended December 23, 1970, [1970] BGB1. 1 1856;
also in STEUERGESETZE, supra note 7, at 250; Killius, German Inheritance and Income
Taxation of United States Estates, 24 TAX. L. REv. 127 (1968).
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ists, but not usually businessmen) so requests. 6 '
Personal income taxation is based upon the personal income
after allowances have been deducted. There are blanket deductions
for professional people, special deductions such as interest on cred-
its, 12 insurance fees, church taxes, charitable contributions, pay-
ments on savings to build private homes, and deductions for private
homes recently built.' 3 More deductions are made for dependent
children, and old age before the taxable income found in the tax
schedule is determined. Individuals and spouses filing separate re-
turns are taxed upon the general schedule (Grundtabelle), spouses
filing joint returns and widows upon the so-called splitting schedule.
These schedules are found in Section 32 of the Personal Income Tax
Law (EStG). Taxation of yearly income varies between 19 percent
(incomes between 1,680 and 8,000 DM) and 53 percent (over 110,000
DM).
2. Corporation Income Tax
Corporation income tax'64 is based upon corporate income as
calculated according to Personal Income Tax Law (EStG) and Sec-
tions 7-16 of the Corporation Income Tax Law (Koerper-
schaftsteuergesetz).' 65 One starts with balance sheet profits, then
adds certain non-deductible expenses (personal income tax, net
worth tax,'6 6 gratuities of members of supervisory boards, etc.) and
hidden distributed profits. Deductions are taken for expenses such as
rehabilitation gains, charitable contributions, and intercorporate div-
idends. After deductions, the loss carry-forward is subtracted accord-
ing to Section 10(d) of the Personal Income Tax (EStG) to form the
income from which 30 percent capital yields are subtracted to arrive
at taxable income. The tax rates for the different kinds of companies
vary between 15 and 51 percent.
3. Surtaxes on Income Taxes
In 1967, a surtax on income taxes at the rate of three percent of
161. Section 10 Law on Net Worth Tax (Vermoegensteuergesetz) of June 10, 1954,
[19541 BGBI. I 137; also in STEUERGESETZE, supra note 7, at 220 [hereinafter cited as
Law on Net Worth Tax/VStG]; Section 31 Personal Income Tax Law (EStG), supra
note 160; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 132; CREIFELDS, supra note 1, heading "Pauschbes-
teuerung" at 801.
162. This will be abolished in 1974. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frank-
furt/Germany), May 19, 1973, at 19, col. 3-5; June 16, 1973, at 5, col. 1-2.
163. This will be suspended from May 1973 to April 1974. Id.
164. On corporation income tax generally see Corporation Income Tax Law (Koer-
perschaftsteuergesetz) of October 13, 1969, [19691 BGBI. I 1869; also in
STEUERGESETZE, supra note 7, at 100 [hereinafter cited as Corporation Income Tax Law
(KStG)J; BRUECHER, supra note 109, at 539; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 108-28;
HAMBURG, supra note 1, at 6-7.
165. For citation of statute see supra notes 160 and 164.
166. See supra note 161.
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the income taxes was introduced. 7 An additional surtax called sta-
bility surtax (Stabilitaetsabgabe) is tacked on all personal incomes
over 24,000 DM (single) or 48,000DM (joint return) at the rate of 10
percent of the regular income tax. Similar rules apply to corporation
income tax. Although this second surtax is to operate for about a year
only, starting on July 1, 1973, as an effort to stop inflationary tenden-
cies, it gives an idea of how similar measures might look in the future.
Numerous other legislative efforts of May 10, 1973 are designed to
stabilize the economy. This so-called stability program includes a tax
of 11 percent on industrial investments for a period of two years and
reform of the law of restrictive trade practices.' 6
4. Trade Tax
The trade tax covers stationary and migratory domestic trades.
It is federally and uniformly regulated,'69 and accrues to the local
communities where it constitutes the most significant source of reve-
nue. It is designed to contribute to the costs of utilities and roads.
The applicable statutes include the Trade Tax Law (GewStg)
with its enacting ordinances (Durchfuehrungsverordnungen) and
directions (Richtlinien). The trade tax is five percent of the trade
earnings (Gewerbeertrag) which are calculated by adding to the prof-
its (after personal and corporation income taxes) certain sums such
as payment of interests on debts and subtracting other sums such as
tax-exempt donations. Trade capital (Gewerbekapital) is taxed in a
similarly complicated computation.
Additionally, numerous communities impose a payroll tax
(Lohnsummensteuer). Each community may set its own index which
is applied to the rate of two percent of the total of the payrolls. 70
At times there have been "arrangements" or reductions of these
taxes in an effort to attract new industries. These manipulations have
been declared illegal under most circumstances by the courts, but are
still attempted from time to time."7
167. Law of December 21, 1967, [1967] BGBI. I 1254.
168. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt/Germany) May 11, 1973, at 1,
col. 2-4, at 4, col. 4-6, at 5, col. 1-2; May 19, 1973, at 19, col. 3-5; June 16, 1973, at 1,
col. 2-4, at 5, col. 1-2.
The reform of the Law Against Restraints of Trade is about to be settled; see infra
V(B)(3) and note 213.
169. Trade Tax Law (Gewerbesteuergesetz) of October 20, 1969, [19691 BGBI. I
2021; also in STEUERGESETZE, supra note 7, at 450 [hereinafter cited as Trade Tax Law
(GewStG)]; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 123-25; HAMBURG, supra note 1, at 8-9.
170. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 131.
171. Judgment of December 1, 1964, Oberverwaltungsgericht Muenster, 21
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DER OBERVERWALTUNGSGERICHTE 18 (1967/68); Judgment of December
1, 1969, Oberverwaltungsgericht Rheinland-Pfalz, 19 KOMMUNALE STEUER-ZE'TSCHRIFT
96 (1970); H. WOLFF, II VERWALTUNGSRECHT 200 (3d ed. 1970).
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5. Value-Added Tax
In compliance with the Treaty of Rome, on January 1, 1968,
Germany changed from gross turnover tax to its present value-added
tax. 7 2 Under the old system, each step in the production and market-
ing process involving a change of hands was separately and compre-
hensively taxed. This cumulative taxation technique led to distor-
tions of competition whenever an enterprise concentrated several
steps within its own production, and thus escaped repeated taxation.
The new system, by contrast, taxes the increase in value and not
the increase in price. The difference in value between the incoming
and outgoing product or service is taxed rather than the whole prod-
uct or service. Thus gross prices which invisibly included turnover tax
have been replaced by net prices to which the turnover tax is added.
The value-added tax avoids taxing previously imposed tax.
6. Real Property Taxes
The real property tax,7 3 like the trade tax, is regulated on the
federal level, but collected by the communities. With the exception
of real property belonging to charitable organizations, all real prop-
erty is taxed on its value. The computation normally applies the tax
index (Steuermesszahl) which is about one percent and the locally
varying levying index (Hebesatz) to the unit value of the real prop-
erty. The resulting tax rate is between 0.5 and 2.5 percent. The unit
value (Einheitswert) is set at intervals of a decade or more, and is
therefore hopelessly outdated. The last levying index dates from 1935
but is to be updated in 1973.171
Real property acquisition tax becomes applicable when domestic
real property is sold.' 75 It also applies where the possessor enjoys the
economic and financial use of the land without being the owner. The
present tax rate is seven percent, but it is likely that it may be raised
substantially to curb sensational gains made by land owners in urban
centers and other areas which have witnessed rapid multiplications
in value.
172. Turnover Tax Law (Umsatzsteuergesetz) of May 29, 1967, [1967] BGBI. I
545; also in STEUERGESETZE, supra note 7, at 500; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 102-05;
King, Special Tax Problems Related to the Selection and Acquisition of Investments
in European Countries, in Theberge, supra note 1, at 38, 48. See also infra IX and note
271.
173. Real Property Tax Law (Grundsteuergesetz) of December 1, 1936, [1936]
RGB1. 1 986 as amended August 10, 1951, [19511 BGB1. I519, corrected id. 790; also
in STEUERGESETZE, supra note 7, at 420.
174. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt/Germany), May 12, 1973, at 1,
col. 1-2; May 17, 1973, at 15, col. 1-4; June 15, 1973, at 17, col. 4-5.
175. Real Property Acquisition Tax Law (Grunderwerbsteuergesetz) of March 29,
1940, [1940] RGBl. 1 585; also in STEUERGESETZE, supra note 7, at 600; MUELLER, supra
note 1, at 107.
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7. Tax Incentives
Federal legislation has been enacted to counterbalance the geo-
graphic and economic isolation of West Berlin by providing substan-
tial tax relief and investment incentives. The Berlin Relief Law (Ber-
linfoerderungsgesetz)' 78 reduces the value-added tax for transports to
or from West Berlin, and allows for higher depreciations, tax reduc-
tions on long-term building contracts and reductions of 20 to 30 per-
cent on corporation and personal income taxes respectively.
Similarly the Law on Investment Subsidies offers tax incentives
of 7.5 percent of capital invested to establish or improve enterprises
situated along the eastern border of the country."' Additional incen-
tives or premiums exist to boost marginal industries such as coal,'
ship-building, or investments in developing countries. 7 9
8. Additional Considerations
Tax law is so complicated that only the most basic outline can
be given here. This is particularly true with regard to taxation of
corporate income. Such considerations as inter-corporate dividends,
hidden profit distributions and the like can only be briefly men-
tioned."'
Uncer certain conditions tax credit may be given either for per-
sonal or corporation income tax paid abroad. 8' The new Tax Evasion
Law is noteworthy for its introduction of the indirect foreign tax
credit for profit distributions by controlled foreign subsidiaries.'
Some additional kinds of taxes should be mentioned. Three
kinds of capital investment taxes (Kapitalverkehrsteuern) exist.
Company tax (Gesellschaftsteuer) is imposed when capital-
companies are formed or financially strengthened. 8 3 Negotiable in-
176. Berlin Relief Law (Berlinfoerderungsgesetz) of October 1, 1968, [1968]
BGBI. I 1049, as amended October 29, 1970, [1970] BGB1. I 1482; also in
STEUERGESETZE, supra note 7, at 711.
177. Law on Investment Subsidies (Investitionszulagengesetz) of August 18, 1969,
[1969] BGBI. 1 1211; also in STEUERGESETZE, supra note 7, at 740.
178. Coal Adjustment Law (Steinkohlenanpassungsgesetz) of May 5, 1968,
[1968] BGBI. I 365.
179. See Section 82 (f) Personal Income Tax Law (EStG), supra note 160; Section
2 (3) Law on Net Worth Tax (VStG), supra note 161; Section 4 (4). Turnover Tax Law
(Umsatzsteuergesetz), supra note 172; Section 9 (a) Law on Net Worth Tax (VStG),
supra note 161; von Boetticher, A New Approach to Taxation of Investments in Less
Developed Countries, 17 AM. J. COMP. L. 529 (1969).
180. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 108-28.
181. FULDA, supra note 1, at 733-55; Carroll, IFA's Growth with International Tax
Law, 5 INT'L LAWYER 558 (1971).
182. Tax Evasion Law (Aussensteuergesetz) of September 8, 1972, [1972] BGBI.
11713; also in STEUERGESETZE, supra note 7, at 725; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 111, 140.
183. Sections 2-10 Capital Transfer Tax Law (Kapitalverkehrsteuergesetz) of July
24, 1959, [1959] BGBl. I 530; also in STEUERGESETZE, supra note 7, at 610; MUELLER,
supra note 1, at 105-06, 116.
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struments tax (Wertpapiersteuer) is no longer applicable.'84 And
stock exchange turnover tax concerns the sale of most kinds of
shares.' 5 This last type is a follow-up to the company tax after com-
pany formation and covers subsequent transfers. It ranges between
0.1 and 0.2 percent and is reduced by half if the agreement is con-
cluded abroad and if one party is foreign.
Proposed tax reform would raise taxes on higher incomes and
introduce measures to curb unusual profits.' 6
V. ANTITRUST LAW
A. U.S. and German Approaches Compared
Many commentators dealing with antitrust law 7 on both sides
of the Atlantic allege a significant difference between U.S. antitrust
laws (which prohibit almost any kind of restrictive trade practices)
and European laws (which allow cartels in an "anything-goes-
attitude"). To assume this to be true without reservations would be
a misunderstanding.
In fact, results on both sides of the Atlantic are often identical
in result, although the legal setting is quite different.'88 Most U.S.
companies are eager not to attract too much attention from the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, and most German companies wish to avoid
184. Law of March 25, 1965, [1965] BGBI. I 147 abolishing section 11, 13-16
Capital Transfer Tax Law (Kapitalverkehrsteuergesetz).
However, there is a 0.15 percent tax on bills of exchange which is reduced by one
half if either the bill is drawn in Germany on a foreign drawee and payable abroad or
drawn abroad on a domestic drawee and payable in Germany: Bills of Exchange Tax
Law (Wechselsteuergesetz) of September 2, 1935, [1935] RGB1. I 1124 as amended
July 24, 1959, [1959] BGBI. I 537; also in STEUERGESETZE, supra note 7, at 640.
185. Sections 17-25 Capital Transfer Tax Law, supra note 183.
186. See supra IV(B)(6).
187. On industrial property, see MUELLER, supra note 1, at 68-72, 85-92; COHN,
supra note 1, at 7.182.-7.215.; S. Ladas, Industrial Property, in I STEIN & NICHOLSON,
supra note 1, at 235; Lieberknecht, Industrial Property Rights and the Rules on Com-
petition in the Rome Treaty, 27 Bus. LAWYER 811 (1972); Deringer, A Practitioner
Looks at the German and EEC Rules as Applied to Acquisitions, Mergers, and Joint
Ventures, in Theberge, supra note 1, at 64, 66-68 [hereinafter cited as Deringer];
Newes, The EEC Treaty as Applied to Distribution Arrangements and Industrial
Property Rights, in Theberge at 72; Timberg, Drafting Licensing Arrangements in the
Seventies, in Theberge at 134; Becher, Law and Practice of Defensive Marks in
Germany, 48 TRADEMARK REP. 797 (1958); Jones, Fundamentals of International Li-
censing and Their Application in the European Community, 7 INT'L LAWYER 78 (1973);
Galloway, Trademark and Competition in the EEC, 6 J. WORLD TRADE L. 550 (1972).
188. STEIN & HAY, supra note 1, at 524 et seq.; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 73-85;
Deringer, supra note 187; FULDA, supra note 1, at 105; COHN, supra note 1, at 7.155.-
7.181.; Schapiro, The German Law Against Restraints of Competition, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 201 (1962); H. KRONSTEIN, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS (1972); Riesen-
feld, The Protection of Competition, in STEIN & NICHOLSON n, supra note 1, at 197
[hereinafter cited as Riesenfeld]; see also supra notes 143 and 187.
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the German Federal Cartel Authority (Bundeskartellamt)," 9 or the
Commission of the European Economic Community. Certain large
companies, on the other hand, which enjoy positions of oligopoly or
near-monopoly are bold enough to almost defy the spirit if not the
letter of the law. Car manufacturers in both countries have assumed
a policy of raising prices in uncommon harmony, which in other in-
dustries would immediately stimulate a government investigation for
alleged practice-fixing.
Most experts agree that even the stricter control of horizontal
and vertical mergers envisaged both in German19 and European
Community law will not eliminate all loopholes, because prevailing
considerations of the common good and compelling interests of the
national economy will probably be a valid defense under the new law.
The steel industry quite recently has set stupifying examples of merg-
ers that would not be possible in the United States and have caused
critics to contend that the new law will have little more bite than the
old one. In this respect, mergers are not as suspect in Europe as they
are in the United States.
Returning to the questionable observation, that the U.S. and
German laws of restrictive trade practices are inconsistent, it should
be noted that the U.S. military powers after World War II ordered
the de-cartelization of the German industry. 9' Before the Law
Against Restraints of Trade 9 2 came into being, military ordinances
regulated the German economic scene. Thus, while legal methodolo-
gies are different, the results are not inconsistent with each other.
Both systems have significant irregularities.
B. Law Against Restraints of Trade
The German antitrust law is embodied in the Law Against Re-
straints of Trade (GWB)9 3 often called Cartel Law (Kartellgesetz).
1. Theoretical Foundation
German antitrust law is based on a system of "social market
economy" (soziale Marktwirtschaft), an antithesis to laissez-faire.' 94
189. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 11, 74; COHN, supra note 1, at 7.156., 7.167.
190. See infra V(B)(3) and (4).
191. Riesenfeld, supra note 188, at 213.
192. Law Against Restraints of Trade (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbs-
beschraenkungen) of July 27, 1957, [19571 BGB1. 11087, as amended January 3, 1966,
[19661 BGBI. 1 37; also in SCHOENFELDER, supra note 7, at 74 [hereinafter cited as Law
Against Restraints of Trade (GWB)]; Riesenfeld, supra note 188, at 207; MUELLER,
supra note 1, at 73-85; COHN, supra note 1, at 7.155.-7.181.; FULDA, supra note 1, at
150-51; see also supra note 188. But see supra V(B)(4).
193. For citation of statute see supra note 192.
194. STEIN & HAY, supra note 1, at 606; Riesenfeld, supra note 188, at 216; see also
infra VI(B)(1) and note 232.
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Under this system, the legislature provides the legal framework de-
signed to guarantee the functioning of the economy on the basis of
the principle of free competition, but including certain protective and
slightly directive measures. Direct interference with the economy is
banned, as is certain discriminatory market behavior.
The system is based on a combination of liberalism and central-
ized planning. When interests of free competition conflict with the
interests of a fair market and a sound economy, the latter will govern.
The present neo-liberal system of a social market economy is not the
only conceivable order in harmony with the Basic Law (GG).'9 5 The
constitution remains neutral as far as the economic order is con-
cerned, and the legislature is able to pursue whatever policy it deems
appropriate. In recent years this has included indirect overall guid-
ance to ensure a stable and well-balanced national economy.. The
1967 Stability Law (Stabilitaetsgesetz)'9 provides for coordinated
budgeting and credit policies on the federal, state, and local levels,
regular collection and evaluation of statistical data of the national
economy, and the establishment of various advisory councils.
2. Gist of the Law Against Restraints of Trade
After these introductory remarks, the Law Against Restraints of
Trade and some very recent amendments will be scrutinized in more
detail.'
9 7
Sections 1-37 contain the substantive antitrust law. Of these, the
first 14 deal with cartels which, as a matter of principle, are prohib-
ited; but the law now enumerates a significant number of exceptions.
Sections 15-21 deal with other agreements such as price-fixing, licens-
ing, and protection of techniques. Restrictive practices in those areas
are illegal, although "exceptions" are quite frequent. In contrast, a
dominant position is not illegal per se, but according to Sections 22-
24, abuse of dominance is illegal.
Sections 25-27 prohibit discriminatory behavior, boycotts and
the like, while Sections 28-33 regulate codes of ethics which trade
associations or professional organizations may develop in the interest
of fair competition. Finally, Section 34 requires that cartels be in
writing, and Section 35 contains the law's remedies available to pri-
vate plaintiffs: actual or compensatory damages (regular-not tre-
ble), or injunctive relief. Sections 38-43 provide fines in analogy to
those incurred for misdemeanors.
Section 1 declares that agreements are illegal which are likely to
195. Judgment of July 20, 1954, 4 BVERFG 7, 17.
196. Stability Law (Stabilitaetsgesetz) of June 8, 1967, [1967] BGBI. I 582; also
in STEUERGESETZE, supra note 7, at 910.
197. Riesenfeld, supra note 188, at 216; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 73-85; COHN,
supra note 1, at 7.155.-7.181.; see also supra note 188. But see infra V(B)(4).
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influence production or interfere with the functioning of the market
by means of restrictive practices. The following are the kinds of car-
tels which are permitted:""8
(1) Condition cartels (Konditionenkartelle), thus named for
their use of standardized sales contracts with the terms of the agree-
ment regulating mode of delivery, payment, etc.;
(2) Rebate cartels (Rabattkartelle), rebates with the delivery of
goods; however, rebates to the final consumer are not concerned as
those are exclusively subject to the Rebates Statute (Rabattgesetz);0 9
(3) Crisis cartels (Strukturkrisenkartelle), cartels to reduce pro-
duction capacity in industrial branches that have been hit by eco-
nomic decline (but not by a general recession);
(4) Standardization cartels (Rationalisierungskartelle), uniform
use of standardized measures and patterns;
(5) Specialization cartels (Spezialisierungskartelle), standardi-
zation by specialization;
(6) Export cartels (Exportkartelle);
(7) Import Cartels (Importkartelle);
(8) Special cartels (Sonderkartelle), also known as Ministerkar-
telle because these are permitted only by express order of the Minis-
ter of Economics.
All of these are lawful only under certain circumstances. The
Ministerkartell has been granted only twice '00 because it is meant as
an ultima ratio.
"Other contracts" (sonstige Vertraege) in the language of Sec-
tions 15-21, if they restrain price setting or other terms regulating sale
of goods or services, are void, subject to exceptions in Sections 16-21
relating to vertically fixed resale prices. Price recommendations are
not automatically unlawful, but there is a strong presumption of
illegality. Similarly, licensing agreements are prohibited (with cer-
tain reservations) if the restraint imposed on the licensee is greater
than required by the scope of the license. 0'
The Federal Cartel Authority22 acts as a supervisory body to
prevent abuses by dominant companies and consolidated enterprises.
Any consolidation of enterprises having more than 20 percent market
share or more than 10,000 employees or more than 500 million DM
198. Riesenfeld, supra note 188, at 218; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 75-76.
199. Rebates Statute (Rabattgesetz) of November 25, 1933, [1933] RGB1. I 1011;
also in SCHOENFELDER, supra note 7, at 78.
200. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 77.
201. FULDA, supra note 1, at 670 et seq.; see also supra note 187.
202. See supra note 189.
1973
238 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
turnover or a balance sheet total of more than one billion DM must
be reported to the Federal Cartel Authority."3 Not surprisingly, many
problems appear which are familiar to the American antitrust lawyer:
determining the dominant position in the market (market power),
relevant market, and interchangeability of products.
Non-contractual behavior restraining competition is covered in
Sections 25-27. There must be no compulsion, threat, incitement,
boycott, or other activity to accuse another of committing infractions
of the Cartel Law. No enterprise may refuse to deal with or supply
goods or services to another for the purpose of restraining competi-
tion, nor can trade associations or professional organizations refuse
admission to applicants without justification. Section 28 et seq. con-
cern less essential details previously mentioned. 04 Sections 44-109
contain numerous rules of procedure.
Special attention should be paid to Section 38(2). Its first clause
forbids complicity in restrictive practices, the second prohibits insti-
gation of practices by recommendations which have led in the past
to evasion of the law by parallel behavior, and the third clause makes
an exception for small and medium size enterprises which follow price
recommendations in order to further competition against large enter-
prises.
3. Weaknesses and Reform of the Law Against Restraints of
Trade
From the moment the Cartel Law became effective on January
1, 1958, much criticism has been voiced from many sources. One
illustration is instructive. Although the "Tar-Dyes Judgment ' 25 was
decided only in 1972, it already has become an ill-famed case. The
antitrust section of the highest court, the Federal Supreme Court
(Bundesgerichtshof) refused to recognize blatant parallel behavior. It
did not give proper attention to the defendants' behavior which,
under German law, should conclusively infer an illegal meeting of the
minds. The court's decision, called mechanistic and shallow by most
observers, has lead to a significant reform of Section 25 dealing with
discriminatory behavior.2 °0 This step has brought German antitrust
law into closer harmony with Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome.
In addition, the abolishment of vertically fixed retail prices has
long been proposed 07 and recently accomplished.20 German enter-
203. FULDA, supra note 1, at 652. But see infra V(B)(4)(a).
204. See supra V(B)(2) first textual paragraph.
205. Judgment of December 17, 1970, 24 BGHST 54; cf. Lieberknecht, Antitrust
Law in West Germany, 27 Bus. LAWYER 803, n. 1 (1972). But see infra V(B)(4)(c).
206. Sandrock, Die zweite Kartelnovelle, 28 DER BETRIEBSBERATER 101 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Sandrock]. But see infra V(B)(4)(c).
207. Sandrock, supra note 206, at 105.
208. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt/Germany), May 16, 1973, at 17,
VOL. 3:197
DOING BUSINESS IN GERMANY
prises have found it difficult to maintain fixed prices because re-
imports from other EEC member countries have upset the system
and cannot be prevented under the law of the European Communi-
ties.' 9 The definition of dominant position in the market is another
point recently reformed.2 10 Meanwhile, the far-reaching effects unfa-
vorable to competition by licensing agreements have been attacked
as undesirable."1' But the most significant reform to be faced was that
of economic concentration .
1 2
4. Recent Amendments to the Law Against Restraints of Trade
The reform of German antitrust law became reality through a
very recent amendment to the Law Against Restraints of Trade. 213 Its
main features are the following:
a. Preventive Merger Control
The old Section 23 essentially corresponds to the new section
col. 3; id. May 19, 1973, at 21, col. 1. But see infra V(B)(4)(e).
209. Sandrock, supra note 206, at 106. Consten & Grundig v. E.E.C. Commission,
CCH Comm. Mkt. Rep. 8046 (1966); Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, cited in
Jones, in/ra note 215, at 613.
The rule in the Consten case has been somewhat undercut, if not undermined, by
two exceptions granted by the Commission to Omega watches in 1970 and to French
luxury perfume producers Lancome, Dior, Rochas, and Guerlain in 1973. In both
instances the Commission authorized selective distribution to exclusive dealers only,
the rationale in the watch case being that a high quality system of guarantee and repair
required the singling out of the best retailers. While one may go along with that
reasoning and accept it as a justification for actions which could be called quasi-price
fixing and which result in eliminating competition to a substantial degree, the situa-
tion is even more doubtful with regard to luxury perfumes. The only service in question
is to guarantee that because perfumes do not keep for an unlimited time, they will be
replaced by new products of the same kind if necessary. A measure which would not
lead to such a drastic decrease in competition would have been to have expiration dates
imprinted as is the case already with many drugs, films, and food articles. However,
this was refused by the producers for reasons of prestige; the Commission as a whole,
against the opposition of the Commissioner for Competition, succumbed to the per-
fume producers arguments. [This attitude of the Commission stands in contrast to
that of the German Cartel Authority which seems determined to take on a tough stand,
especially since the enactment of the reform of German antitrust on August 4, 1973;
see in/ra V(B)(4)1. Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt/Germany), Septem-
ber 5, 1973, at 17, col. 1-2 and 3-5.
210. Sandrock, supra note 206, at 106. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frank-
furt/Germany), May 16, 1973, at 17, col. 3 reports that the future law will consider 33
percent market share as a dominant position. For the content of that new law, see infra
V(B)(4)(b).
211. Cf. FULDA, supra note 1, at 676 et seq.
212. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt/Germany), May 16, 1973, at 17,
col. 3; see also supra III(E) and note 143; but see in/ra V(B)(4).
213. The Law Amending the Law Against Restraints of Trade of August 3, 1973,
[1973] BGBI. I 917. The law became effective on August 4, 1973. The new sections
22, 23, and 24 were given retroactive effect as of June 7, 1973 to the degree that they
deal with merger control; vertically fixed retail prices are legal until December 31,
1973.
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which, now in some more detail, defines merger for the purposes of
antitrust and provides for registration of mergers of companies to-
gether enjoying a market share of 20 percent or having at least 10,000
employees or turning over at least 500 million DM.
The old Section 24 somewhat resembles the new Section 24(a).
It declares illegal a merger as defined in Section 23 unless there is
proof that competition is advanced to a degree which outweighs the
disadvantages of dominant position. In Section 24(3) one finds an
exceptional tolerance of such a merger to be possible by permission
of the Minister of Economics if the restraint of trade is balanced by
advantages to the national economy or if the merger is justified by a
paramount public interest (ueberragendes Interesse der Allgemain-
heit); this judgment is to take into account the competitiveness of the
enterprises on extraterritorial markets. Permission can be granted
only under the condition that the principle of a free market economy
(marktwirtschaftliche Ordnug) remain untampered.
Section 24(7) gives ample powers to the Federal Cartel Authority
(Bundeskartellamt) to enforce its orders by levying one or several
fines between 10,000 and 1 million DM.
Section 24(a) requires registration of proposed mergers if two or
more enterprises each had a turnover exceeding 1 billion DM during
the previous year.
Section 24(b) for the first time establishes a so-called monopoly
committee (Monopolkommission) which is to regularly supervise and
comment on the development of mergers.
b. Increased Supervision of Dominant Enterprises
Section 22(1) defines a dominant enterprise as one which en-
counters no substantial competition or which has a superior (ueberra-
gend) position vis-a-vis its competitors. The latter judgment is based
upon market share, financial resources, access to supplying and sales
markets, combinations with other enterprises, and legal or factual
barriers to market-entry of newcomers.
Section 22(3) establishes a presumption of dominant position of
an enterprise turning over 250 million DM if it holds one-third of the
market. Up to three enterprises turning over 100 million DM are
presumed dominant when holding one-half, and up to five enterprises
of the same size when holding two-thirds of the market.
c. Prohibition of Concerted Behavior
Section 25(1) prohibits concerted behavior among enterprises or
groups of enterprises which would be illegal if committed in accord-
ance with an agreement, the so-called breakfast-cartels (Fruehs-
tueckskartelle). This provision eliminates the problems created by
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the Tar-Dyes Case214 which left defendants-respondents untouched
because the court failed to see an agreement despite supporting evi-
dence of a tacit agreement clearly demonstrated by parallel behavior.
d. Improved Conditions of Competition for Small and
Medium Size Enterprises
An attempt to protect small and medium size enterprises from
the ever-growing industrial giants is made in Section 5(b). The regu-
lation exempts agreements bringing about standardization (Rational-
isierung) by some means of cooperation other than specialization
(Spezialisierung), which are declared legal, from the general prohibi-
tion of Section 1 if competition is not substantially impaired and if
the agreement is to promote small and medium size enterprises.
e. Abolishment of Vertically Fixed Retail Prices
Section 16 abolishes vertically fixed retail prices as of January
1, 1974, with the exception of products of publishing companies. In
the remaining branches price recommendations will be permitted;
however, no pressure on retailers is allowed. Two-fold abuse of price
recommendations to coerce retailers will entail action prohibiting the
enterprise from setting any recommendations at all. This provision
is intended to do away with both artificially high recommendations
called "moon prices" (Mondpreise) and loss leaders (Lockvogelan-
gebote).
C. European Antitrust Law
Any analysis of German antitrust law is incomplete without ref-
erence to the European Community law.1 5 As the Community law is
more accessible to U.S. lawyers than the German law, it is sufficient
to say it roughly follows the lines of German antitrust law. The Euro-
pean law of competition is codified in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
of Rome and in ordinances relating to them."t 6
214. See supra note 205.
215. STEIN & HAY, supra note 1 at 612 et seq.; C. RUNGE, EINFUEHRUNG IN DAS
RECHT DER EUROPAEISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN 78-90 (1972) [hereinafter cited as RUNGE];
see also, Adeler & Belman, Antimerger Enforcement in Europe-Trends and
Prospects, 8 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 31 (1973).
216. For an English language edition of the treaties, see EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
TREATIES (Sweet & Maxwell's Legal Editorial Staff ed. 1972). A. CAMPBELL, COMMON
MARKET LAW, 2 vols. (1969) provides both the text and annotations and reference
material. See also Riesenfeld, supra note 188, at 200 et seq. (arts. 85 and 86 are
translated at 200 and 201); FULDA, supra note 1, at 105 et seq. (arts. 85 and 86 at 108-
09); J. HEATH, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MONOPOLIES, MERGERS AND RESTRICTIVE
PRACTICES (1971); W. ALEXANDER, THE E.E.C. RULES OF COMPETITION (1973); Jones, A
Primer on Production and Dominant Positions Under E.E.C. Competition Law, 7 INT'L
LAWYER 612 (1973); Canenbley, Price Discrimination and EEC Cartel Law: A Review
of the Kodak Decision of the Commission of the European Communities, 17 ANTITRUST
BULL. 269 (1972); Rahl, Relationship of U.S. to EEC Antitrust Law, in Theberge, supra
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As to the relationship between national and Community law, the
European Court of Justice attributes supremacy to Community
law.2" It does not hesitate to allow proceedings in the national courts
while EEC proceedings are pending, and likewise it refuses to take
into consideration fines already imposed by national courts when it
sets fines under Community law."1 8
Many of the questions being discussed in German law were
broached in the much publicized Continental Can Case, decided in
February 1973.219 In it, the European Court of Justice rules that Arti-
cle 86 may apply to mergers if there is an abuse of dominant position.
This is concluded by the legal uniformity of Articles 85 and 86. The
aim of these articles is to assure the functioning of the market accord-
ing to the principle of free competition, which can be achieved only




Labor law220 applies to employees who, under a labor contract,
hold jobs which require subordination and execution of orders.2 2 1 This
note 1, at 79, 83-86 (with valuable further references at 86-88) [hereinafter cited as
Rahl]. See also supra note 188.
217. STEIN & HAY, supra note 1, at 200 et seq.; Deringer, supra note 187, at 65;
M. ZULEEG, DAS RECHT DER EUROPAEISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFrEN im INNERSTAATLICHEN
BEREICH (1969) (Heymanns Verlag, Koeln/Germany); RUNGE, supra note 214, at 108-
12; cf. Zaphiriou, Note, 1971 J. Bus. L. 252, and 1973 J. Bus. L. 89.
218. Rahl, supra note 215, at 79; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 83; see also infra VIII
and note 272.
219. Judgment of February 21, 1973, BGH in 26 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT
966 (1973); see Continental Can Co. v. E.E.C. Commission, 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
603 (1973); cf. on the Commission's decision 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 316 (1972), and
Note, 1972 J. Bus. L. 263. See also Deringer, supra note 187, at 70; Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung (Frankfurt/Germany), February 23, 1973, at 19, col. 4-6.
220. Generally see Kahn-Freund, Labor Law and Social Security, in I STEIN &
NICHOLSON, supra note 1, at 297 et seq.; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 92-100.
221. German law distinguishes between what may be described as ordinary work-
ers or laborers (Arbeiter); employees, meaning white collar or at least gray collar
workers (Angestellte); and civil servants (Beamte) who traditionally enjoy specific
privileges (e.g., permanent employment except in cases of severe crime, old age pen-
sion) and have certain duties (e.g., loyalty towards the state as the employer). These
principles are known as the "traditional principles of the professional civil service"
(hergebrachte Grundsaetze des Berufsbeamtentums) and are anchored in art. 33 (5)
Basic Law (GG.).
The civil service as an organizational and institutional principle is under attack
for alleged inflexibility and lack of competitiveness (promotion by seniority rather than
merit cannot lure qualified people from private employers), and substantial revisions
are possible in the future.
The distinction between workers (Arbeiter) and employees (Angestellte) is fading
away rapidly as many companies have promoted their workers to "honorary employ-
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body of law has been developing since the late nineteenth century and
is scattered in numerous codes, statutes and case law.22 The First
Labor Compilation Law of 19693 is a first step towards a comprehen-
sive Labor Code (Arbeitsgesetzbuch). To interpret these laws, a sepa-
rate system of labor courts exists (Arbeitsgerichtsbarkeit). 2
For purposes of information, several legal rules will be mentioned
without further comment on the legal problems involved."' Particu-
lar statutory provisions are designed to protect minors, pregnant
women, and the disabled. Children are not allowed to work before the
age of 14; pregnant women are excused from work six weeks before
and eight weeks after childbirth; and private enterprises with more
than 16 employees have to offer one job out of every 16 to a disabled
person. Mass dismissals (more than ten percent of the employees)
require notification to the enterprise council (Betriebsrat)26 and
clearance by the state labor authority (Landesarbeitsamt).
2 2 7
B. Co-Determination (Mitbestimmung)
A characteristic of German labor law is the so-called co-
determination (Mitbestimmung) of labor in the management of en-
terprises. 228 Any enterprise having five or more regularly employed
workers or employees (arbeitnehmer) 2 1 must have an enterprise
ees" (Ehrenangestellte) or plain employees for reasons of prestige.
When referring to either workers or employees, the law usually describes an indi-
vidual as an "Arbeitnehmer" (one who takes work). Correspondingly, an employer
because an "Arbeitgeber" (one who gives work). -
222. For a collection of statutory law see NIPPERDEY, supra note 7. An excellent
compendium is G. SCHAUB, ARBEITSRECHTSHANDBUCH (1972) [hereinafter cited as
SCHAUB].
223. First Labor Compilation Law (Erstes Arbeitsrechtsbereinigungsgesetz) of
August 14, 1969, [1969] BGB1. 1 1106; also in NIPPERDEY, supra note 7, at 2001.
224. Cole, The Role of the Labor Courts in Western Germany, 18 J. OF POL. 479
(1956); COHN, supra note 1, at 59.; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 93.
225. A good compendium in German is SCHAUB, supra note 221.
226. On the enterprise council, see infra VI(B) and note 229.
227. Sections 17, 18 Law on Protection Against Dismissal (Kuendigungs-
schutzgesetz) of August 25, 1969, [19691 BGBI. 1 1317; also in NIPPERDEY, supra note
7, at 152.
228. On co-determination see Winkhaus, supra note 11, at 1287-89; Beal, Co-
determination in German Industry: Origins of Co-determination, 8 IND. & LAB. REL.
REV. 483 (1955); Conard, supra note 2, at 102 et seq.; Steefel, supra note 102, at 537 et
seq.; Winkhaus, Co-determination of Employees in West German Companies, 27 Bus.
LAWYER 879 (1971/72); W. GARCIN, COGESTION ET PARTICIPATION DANS LEs ENTREPRISES
DES PAYS DU MARCHE COMMUN 15-267 (1968) (Editions Jupiter, Paris); Biedenkopf,
Mitbestimmung am Scheideweg, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frank-
furt/Germany), December 9, 1972, at 17; Ballerstedt, Zurueck zue Klassenwahl?, Die
Zeit (Hamburg/Germany), March 23, 1973, at 42; Bucerius, Der Krieg vom letzten
Mal, Die Zeit (Hamburg/Germany), May 4, 1973, at 48; BAERMANN, supra note 133, at
190-95, 257-59.
229. See supra note 220, last paragraph.
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council (Betriebsrat). 30 This council plays a vital role in negotiating
with the employer.
1. Historical Background
The roots of co-determination are found in canonical and consti-
tutional law and efforts by papal or feudal subjects to take an active
part in making political decisions. 3 ' Surprisingly, the German codifi-
cations implementing co-determination were enacted after World
War II under strong influence and pressure by the Allied Powers in
order to divest the coal mining and steel industries of their former
power.
It is noteworthy to emphasize that the initiators of co-
determination were opposed to the German postwar concept of the
"social market economy" (soziale Marktwirtschaft).2 2 Quite
strangely, both of these concepts, supposedly irreconcilable with each
other, have been co-existing since then.
2. Present Law
Co-determination is extensively regulated in the 1972 Labor
Management Relations Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz).113 This is an
elaborate version of the 1951 Co-determination Law 34 and the 1952
Labor Management Relations Act.23 5 The Co-determination Law pro-
vided that all capital-companies in the coal and steel industries with
at least 1,000 employees create a supervisory councill3 composed of
five share-owners, five employees, and one neutral member to be
chosen jointly by the other ten representatives. 27 This is the so-called
qualified co-determination (qualifizierte Mitbestimmung) whereas
230. Labor Management Relations Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) of January 15,
1972, [1972] BGBl. 1 13; also in NIPPERDEY, supra note 7, at 570. The Act is com-
mented on and translated by M. PELTZER, LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr (1972).
On the Act's predecessors, see infra VI(B)(2) and notes 234, 235, 237.
See also Fabricius, The German Law of 1972 on the Organisation of Enterprises,
1972 J. Bus. L. 340; Ficker, A Project for a European Corporation, 1970 J. Bus. L. 156,
168-69; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 96-99.
231. Section VI(B)(1) of this article relies on BAERMANN, supra note 133, at 191-
95.
232. See supra V(B)(1) and note 194.
233. For citation of the Act see supra note 229.
234. Co-determination Law (Mitbestimmungsgesetz) of May 21, 1951, [1951]
BGBI. I 347; also in NIPPERDEY, supra note 7, at 573.
235. Labor Management Relations Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) of October 11,
1952, [1952] BGBI. I 681. No translation of this first Act is known, however, the
translation mentioned supra note 229 also casts some light on the 1952 Act.
236. On supervisory council, see supra III(D)(5) and notes 109, 110.
237. The regulation of the Co-determination Law of 1951 was extended to holding
companies by the Co-determination Supplementing Law (Mitbestim-
mungsergaenzungsgesetz) of August 7, 1956, [1956] BGB1. I 707; also in NIPPERDEY,
supra note 7, at 574. See Ficker, A Project for a European Corporation, 1970 J. Bus.
L. 156, 169 n.14.
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ordinary co-determination under the 1952 Labor Management Rela-
tions Act applied to enterprises in any industry of at least 500 em-
ployees where a third, rather than half, of the members of the super-
visory board were labor representatives.
The 1972 law vastly strengthens the position of the labor unions
in general and of the enterprise council in particular. Any enterprise
of at least five employees must have such a council. The initiative to
form one, however, is left to labor. The council enjoys extended rights
in social, personnel, and economic matters. Co-determination in so-
cial matters covers working-hours and breaks, manner of payment,
vacations and control of workers' performance. In personnel matters,
the enterprise council must be informed about selection, training,
evaluation, transfer, and dismissal of employees. Economic co-
determination further manifests itself in the employer's duty to es-
tablish a so-called social plan (Sozialplan) which, in case of substan-
tial changes in production methods or number of employees, is to
protect the individual worker's financial and personal interests. En-
terprises with 100 or more employees must form an economic commit-
tee (Wirtschaftsausschuss) which enjoys informative and consulta-
tive rights. In all matters there are compulsory arbitrational proceed-
ings in case agreement between the employer and the enterprise
council cannot be reached.
3. Outlook
Questions surrounding the future of co-determination take on an
ever-growing significance with the emerging harmonization of law
within the EEC member countries."' Thus, it will be helpful to look
at some of the justifications and alterations that are suggested for co-
determination of labor.
A good survey of the German legal scene is presented in a com-
pendium prepared by a committee known as the Co-determination
Committee (Mitbestimmungskommission or Biedenkopf-
kommission, after its reporter Professor Biedenkopf). 3 9 The report,
238. See infra IX.
239. The reader is referred back to BAERMANN, supra note 133, at 191-95 where the
voluminous report is condensed.
Professor Biedenkopf has lately put forward a slightly modified suggestion of his
own. Out of twelve members of the supervisory board, six would represent the share-
holders and six the employees; however, one of the latter would especially represent
the executives [called "leading employees" (leitende Angestellte) in German law] and
another one of the latter six would be assigned the financial interests of the employees.
These interests typically concern the problems of employees' shares, pension funds,
and other funds created for the purpose of accumulating assets to be put at the disposi-
tion of employees [the technical term is "accumulation of financial assets" (Vermoe-
gensbildung)]. In proposing this 6:4:1:1 model, Biedenkopf also provides for proce-
dures in case of a deadlock vote in the supervisory board which are basically designed
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presented to the public in 1970, made an analysis of past develop-
ments and suggested solutions for the future. The principle of co-
determination is well accepted; the discussions only center around
the composition of the supervisory board. According to the commit-
tee's proposal, six representatives of the share-holders and four repre-
sentatives of labor would jointly select two additional members of the
supervisory board. The proposed preponderance of the influence of
the capital is justified by the principle of the entrepreneurial risk.
Labor protection branches out into numerous areas: enterprise
protection (Betriebsschutz) comprising safety standards on the job,
protection of working-hours (Arbeitszeitschutz), protection of pay-
ment (Lohnschutz), protection against dismissals (Kuendigungs-
schutz), protection for women (Frauenarbeitsschutz), for juveniles
(Jugendarbeitsschutz), for home workers (Heimarbeitsschutz), and
for the disabled (Schwerbeschaedigtenschutz) .241
Democratization is fundamentally incompatible with present
company law because it is not the supervisory board but the general
meeting which has the original power to control the managing board
by its elective decisions. Those arguing in favor of extended co-
determination in the supervisory board in order to curb the power of
super-companies have been proven wrong by experience, at least up
to the present. The concentration of economic power in ever fewer
hands has not been prevented or even impaired by labor. Quite to the
contrary, the German Federation of Labor (Deutscher Gewerk-
schaftsbund) owns some of the most influential oligopolistic enter-
prises, for example, the Bank for Common Economy (Bank fuer Ge-
meinwirtschaft), the New Home (Neue Heimat) home builders,
41
food chains, and travel agencies.
It is probably safe to suggest that the real justification of co-
determination lies in the new understanding of the relationship be-
to assure that the smooth functioning of the enterprise not be jeopardized by the
principle of co-determination. Not surprisingly, this model has been criticized from
both camps. Biedenkopf would stress the partnership character of the relations be-
tween employers and employees, enforce the protection of private property, integrate
the law of companies and the law of labor management relations into one law of
enterprises, and incorporate the principle of the free market policy into company law;
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt/Germany), September 1, 1973, at 1, col.
2-4 and at 6, col. 5-6.
240. For further information, see the two volumes quoted supra note 221.
241. Eglau, "Koenig Alberts" Allmacht, An der "Neuen Heimat" wird jetzt auch
intern Kritik laut, Die Zeit (Hamburg/Germany), May 4, 1973, at 33, col. 2-5;
Broichhausen, Der unersaettliche Bau-Loewe, "Neue Heimat" - ein Mam mut-
Unternehmen im Gewerkschafts-Auftrag, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frank-
furt/Germany), June 30, 1973, at 15. See also Der Spiegel (Hamburg/Germany), July
2, 1973, at 34 on labor problems of the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund in its own school
of training.
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tween employer and employees. Increasingly these groups are seen as
partners rather than opponents in the production process.
24 2
It must be made clear that any change in the present law of co-
determination will require reforms of the law of stock corporations,
of limited liability companies, and of company law in general. Almost
all of the proposals in one way or another touch upon the number of
members in the supervisory board, the duty of board members to
keep secrets, the representation of executives (leitende Angestellte)
and numerous other questions of the law of industrial enterprises.
The labor unions and many Social Democrats demand "co-
determination on a par" (paritaetische Mitbestimmung), i.e. equal
representation of labor and capital. In this regard they are opposed
by their coalition partners, the Free Democrats, who advocate a 4 : 2
: 4 model, with two seats going to the executives. 2 3 Apart from the
familiar problem of where to draw the line (between a regular em-
ployee and one with executive status)2 4 this scheme is questionable
because of its difficult applicability to limited liability companies
and person-companies.
A similar critique would apply to a proposal to adopt a board-
system comparable to Anglo-American law. This indeed would con-
stitute a complete alienation from German company law which
sharply distinguishes between the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat),
the managing board (Vorstand), and the general meeting (Hauptver-
sammlung) .24
Still another proposal 246 suggests a supervisory board made up in
equal parts by representatives of capital, labor and of the representa-
tives of the "enterprise interest." The latter would be outsiders cho-
sen jointly by the representatives of capital and labor. Management
would continue to work to make profit, while distribution or other use
of profits would be decided by the supervisory board.
This brief survey shows that the race is still open to anybody
with new ideas. Undeniably, mass-production has brought serious
problems. Unusually high rates of illness, unexplained absence, and
bad performance call for a reconsideration not only of production
techniques, but also of labor law.
242. See Engels, Kompetenz und Verantwortung, Die Zeit (Hamburg/Germany),
October 13, 1972, at 46-47.
243. The government, consisting of a coalition between the Social Democrats and
the Free Democrats, may soon be able to reach a compromise and suggest a 6:1:5
(share-holders: "leading employees": employees) model; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung (Frankfurt/Germany), September 4, 1973, at 1, col. 2-4.
244. Steefel, supra note 102, at 537 n.149.
245. See supra III(D)(5) and note 109.
246. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt/Germany), April 9, 1973, at 13,
col. 3.
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A number of private entrepreneurs are trying incentive programs
which may one day become workable alternatives. Different models
are being tested currently, mostly by medium sized companies owned
by individuals or families. Payment is often partially in shares, or
other devices are used by which the individual's and the enterprise's
financial interests are interrelated. The experience so far has been
favorable.1
47
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGES AND ACCESS TO THE COURTS
The first part of the Basic Law (GG) contains what could be
called a bill of rights.2 48 Certain rights are declared basic rights (Grun-
drecht), and these rights enjoy constitutional status making them
privileged over conflicting legal positions. They were originally de-
signed to protect the individual citizen from interference by the gov-
ernment but have gradually taken on an affirmatory character by
assuring, under certain conditions, positive rights both against the
government and individuals. These basic rights play an extremely
important part in German administrative and constitutional law.
A certain number of the basic rights may become relevant for
foreign parties, especially Article 3 incorporating the principle of
equal treatment before the law, and Article 14 guaranteeing private
property. However, although many basic rights are granted regardless
of nationality, on paper there remains some doubt as to exactly how
far foreign parties can go in court in invoking basic rights. Article 19
(3) of the Basic Law (GG) attributes basic rights to domestic legal
persons, but remains silent on foreign legal persons. Nevertheless, it
is safe to suggest that German courts will give virtually identical legal
protection to domestic and foreign parties regardless of capacity to
hold legal rights. This analysis should be on safe ground because
Article 25 of the Basic Law (GG) incorporates the generally recog-
nized rules of international law into German law.249
Another significant constitutional provision is Article 19 (4)
which allows recourse to the courts to anybody who has been denied
his rights by public executive authorities. This rule is essentially a
247. Cf. Braun, German Legislation to Encourage Capital Accumulation by
Employees, 17 LAB. L. J. 371 (1966); G. SCHWERDTFEGER, MITBESTIMMUNG IM PRIVATEN
UNTERNEHMEN (1972); M. JUNGBLUT, NICHT VOM LOHN ALLEIN (1973).
248. COHN, supra note 1, at 48; Barnet, The Protection of Constitutional Rights
in Germany, 45 VA. L. REV. 1139 (1959); Lewan, The Significance of Constitutional
Rights for Private Law: Theory and Practice in West Germany, 17 INT'L & ComP. L.
Q. 571 (1968); cf. Doehring, Non-Discrimination and Equal Treatment Under the
European Rights Convention and the West German Constitution with Particular Ref-
erence to Discrimination Against Aliens, 18 Am. J. ComP. L. 305 (1970). For citation
of the Basic Law (GG), see supra note 153.
249. COHN, supra note 1, at 49. But see Mann, The U. S. Treaty of Commerce with
Germany and the German Constitution, 65 AM. J. COmP. L. 793 (1971).
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In commenting on the problem of the "nationality" or "domi-
cile" of a company under German law, the principal place of business
is the point of domicile with regard to virtually all questions: capacity
to hold legal rights, legal organization of a company, rights and duties
of its partners and managing directors, and access to the courts.
2 51
Recognizing a foreign corporation in German law means ac-
knowledging the fact that the corporation or company is capable of
holding legal rights under that foreign law.
252
VIII. Control of Foreign Exchange
Until some years ago, control of foreign exchange in the Federal
Republic of Germany was negligible.25 But, since the international
monetary crisis repeatedly caused a severe problem in recent years,
Germany's foreign exchange has shifted from almost absolute free-
dom to some protection of the national economy and even interna-
tional trade from speculation in national currencies.
Since 1961 the Law on Foreign Trade (Aussenwirt-
schaftsgesetz) 54 has given far-reaching powers to the government to
regulate foreign trade. Restrictions may generally be imposed if Ger-
many's obligations under international treaties or foreign restrictive
activities so require-an extremely rare case so far. A list of specific
transactions which may be restricted is similarly limited; at present
it includes agricultural exports to countries outside the EEC.
Substantial restrictions do exist today in the import and export
of capital. Of particular significance is Article 23 of the Law on For-
eign Trade (Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz) which authorizes the govern-
ment to prohibit the sale of real property by residents to nonresi-
dents, the purchase of bonds, securities and shares by foreigners, and
250. T. MAUNZ, G. DUERIG & R. HERZOG, GRUNDGESETZ, KOMMENTAR (1971) notes
52-61 on art. 19 (4) Basic Law (GG).
251. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 288; FULDA, supra note 1, at 767 n.6; BRUECHER,
supra note 109, at 533; ZAPHIRIOU, supra note 1, at 127; Conard, supra note 2, at 61 et
seq.; MUELLER, supra note 1, at 24; Kronstein, The Nationality of International
Enterprises, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1962); Van Hecke, Nationalities of Companies
Analyzed, 8 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIr VOOR INTERNATIONAAL REcHT 223 (1961); KEGEL,
supra note 142, at 229-35.
252. KEGEL, supra note 142, at 233; ZAPHIRIOU, supra note 1, at 129-30.
253. Cf. Dagon, Regulation of Capital Influx: Recent Developments in France,
Germany, and Switzerland, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 38 (1965); STEIN & HAY, supra note 1,
at 235 et seq., 284 et seq., 788 et seq.
254. Law on Foreign Trade (Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz) of April 28, 1961, [1961]
BGBI. I 481, last amended by the so-called Cash Deposit Law; see infra note 258. Cf.
M. PELTZER AND K. NEBENDORF, BANKING IN GERMANY (1973).
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the payment of interest on foreign bank accounts. 5  Many restrictions
are quite short-lived. A brief sketch of the restrictions in force in
August 1973 is instructive. Foreigners cannot buy German bonds,
securities, shares in stock corporations,25 (shares in limited liability
companies are exempt); foreign investments require clearance by the
Federal Reserve Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) and Germans cannot
take out credits abroad totalling more than 50,000 DM. The last
provision has been replaced, however, by the Cash Deposit Law (Bar-
denpotgesetz) which reaches the same result in a different way.
257
Since March 1972, the Cash Deposit Law has been stiffened several
times; 258 at present, German residents, including German branches
and subsidiaries of foreign enterprises, must deposit 100 percent of
the amount of foreign borrowing exceeding 50,000 DM. The rate to
be deposited changed from 40 to 100 percent, and the maximum
amount allowed from 2 million to 50,000 DM. These developments
clearly demonstrate that these restrictions are a reflection of the in-
ternational monetary crisis. At present, regular reading of reliable
newspapers 2 s is mandatory to keep up with foreign exchange control.
IX. PERSPECTIVES FOR LEGAL HARMONIZATION
The Treaty of Rome2 11 is to ensure within the member states the
free circulation of goods,'26 persons,212 services,2 63 and capital.264 Also,
255. Art. 23 is translated by BRUECHER, supra note 109, at 523.
256. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt/Germany), February 28, 1973, at
15, col. 4-5; June 14, 1973, at 13, col. 4-5; July 20, 1973, at 13, col. 4-5; cf. infra note
258.
257. Law of February 23, 1973, [19731 BGBI. I 109 (100 percent deposit over
50,000 DM).
258. The so-called Cash Deposit Law (Bardepotgesetz) of March 1, 1972, [1972]
BGB1. 217 (40 percent deposit of the amount exceeding 2,000,000 DM) and numerous
amending laws, e.g., of June 29, 1972, [1972] BGB1. I 999 (50 percent deposit of the
amount exceeding 500,000 DM). The current law is quoted at supra note 257. Cf.
Winkhaus, supra note 1, at 1296, but note that the law is given as of June 29, 1972.
Another effort to keep speculation out of Germany is being made by imposing on non-
resident holders of German bonds a so-called coupon tax; cf. MUELLER, supra note 1,
at 138.
259. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt/Germany) is suggested as a
reliable source of information. It is available in many foreign libraries and newsstands.
260. For English language editions of the Treaty see supra note 215.
261. FULDA, supra note 1, at 107.
262. STEIN & HAY, supra note 1, at 715 et seq.; FULDA, supra note 1, at 107; U.
EVERLING, THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT IN THE COMMON MARKET (1964); RUNGE, supra
note 214, at 65-69.
263. STEIN & HAY, supra note 1, at 765 et seq.; RUNGE, supra note 214, at 69-70;
FULDA, supra note 1, at 107.
264. STEIN & HAY, supra note 1, at 788 et seq.; RUNGE, supra note 214, at 70-71;
FULDA, supra note 1, at 107.
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common principles are envisaged in agriculture; 6 5 coal, steel, and
atomic energy;266 traffic and transportation;267 and foreign and domes-
tic trade. 2 8
The legislative bodies of the European Economic Communities
are entitled to make new law or to harmonize or coordinate existing
law. While few clear-cut definitions of harmonization or coordination
exist, it is sufficient here to agree with the experts who suggest that
harmonization is identical to coordination, approximation, or assimi-
lation. 6 ' Substantial accomplishments in harmonization already
exist or are about to materialize. 0 Examples are the introduction of
the value-added tax,27 1 the developments in the law of restrictive
trade practices, company law, inter-community sales, and creditor-
protection.
The present situation in the law of restrictive trade practices is
still unsatisfactory because of double, or even multiple, barriers.
2 12
Enterprises may have to comply with one or several national and
EEC antitrust laws; their actions may be legal under one system,
illegal under another, and the companies may incur separate fines.
This area of the law desperately needs harmonization which, unfor-
tunately, will not come about in the near future. U.S. enterprises, of
course, face the additional threat of U.S. antitrust laws.
273
In company law, draft directives and other legislative projects
produce quite an intelligible outline of the future law.274 The First
265. STEIN & HAY, supra note 1, at 364 et seq.; RUNGE, supra note 214, at 90-96.
For some of the more everyday consequences of a common agricultural policy see TIME,
(European Edition), April 30, 1973, at 8-9.
266. RUNGE, supra note 214, at 96-101.
267. RUNGE, supra note 214, at 101-04; STEIN & HAY, supra note 1, at 913.
268. STEIN & HAY, supra note 1, at 378 et seq.; RUNGE, supra note 214, at 30-34;
Kim, The Common Commercial Policy of the EEC, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L. 20 (1970).
269. BAERMANN, supra note 133, at 61; STEIN & HAY, supra note 1, at 776 et seq.;
RUNGE, supra note 214, at 34-41; Chloros, English Law and European Law: The Prob-
lem of Harmonisation, 36 RABELS ZEIrSCHRIFT FUER AUSLAENDISCHES UND INTERNATION-
ALES PRIVATREcHT 601 (1972).
270. Cf. Sprudzs, Status of Multilateral Treaties-Researcher's Mystery, Mess or
Muddle? 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 364 (1972); Majoros, Zur Krise der internationalen Kodifi-
kationspolitik, 6 ZEITSCHRIFr FUER RECHTSPOLITIK 65 (1973).
271. C. SHOUP, FISCAL HARMONIZATION IN COMMON MARKETS, 2 vols. (1967); RUNGE,
supra note 214, at 37-39; Massel, Future Business Trends in Europe, in Theberge,
supra note 1, at 143, 145-46; Hall, Note, "Value Added Tax," 1971 J. Bus. L. 326-28.
272. Schmitthoff, Editorial, 1973 J. Bus. L. 1 [hereinafter cited as Schmitthoffl;
Rahl, supra note 215, at 79.
273. Rahl, supra note 215, at 79.
274. Schmitthoff, supra 272, at 2-4; E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COM-
PANY LAWS: NATIONAL REFORM AND TRANSNATIONAL COORDINATION (1971); BAERMANN,
supra note 133; Massel, Future Business Trends in Europe, in Theberge, supra note 1,
at 144-45.
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Council Directive of March 9, 1970 on the capacity of the company
and its directors has become Community law. Six other draft direc-
tives 7 5 and a proposal of a draft statute of the European Company
based on Article 23576 together with recent and future reforms of
company law in member states 7 constitute further elements of har-
monization. Interestingly, the European Company has adopted many
traits of German law such as co-determination and the creation of two
separate boards .2 7 Likewise, in the law of inter-community sales and
creditor protection, uniform laws, draft conventions, and conventions
represent first steps on the long road to harmonized law.
79
275. See Schmitthoff, supra note 272, at 2-3 (draft directives on formation of the
company and maintenance of the capital, on mergers, on the accounts of the company,
on the organization of the company, on groups of companies, and on prospectuses of
securities). See also Zaphiriou, European Community Law, 1973 J. Bus. L. 199.
276. On the European company, see Ficker, A Project for a European Corporation,
1970 J. Bus. L. 156; 1971 id. at 167; Mann, The European Company, 19 INT'L & COMP.
L. Q. 468 (1970); Baermann, supra note 133, at 4, 50, 60, 143, 145; KEGEL, supra note
142, at 230-31; FULDA, supra note 1, at 767-69.
277. Schmitthoff, supra note 272, at 3-4; Schmitthoff, Editorial, 1973 J. Bus. L.
93; Sanders, The Reform of Dutch Company Law, 1973 J. Bus. L. 194.
278. Ficker, A Project for a European Corporation, 1971 J. Bus. L. 167, 174-80;
RUNGE, supra note 214, at 41.
279. Schmitthoff, supra note 272, at 4; Zaphiriou, European Community Law,






In international law there are a wide variety of legal beings. At
one end of the spectrum is the individual, an increasingly important
subject of international jurisprudence, and at the other is the state
itself, the archtype of the international legal person. Between the two
lie a number of entities, one of which is the national or ethnic minor-
ity group. This somewhat unfamiliar legal entity is composed of peo-
ple who wish to retain their distinctive culture, but cannot find ex-
pression through an independent state of their own.
Historically, the protection of minority group rights has been a
significant issue of international law. As early as 1696, the legal
scholar, Victoria, wrote of the rights of the Indian peoples of the
Western world in their dealings with Spain, rights which were not
grounded on statehood.' Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries the concept of minority rights slowly developed, almost
exclusively manifested by bilateral treaties guaranteeing religious
freedom to various national groups. 2 By the early twentieth century
protection of minorities was a major question of international law.
The concept gained its widest acceptance in the Minorities Sys-
tem of the League of Nations. The resulting shortlived institutional
protection was brought to an abrupt halt by World War II. Since then
the issue has remained relatively dormant. Only a few remnants exist
today, e.g. debates over the legal status of the Palestinian organiza-
tions.
Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the 25 years of neg-
lect may soon come to an end. Three basic factors support this con-
clusion: (1) the various conditions which directly caused this neglect
have either disappeared or are changing; (2) minority groups are
increasingly asserting their right to existence and protection; and (3)
the basic international machinery is once more available to respond
to their problems.
Before these factors are considered, however, it is necessary to
explore the development of minority groups as subjects of interna-
* Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law. B.S., Xavier University; J.D., Uni-
versity of Cincinnati; M.A., LL.M., Georgetown University.
1. FRANCIS[ DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BILLI RELECTIONS, 115-87 of the re-
printed 1696 translation in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964).
2. J.A. LAPONcE, THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES 23-9 (1960); see also INIS CLAUDE,
NATIONAL MINORITIES 6-9 (1955).
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tional law, including the role of the League of Nations and the United
Nations, and to consider what legal rights, if any, minority groups
possess under current international law.
II. Minority Groups as Subjects of International Law
The existence of minority groups as subjects of international law
stems from the development of the nation-state system. Until this
century, the struggle for human rights was not principally waged by
the individual against the state, but by an identifiable group (a na-
tion) against a state in which it was not the predominant nationality.
This resulted from the unique development of the European political
system both before and after the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. The
system's evolution was marked by a tendency to align the state with
the nation, thereby creating not a state system, but a nation-state
system.3 The idea of the nation-state system limits the demographic
extent of the state to that of the nation.
One difficulty with the nation-state is that racial minorities are
either rejected by the state or forced to lose their identity and become
part of the dominant group. Language, customs or religion of the
minority must be changed to that of the predominant nationality
within the state before full citizenship is complete.' Casualties of this
tendency to equate the nation with the state, included the integral
land empires of Austria, Turkey and the tiny states of Germany and
Italy.
It is natural for a nation to seek independent statehood. The
nation forms the state in order to further its self-interest, to insure
its survival, and to protect it from exploitation by a foreign nation-
state. Initially, the resulting union of nation and state, if achieved,
seldom precipitated an expansionist drive, the more immediate goal
being freedom from foreign domination. Later, as will be seen, this
was not always so.
Instances of abuse of minorities by the nation-state were widely
publicized in the nineteenth century. This publicity sparked public
approval of collective action against such abuses. One of many exam-
ples was popular support for European action against Turkey to pro-
tect the Armenians shortly after World War I.5
3. See P. POTTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, at
Ch. IV (1922) for a concise discussion of the rise of the present system of nation-states.
4. Max Lerner, in his introduction to MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE Dis-
couRsEs xxxiv (1940) concisely stated this tendency of the new nation-state to force
internal uniformity: "two elements were historically to enter into the composition of
the Western nation-state. One was national unity and the idea of a common tongue,
common culture and common economic limits. The second was a realistic concentra-
tion of power at the center in order to break down divisive barriers."
5. For a brief synopsis of the Armenian massacres during World War I see A.
MOOREHEAD, GALLIPOLI 98-101 (1956).
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A parallel development of importance was the emergence of the
colonial system. The African and Asian continents were being carved
up into various units controlled by European powers. This arbitrary
division led, in virtually every case, to the creation of national and
ethnic groups who were denied basic civil and political rights. While
the abuses of the European minorities would later be the base of the
Minorities System of the League of Nations,' the oppression of colo-
nial peoples would lead to the development of the Mandate System
which would deal, in substance, with many of the same problems.
In large part, the tensions of colonial expansion, combined with
the abuses of European minorities and their blossoming national con-
sciousness, served as a catalyst for World War I. 7 It is not surprising,
then, that 1919 was a crucial year in the development of minority
rights.
At that point, looking back at the experience of the nineteenth
century, two goals appeared in the area of national minority rights.
One was the need to protect national minorities living within the
various nation-states by either giving them their own nation-state or
by insuring, through supervision by an international body, equality
of treatment with that of the national majority with which they re-
sided.8 The second was the desire to protect colonial peoples by either
promoting their independence or insuring against their exploitation
by the colonial power. This desire to solve these national minority
problems inherited from the nineteenth century is clearly seen in the
League of Nations' efforts to protect the rights of minorities, and to
a much lesser extent in similar United Nations' efforts. The framers
of the League Covenant and the U.N. Charter, and the delegates who
later implemented these documents, may not have been specifically
aware that they were adding some substance to the shadowy legal
existence of collective groups, where the emphasis is on group rights
rather than on individual human rights. Certain real problems left
over from the nineteenth century were there and the League merely
attempted to solve them.
III. The League of Nations and the Minorities System
It was natural that the League of Nations should interest itself
in the national minorities problem. History and recent events had
shown that such groups needed protection from a nation-state. Wood-
row Wilson had attempted to write international protection of minor-
ities into the League Covenant itself, but was frustrated in his ef-
6. See Section III infra.
7. P. DE AzcARATE, PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES 1 (1967); see also CLAUDE,
supra note 2, at 10.
8. See Sectino Ill infra.
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forts The notion of minority group rights ran contrary to concepts
of individualism and state sovereignty on which the League was
based.'" Nevertheless, through various treaties, declarations, institu-
tions, and actions associated with the League, there developed a sys-
tematic approach to the problem which became known as the Minori-
ties System.
As far as possible the Treaty of Versailles and related treaties
drew or confirmed the boundaries of states along nationalistic lines.,
The dominant theme of self-determination meant the liberation of
minorities from real or fancied abuses. These abuses ran the gamut
from outright physical persecution to the denial of certain social or
economic rights. If a minority could protect itself by forming its own
state then all "rights" of the minority would be secured.
It was, however, impossible to follow nationalistic lines com-
pletely in the formation of the new states. Therefore, to afford protec-
tion when a new nation-state contained a minority, several different
steps were taken:
(a) Special minorities treaties, each containing a guarantee
clause allowing direct access by minorities to the League, were con-
cluded between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia;"
(b) Provisions on the rights of minorities were included in the
peace treaties with Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey; 3
(c) Declarations pledging minority protection were made before
the Council of the League by Albania, Estonia, Finland, Iraq, Latvia,
and Lithuania on or after their admission to the League; 4
(d) Special provisions were included in the convention regarding
Memel concluded by the Allied Powers and Lithuania, 5 and in the
9. P. DE AZCARATE, PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES 1 (1967); see also CLAUDE,
supra note 2, at 10.
10. CLAUDE, supra note 2, at 14-15.
11. Id. at 14.
12. Id. at 19-20.
11. Parts II and III of the Versailles Treaty with Germany; Parts II and III of the
Treaty of Trianon with Hungary; and Parts II and III of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-
in-Lay with Austria. Found in 3 TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PRAC-
TICES AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER POWERS 1910-1923, at
3346, 3553, 3136 (1923).
12. Treaty of St. Germain, arts. 2, 7, 8, and 9; Treaty of Peace with Poland, arts.
2-8; Treaty with the Serb-Croat-Slovene States, arts. 2-10. Id. at 3699, 3714, 3731.
13. Treaty of Peace with Hungary, arts. 54-60; Treaty of Saint Germain-in-Lay
with Austria, arts. 62-69. Id. at 3529, 3141. Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, arts. 49-57;
Treaty of Peace with Turkey. 2 TREATIES OF PEACE 1919-1923, at 658, 789 (1924).
14. Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/221/43v.1 (1967).
15. Discussed in Green, The United Nations and Human Rights, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE PROMOTION OF THE GENERAL WELFARE (R. Osher ed. 1957).
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convention concerning Upper Silesia concluded by Germany and Po-
land.'"
These instruments guaranteed mutatis mutandis protection of
life and liberty and freedom of religious worship for all inhabitants
of each country. In addition, they guaranteed the following "rights"
to minorities: (1) equality of legal, civil and political rights, especially
for admission to public employment; (2) free use of the mother tongue
in private intercourse, commerce, religion, the press, and at public
meetings and before courts; (3) a right, equal to that of other nation-
als, to maintain at their own expense charitable, social, or educa-
tional institutions; and (4) in districts where a considerable propor-
tion of the population belong to the minority, instruction in the state
elementary schools in the language of the minority.
Without enforcement clauses, these treaties, offering minorities
recourse to the League of Nations, and the declarations, spelling out
the rights to be protected, would probably have been ineffective.
Realizing this, the League Council took two dramatic steps. First,
and most importantly, it allowed direct petitioning to the Council by
the minorities themselves. Secondly, it created Minorities Commit-
tees to consider petitions and make inquiries into facts. Then, to
modify these major inroads on national sovereignty, the Council
chose to establish a strict screening procedure. The Secretary-
General was authorized to eliminate petitions that (1) requested sev-
erance of political relations between the minority and the state of
which it was a part, (2) emanated from an anonymous or unauthenti-
cated source, or (3) contained violent language.'"
The net result of these treaties and actions was the essence of the
Minorities System. The system was administered in large part by the
Minorities Section of the League Secretariat.'" Clearly, this was the
high-water mark in international concern with minority rights.
The League acted, often successfully, as moderator in the rela-
tions between minorities and the various nation-states involved.
Thus, at least superficially, a distinct limitation was placed on the
internal sovereignty of these states which had received international
recognition. The actual enforcement of this limitation depended, as
everything ultimately depends in an international organization, upon
the cooperation of the member states. The weakness of the system
16. Convention relating to Upper Silesia, May 15, 1922, 9 L.N.T.S. 465 (1922).
Discussed in I.F. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 152-158 (1958).
17. CLAUDE, supra note 2, at 15.
18. LEAGUE OF NATIONS ASSOCIATION, TEN YEAR REVIEW OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
119 (1930); C. WEBSTER, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN THEORY AND PRACI'CE 212 (1933).
19. P. DE AZCARATE, LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 123-30 (1945).
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was thus reflective of the reluctance of the states concerned to fully
cooperate.20
A. The League's Actions to Safeguard Minority Rights
From its very inception, the League Council's effort to assist
minorities ran into opposition from all sides." The small states were
especially concerned. They thought the provisions were not only de-
rogatory to their sovereign rights and an interference in their domes-
tic affairs, but also discriminatory.2 2 As only small powers were af-
fected by the treaties23 they thought that the Great Powers were im-
posing on other states obligations they were not prepared to accept
in regard to their own minorities.24 As a result, they "usually did
everything in their power to forestall petitions by imposing obstacles
to intimidate and discourage potential complainants." 5
The Council was also under continuous attack from the minori-
ties themselves on the ground that the Council did not give them an
equal chance to present their case.26 The German minorities outside
Germany were particularly vocal. Under the inspiration of the League
of Germans Abroad, a Congress of Minorities, which met annually
from 1925 to 1938, was formed to pressure the Council into the strong-
est forms of intervention.2 7 The German minorities were quick to
petition the Council, even in trivial matters.
A third, and ultimately fatal, source of difficulty came from
states who had national groups outside their borders. These states
attempted to use the minority question as an excuse to regain lost
territory. Germany and Hungary especially found it in the best inter-
est of their territorial ambitions to keep the unhappy state of their
minorities in other countries constantly before the public eye. This
was a dangerous game played with the peace of Europe.
As Germany's territorial ambitions increased so did its alleged
humanitarian interest in the protection of minorities.28 It encouraged
German minorities to petition the League. Between 1920 and 1929 of
the eighteen different minority groups petitioning the League, Ger-
man minority groups filed 18 percent of the total; in the next nine
20. Robinson, International Protection of Minorities and the Right of Self Deter-
mination, ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 70 (1971).
21. CLAUDE, supra note 2, at 15.
22. Id. at 26.
23. Poland, Czechslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, Austria, Hun-
gary, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Turkey and Iraq. Germany, a
major power, was affected in respect to Upper Silesia.
24. WEBSTER, supra note 18, at 210.
25. J. ROBINSON, WERE THE MINORITIES TREATIES A FAILURE? 175 (1943).
26. CLAUDE, supra note 2, at 25-35.
27. WALTERS, supra note 16, at 405, 406.
28. J.B. SCHECHTMAN, EUROPEAN POPULATION TRANSFERS 1939-45, at 31 (1946).
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years that percentage was 38 percent.2 9 Germany's use of the minority
issue was obviously prompted by self-interest.
The situation came to a head in the League in 1929. The Polish
Foreign Minister, on December 15, 1929, charged before the Council
that Germany was "using" her minorities in Poland as a pretext for
extending the German frontier. Other states bound by the Minorities
Treaties began to fear for the safety of their own frontiers, particu-
larly those bordering Hungary. They felt that they had accepted the
Minority Treaties in return for a frontier guarantee which no one was
now willing to give them.
At the same time, the weaker, non-German minorities became
discouraged. Petitions to the League Council peaked in 1930-31 at
204, and then declined rapidly to only four in 1938-39. 30 The fall-off
was due to the frustrations of the weaker groups and the self-
perception of the stronger groups (notably German) that they were
potential majorities and thus no longer interested in minority sta-
tus. 31
The prestige of the Council was the principal force keeping the
treaties in effect as long as they were against this three-sided attack.
3
1
Despite the difficulties, the Council was successful in the settlement
of many actual cases. It received 400 petitions (excluding those from
the special area of Upper Silesia), rejected about half, settled 15, and
referred the rest to committees for settlement out of the glare of
publicity.3 3 On three occasions the Council applied to the Permanent
Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion on points of
law.
34
The Council, in the final analysis, pleased no one in its handling
of the Minority problems. At best it had a difficult task. The
Minorities Committees of the Council are perhaps the only institu-
tion of the League of which no trace appears in the structure of the
United Nations.3 5 Nevertheless, the Minorities System was not a fail-
ure in the development of the concept of individual human rights. It
29. Id.; also CLAUDE, supra note 2, at 45.
30. ROBINSON, supra note 25, at 252.
31. Id. at 251.
32. See WALTERS, supra note 16, at 402-11 for a full account of the 1928-29 crises
in the Minorities System. See also L. MAIR, THE PROTECTION OF MINORMES (1928) for
a complete reporting of minority petitions to the League.
33. WEBSTER, supra note 18, at 215; PALMER & PERKINS, supra note 5, at 343.
34. Advisory Opinions No. 7, Sept. 14, 1923 on Acquisition of Polish Nationality,
P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 7; Advisory Opinion No. 19, May 15, 1931 on Access to German
Minority Schools in Upper Silesia, P.C.I.J. (ser. A/b) No. 40; Advisory Opinion No.
26, Apr. 6, 1935 on Minority Schools in Albania, P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64; Judgment
of Apr. 26, 1928 on Minority Schools in Supper Silesia, P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 15.
35. WALTERS, supra note 16, at 175.
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was here that the rights of a group of people within a state became
an international, rather than national, concern."6 It was here that
enumerated rights of a group as against their state were put into
international treaties supervised by an international organization. It
was here also that individuals had an explicit right to by-pass their
state and to appeal directly to an international organization. Groups
of individuals were actually placed against their own states in the
international arena. The international politics involved may have
been faulty because these groups eventually became pawns of various
states in a political power struggle,3 7 nevertheless, the principles
which evolved were distinct inroads into the rigid rule that interna-
tional law was concerned only with the relationship of states with
each other and with foreign individuals. 38 A new legal personality,
recognized in international law, was emerging. The minority group,
asserting its right to maintain its group characteristics and to partici-
pate fully and equally with others in the life of the state, became a
bona fide subject of international law.
The League attempted to protect the rights of people who for
some reason needed more protection than their state was able or
willing to give them. As a consequence, human rights began taking
on international significance, not because the world suddenly discov-
ered minorities had rights, but because it realized that a new basis
of protection was necessary, on the international, rather than na-
tional level .
3
B. The Mandates System and Minorities
Closely related to the question of minorities within a nation-state
was the question of colonial nations under the domination of foreign
states. By the end of World War I colonialism had come to be looked
upon as an evil. 0 With this attitude in mind the framers of the
36. WEBSTER, supra note 18, at 217.
37. The political overtones which minorities, along with mandates, had assumed
is reflected in the following observation on committee work in the League: "The Fifth
[committee] devoted itself to social and humanitarian questions and the Sixth to
'political' questions such as mandates, minorities and the admission of non members."
A. ZIMMERN, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW, 1918-1935, at 461 (1936).
38. In Upper Silesia alone, a local international body functioning under the super-
vision of the League of Nations heard 2300 cases where minorities were authorized to
proceed against their own state before an international commission. Korowicz, The
Problem of the International Personality of Individuals, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 533, 534
(1956).
39. For example, art. 12 of the minorities treaty between the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers and Rumania signed at Paris on Dec. 9, 1919 stated that:
Roumania agrees that the stipulation in the foregoing Articles, so far as
they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities,
constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under
the guarantee of the League of Nations. [Emphasis supplied.]
3 TREATIES, supra note 11, at 3728.A "moral" objection to a continuation of colonialism
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League were faced with the task of providing new governments not
modeled on old colonial structures for the former German and Turk-
ish colonies in the Pacific, Africa and the Middle East. The Mandates
System, which the League adopted, was a farsighted solution to part
of the problem of colonialism.
The Covenant made the following specific provisions for the in-
ternational supervision of the advancement and protection of a por-
tion of colonial peoples:
Article 22. (Former Colonies of the Central Powers)"
1. For peoples not yet able to stand by themselves, under strenuous
conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that
the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of
civilization.
2. The tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advance na-
tions and should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the
League.
Three different classes of Mandates were created with varying
degrees of control and quarantees.
The League approach to mandated colonies was surprisingly
similar to that of minorities, despite the fact that minorities were
handled only within the League System and not within the covenant
itself.4 2 Such a similarity can be seen in the Council supervision of
minorities and mandates. In the former, it worked through the Mi-
norities Committee and in the latter through the Permanent Man-
dates Commission.13 Petitions could come to the Council from the
mandates as well as the minorities. In both cases abusive petitions
were screened. All petitions were either routed to the state containing
the minority or to the Mandatory for its comments.
An interesting interplay of the mandate and minority systems
occurred in the case of Iraq. Iraq was a Class A Mandate protected
by Article 22. In 1932 Britain offered to withdraw as the mandatory
power and to recommend Iraq for admission into the League. The
Mandates Commission agreed to terminate the mandatory regime in
Iraq when Iraq entered into undertakings designed to secure the pro-
tection of minorities and freedom of conscience within its territory.
by the allied powers in the German and Ottoman colonies was evident in the pre-
League debates on the proposed mandate system. WALTERS, supra note 16, at 58.
41. The "Council of Ten," consisting of two representatives each of the five great
powers, drafted art. 22 which was adopted by the League Committee. For a summary
of the compromises necessary to reach agreement see WALTERS, supra note 16, at 57,
58 and WEBSTER, supra note 18, at 44, 45.
42. WALTERS, supra note 16, at 173.
43. Provided for by para. 9, art. 22, Covenant of the League of Nations. For a brief
discussion of its functions and manner of operation see WEBSTER, supra note 18, at 285-
90.
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For colonies not under mandate, Article 23(b) of the Covenant
required that the inhabitants be treated "justly." No international
machinery was, however, set up to supervise the treatment accorded
such colonials by the state controlling them. Nevertheless, an inter-
national duty was recognized, which was to be further implemented
under the United Nations.
The Permanent Mandates Commission found itself at first en-
couraged by the Assembly and treated cooly by the Council. No mi-
nority power sat on the Council, but four of the seven Council mem-
bers had mandates. The Assembly, therefore, had more confidence in
the Council on minorities matters than it had in colonial questions.
Consequently, the Assembly became the vocal spokesman for the
equitable treatment of persons residing in mandates.
In five instances the various organs of the League were particu-
larly effective in preventing or correcting abuses in mandated territo-
ries. The Union of South Africa was called upon in 1922 in the Assem-
bly by Haiti and India to defend its suppression of the rebellion of
the Bondelzwarts tribe in South West Africa over the imposition of a
dog tax." Over 100 natives had been killed by air bombings. The
Mandates Commission, after investigation, reported to the Council
that the suppression was too drastic. The next rebellion in this area
was dealt with by the Union of South Africa without a single loss of
life.4 5
In 1925, a rebellion broke out in Syria, led by tribal chiefs who
were resisting French policies, particularly the French effort to trans-
form their feudal society. To end the rebellion the French bombed
Damascus in October 1925. The Mandates Commission met in emer-
gency session and made it clear that it disapproved of many features
of the French administration. The French made extensive changes in
officials and reform was effected. By 1927, all revolts in Syria had
ceased.
46
In Tanganyika, the British, as Mandatory Power, sought to cor-
rect abuses by prohibiting the sale of alcohol to natives. They also
entered upon a comprehensive campaign against the tsetse fly which
prevented animal husbandry in a large area. The Mandates Commis-
sion, while noting these gains, was still concerned with slavery in the
mandates. It, therefore, called upon the British to justify the exist-
ence of household slavery, and the forced requisition of labor on Lake
Victoria and in the distribution of government cotton seed. The Bri-
tish made a detailed reply, explaining their efforts to abolish slavery
44. WALTERS, supra note 16, at 212.
45. LEAoUE OF NATIONS ASSOCIATION, supra note 18, at 116.
46. Id. at 117.
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and the circumstances under which forced labor was used.4 7
The Mandates Commission, at the request of Belgium, urged an
adjustment of the boundaries between Tanganyika and Ruanda-
Urundi because the agreed boundary involved a loss to King Musinga
of a considerable part of his territory. The British agreed and a new
boundary was adopted to the satisfaction and advantage of the popu-
lations concerned.
48
The Permanent Court of International Justice, in addition to the
Assembly, the Mandates Commission, and the Council, contributed
to the protection of the mandated people by outlining the interna-
tional obligations and position of the Mandatory power in their opin-
ion in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case.' 9
For those colonies not under mandate, the system had a favor-
able effect in formulating a concept of collective rights, not only
applicable to all colonies, but to all minority groups as well. First, it
established the principle that peoples not able to govern themselves
were the sacred trust of civilization, not to be left at the mercy of an
individual state. Second, it fixed a standard in colonial administra-
tion which tended to be applied in territories beyond the scope of the
Mandatory System.
IV. The Protection of Minorities and the United Nations
One of the most striking features of the 1946 peace discussions
in Paris was the total lack of discussion about protection of minori-
ties.50 This was also the case in San Francisco where minority prob-
lems were virtually ignored. 5' The reasons were many.
Solicitude for the protection of minority groups, so strong at the
time of the formation of the League of Nations, had begun to wane
before the outbreak of World War II. As previously suggested, this
change was caused in large part by the German government's use of
German minorities in neighboring countries to expedite a program of
national expansion.
The cases of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Memel and Danzig offer
prime examples of this technique. In Czechoslovakia, the Sudenten
Germans were soon controlled by the Sudeten Nazi Party, which took
its instructions from Berlin. This minority began with demands for
more vigorous enforcement of the minorities treaty, shifted to pleas
for full autonomy, and by 1938 would settle for nothing less than
47. Id. at 117, 118.
48. WEBSTER, supra note 18, at 287.
49. The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Aug. 30, 1924, 1 WORLD COURT RE-
PORTS 293 (1934).
50. CLAUDE, supra note 2, at 143.
51. Id. at 112.
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annexation to Germany. In Munich, under the impact of these de-
mands, England and France, vocal exponents of self-determination
in 1919, were left in a dilemma.52 Berlin followed similar procedures
to effect the Lithuanian cession of Memel to Germany and to annex
Danzig.
53
These Nazi activities raised among the Allies doubts about the
wisdom of continuing interwar policy into the postwar period. By the
end of the war, several incidents had further changed the interna-
tional outlook toward minority problems .
4
The first was the misuse of minorities already discussed. This
misuse not only undermined public support for minorities, it also
resulted in the forcible expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe,
eliminating one minority problem by population transfer.
The second was the large population transfer of ethnic groups as
they fled incorporation of their areas into the Communist orbit. This
resulted in a refugee, rather than minority problem, to which the
United Nations was forced to turn its attention. The third was the
territorial changes in Eastern Europe which eliminated the Russian
minorities in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
And finally, the treatment of minorities in World War II by
Germany struck not at the right of the members to retain their char-
acteristics as a separate ethnic group, but at their right to be treated
as human beings. This had the effect of turning international concern
from protection of group rights, some of which are often superficial,
to the more fundamental individual rights of man.
A. Assimilation and the Post-War Period
Minority protection and assimilation are manifestly incompata-
ble. Thus, it is most significant that the concept of assimilation was
predominant in the development of the post-war international sys-
tem. In this regard the role of the United States is of the utmost
importance.
The League Minorities System had, of course, developed without
any input from the United States. In 1945, however, the United
States was not only present, but dominant. As with most countries
of immigration, 5 the concept of assimilation was very popular in both
the United States and in Great Britain." While assimilationist atti-
tudes were by no means universal, 5 they were clearly predominant
52. E. WISKEMAN, CZECHS AND GERMANS (1938).
53. M. BALL & H. KILLOUGH, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 268 (1956).
54. Id. at 267-70.
55. CLAUDE, supra note 2, at 166.
56. Id. at 81-3.




The Western attitude was hardened in this respect by the pro-
minorities view expounded by the Soviet Union." Thus on the brink
of the Cold War, the minorities question became further distorted by
political considerations. Similar political reasoning caused the anti-
colonial blocs to seek separation of the issue of self-determination
from the issue of minority rights.
6 0
As a result there are few vestiges of the interwar approach to the
minorities problem either inside or outside the United Nations. The
Charter, like the Covenant, contains no specific reference to minori-
ties. While such exclusion did not prevent the League from incorpo-
rating a minorities system into its functions, this was not the case
with the United Nations.
During the creation of the United Nations organization, only
token consideration was given to the question of minorities. In 1947,
under the Human Rights Commission of the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC), a Sub-Commission was formed on the Preven-
tion of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities61 (hereinafter
the Sub-Commission). The Sub-Commission was originally intended
to be two separate commissions, one for discrimination, the other for
minorities. Still functioning, it has devoted virtually all its energies
to the study of discrimination of individuals, effectively ignoring mi-
nority protection."
This situation, however, is not a manifestation of the Sub-
Commission's lack of concern. Indeed, the Sub-Commission has
made frequent attempts to take some action in the area of minority
protection.6 3 The chief obstacle has been the parent Human Rights
Commission which "has endlessly found such interest in minorities
to be 'premature' or 'untimely.' ",64
Initially the Human Rights Commission authorized a study
which concluded that the League Minority System was not still valid
and enforceable by the United Nations. 5 In spite of this setback, the
58. Hauser, International Protection of Minorities and the Right of Self-
Determination, ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 92 (1971).
59. CLAUDE, supra note 2, at 170.
60. Id. at 173.
61. See Claude, The Nature and Status of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 5 INT'L ORGANIZATION 300-12 (1951) for a
review of the early work of this Sub-Commission.
62. See, Review of Further Developments in Fields in Which the Sub-Commission
Has Been Concerned, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/sub.2/327 (1972).
63. CLAUDE, supra note 2, at 147.
64. Hauser, supra note 58, at 100.
65. Study of the Legal Validity of the Undertakings Concerning Minorities, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/376 (1950).
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Sub-Commission continued to raise the issue. For example, it
strongly recommended that the draft Convention on Human Rights
include specific reference to the rights of minority groups to maintain
their own culture and language.6 The proposal was not adopted.,7
More recently, however, the Sub-Commission has begun to func-
tion, if only slightly, in the area of minority rights. After more than
20 years, the ECOSOC Council finally agreed to a Sub-Commission
request to conduct a study on protection of minorities." That study,
still in progress, was first presented in the 1972 annual meeting of the
Sub-Commission. 9 The Sub-Commission authorized the study to
continue and resources to be made available to the special rappor-
teur.71 While such activity seems slight, in the perspective of the total
inactivity of the 1950's and 1960's it becomes significant. More impor-
tantly, however, such activity serves to keep the international machi-
nery lubricated and ready to be used when the world community so
demands.
V. The Current Legal Status of Minorities
At this point it is necessary to step back and attempt to view the
precise status of minorities in international law. The basic question
is: Do minority groups have a right to exist under international law?
If such a right does exist, there are three traditional solutions. These
are (1) frontier revision, (2) population transfer, and (3) the develop-
ment of the non-national state.7 If the right to remain a minority is
not a basic human right, then the only solution would be a supervised
gradual assimilation of the minority into the larger ethnic group with
emphasis on the protection of the individual rather than on group
rights.
72
By far the most persuasive contemporary codification of an inter-
national right to exist as a minority is Article 27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which reads:
66. EVERYMAN'S UNITED NATIONS 194 (3d ed. 1952).
67. PALMER & PERKINS, supra note 5, at 414.
68. ECOSOC Res. 1418 (XLVI), U.N. Doc. E/4714 at 16-17 (1969).
69. Summary Records of the Sub-Commission Meeting 1972, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/sub.2/SR.647 at 150.
70. Sub-Commission Res. 1 (XXV), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/sub.2/332 at 45.
71. These three solutions are discussed in C. MACARTNEY, HUNGARY AND HER SUC-
CESSORS: THE TREATY OF TRIANON AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1937).
72. For example, an individual has a right to participate in the educational system
of the state, but not necessarily the basic right to receive his education in a certain
language. Also, an individual has the right to a certain period of rest from labor, but
not necessarily the basic right to rest on a particular day. Alfred Zimmern's comment
on the ideal international order could well be applied as the ideal treatment by a state
of its minorities: "In things necessary, Unity; in things indifferent, Liberty; in all
things, Charity." Supra note 37, at 496.
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In those states in which ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right,
in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own
language."
The Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, which is composed of a group of highly
qualified international experts on the subject, has interpreted Article
27 as being not only a sound conventional rule for the protection of
minorities, but also a source of principles that could be applied re-
gardless of the entry into force of the Covenant.7 4
Two other contemporary multilateral instruments affirm the
rights of minority groups to maintain their culture and language. The
first is the 1960 Convention Against Discrimination in Education
sponsored by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO). Article 5(c) states that:
.. .it is essential to recognize the right of members of national minorities
to carry on their own educational activities, including the maintenance
of schools and, depending on the educational policy of each State, the use
or the teaching of their own language."5
The other is the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights, which, in Article 14, includes "association with a
national minority" as one of a series of bases on which discrimination
is prohibited.7
In two cases since World War II there appears to have been a
peace treaty provision made for a minority guarantee on the interwar
pattern. The first was with respect to the South Tyrol, an area in
which Italy had pursued a policy of assimilation in the interwar pe-
riod.77 Later, the Trieste Settlement of 1954 between Italy and Yugo-
slavia contained similar express minority guarantees."5 There was,
however, no provision for international implementation in either of
these agreements.
Even in the assimilationist minded United States, national mi-
norities have achieved a special status. In the United States, Ameri-
can Indian tribes are in a class by themselves, treated since the land-
73. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 861
(1967).
74. Summary Records, supra note 69, at 150.
75. Convention Against Discrimination in Education (UNESCO), Dec. 14, 1960,
429 U.N.T.S. 93 (1962).
76. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1955).
77. Treaty of Peace with Italy, 61 Stat. 1369, 1427 (1947).
78. See, Schwelb, The Trieste Settlement and Human Rights, 49 AM. J. INT'L L.
240-48 (1955) for a discussion of the protection of minorities by this agreement.
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ing of the first European settlers not as independent states, but still
as groups with enough independent legal existence to enter into treat-
ies and to maintain tribal organizations recognized by Great Britain
and the United States down to the present day."9 The separate legal
status of these tribes and the rights they possess are separate from
other American citizens. This was evident in the negotiations in the
spring of 1973 at Wounded Knee, and in the recent opinion of the
United States Supreme Court wherein the court stated:
It is settled that whatever title [in mineral leases] the Indians have is
in the tribe [here the Navajo] and not in individuals, although held by
the tribe for the common use and equal benefit of all the members [cases
cited]."
Even Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act exempts Indian Tribes
from its non-discriminatory employment regulations."
On the whole, however, the approach of protecting group rights
of minorities by a system of international guarantees have been re-
placed by guarantees of protection for the individuals who comprise
these groups. The peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Hungary, and
Finland all provide that each state was to "take all measures neces-
sary to secure to all persons the enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms. . ." In addition, the Hungarian and Ruma-
nian treaties also contain a provision (Article 2) forbidding "any dis-
crimination between persons of Hungarian (Rumanian) nationality
on the grounds of race, sex, language or religion." 2
It can be argued that the collective enjoyment of these individual
rights implicitly grants minority groups the right to exist. Such an
analysis ignores the fact, however, that these bilateral treaty provi-
sions and their multilateral equivalent, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, use the same approach as the U.S. Constitution in
which rights guaranteed are those of "persons" or "citizens" and in
which there is no reference to minority groups.s This type of ap-
proach clearly represents the assimilationist ideal. Any analysis
79. It has been stated categorically that a tribe is not a legal unit of international
law. See Cayuga Indian Claims Arbitration (Great Britain v. United States), NELSON
REP. 203, 307 (1926); also, Marshall, C.J., in Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat)
543, 578 (1823). But such attempts emphasize more their lack of statehood or their lack
of allegiance to and right of protection by a foreign power. The tribes stand alone in
their dealings with the United States or Canada. But that does not mean that they
have no legal existence any more than it could be said that an individual has no legal
existence.
80. United States v. Jim, 409 U.S. 80 (1972). In this same case the Navajo Tribe
was granted leave to file a brief as Amicus Curiae.
81. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970).
82. Treaty of Peace with Roumania, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 3, 61 Stat. 1799, 1801
(1947); Treaty of Peace with Hungary, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 2, 61 Stat. 2109, 2112 (1947).
83. Particularly, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
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which reads a great deal into these instruments must be tempered by
a recognition of this element.
Another international instrument which may prove deceptive on
its face is the Convention on the Preventon and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. 4 The Convention certainly aims at the protection
of minorities, at least against physical and biological destruction.
The Ad Hoc Committee drafting the convention had specifically
wanted to include cultural genocide as a species to be prohibited,8 5
but strong opposition by the United States and France defeated the
idea and as a result the convention avoids all mention of cultural and
political genocide.86
Thus, if read literally, the Genocide Convention may be inter-
preted as guaranteeing the right to exist as a minority group. In
practice, however, the convention has been interpreted as guarantee-
ing members of minorities the right to exist, and not necessarily as
assuring the existence of the group itself. 7
One of the most striking aspects of relatively recent international
agreements is the absence of reference to minority protection where
such reference would seem appropriate. Most notable is the lack of
provisions in the various treaties granting autonomy to former colo-
nies with large minority populations8 and in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. 8 These intentional omissions tend to dampen
the already weak provisions in the few treaties which deal with the
subject matter.
Yet, on the whole, it appears that the various international pro-
tective measures can reasonably be interpreted as according minority
groups the right to exist. An exceedingly helpful United Nations
study0 breaks down those areas in which protective measures have
been taken. The following shows the number of protective measures
taken in international treaties and instruments both before World
War II and afterwards:
(1) Grants of Local Autonomy-four prewar/two postwar;"
(2) Guarantees of political representation of minorities-none pre-
war/eight postwar; 2
84. Convention for the Prevention and Elimination of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951).
85. CLAUDE, supra note 2, at 154-5.
86. Kung, The Present Status of the International Law for the Protection of Mi-
norities, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 285 (1954).
87. LAPONCE, supra note 2, at 34.
88. Hauser, supra note 58, at 100.
89. CLAUDE, supra note 2, at 154-55.
90. Protection of Minorities, supra note 14.
91. Id. at 47.
92. Id. at 48.
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(3) Protection of nationality-eleven prewar/two postwar;"
(4) Protection of family law or personal status-four prewar/three post-
war;"4
(5) Use of language:
a. in general intercourse-thirteen prewar/ten postwar,"
b. in courts-thirteen prewar/five postwar,"
c. in social ad charitable institutions, religious and educational es-
tablishments-13 prewar/seven postwar, 7
d. in various information media-none prewar/seven postwar;"
(6) Social, charitable and religious institutions and educational estab-
lishments:
a. religious and charitable-thirteen prewar/two postwar,99
b. educational establishments-thirteen prewar/five postwar,"*
c. sacred places-four prewar/one postwar."'
From this breakdown it is clear that there has been substantial
international legislation to protect minorities. Additionally, on the
customary law level, in some parts of the world, notably Eastern and
Central Europe, the right not to be assimilated is considered a basic
human right. 02 Yet not too much can be made of the combination of
these factors. There are essentially two levels of protection of minori-
ties-toleration and encouragement. 0 3 At the most, international law
currently gives minority groups the right to be tolerated. Any progress
in the protection of minorities will be directed either towards
strengthening provisions relating to toleration of minorities, or to-
wards creating means actually to encourage their existance. The lat-
ter course is highly unlikely and open to serious inquiry as to its
desirability where it leads to chronic political instability. The former
course, that is the strengthening of the basic right to be tolerated,
could very well be followed in the near future. The various factors
which led to 25 years of virtual inactivity are changing significantly.
Furthermore, new factors exist which may increasingly push the
international community towards new activity.
VI. MINORITIES TODAY
As previously discussed, the minorities vogue in the League was
replaced by a concern for individual human rights in the United
Nations. It is clear, however, that the minorities problem, a strict and
93. Id. at 49.
94. Id. at 49-50.
95. Id. at 50-52.
96. Id. at 52-53.
97. Id. at 53-54.
98. Id. at 55.
99. Id. at 55-56.
100. Id. at 56-57.
101. Id. at 57-58.
102. CLAUDE, supra note 2, at 165.
103. Robinson, supra note 20, at 91.
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logical corollary of the principle of self determination of nations, did
not disappear.104
With the rapid decline of colonialism following World War II and
the concurrent emergence of nation-states all over the world, the
world's minorities, locked within the borders of states, have increased
rather than decreased. Violence and terrorism have marked the path
of minorities as they have had to fend for themselves in the absence
of any international commission or treaty system. 1 5 For example, the
Tibetans, the Indians of Uganda,0 6 the Kurds of Iraq, the Nagas of
northwestern India, the Biafrians, the tribes of Upper Burma, the
Huks and Mohammedan tribes of the Philippines, the Nubiana of
southern Sudan, the Baltic nations, and to a lesser extent the Ukrani-
ans, the Croats of Yugoslavia, the French Canadians and the Basque
of northwestern Spain have all been unsuccessful in their efforts.
The Bengalis have been more fortunate.' However, paradoxi-
cally, their success has created two new minorities within Pakistan
and Bangladesh. The reported proposed solution is a mass transfer
of the Biharis (260,000) from Bangaladesh to Pakistan.' 8
The Irish Catholic of Northern Ireland and the Palestinian Arabs
are in the throes of a violent struggle for political identity, with par-
tial success to date by the former.109
There has been some limited postwar international legal recogni-
tion of this struggle of minorities. Europe, through the Human Rights
Convention sponsored by the Council of Europe, has given some help
to minorities in that sector of the world. Two cases are illustrative.
The first concerned the Austrians living on the Italian side of the Alps
where their treatment by the Italian government was a sensitive issue
in Austria. In 1961, the Austrian government charged the Italian
officials with improper conduct in the trial of several Italian citizens
104. Kung, supra note 86, at 282.
105. Three recent texts outlining various aspects of this struggle are C. ENLOE,
ETHNIC CONFLICT AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1973); A. RABUSHKA & K. SHEPALE,
POLmCS IN PLURAL SOCIETIS (1972); and E. NORDLINGER, CONFLICT REGULATION IN
DIVIDED SOCIETIES (1973).
106. See The East African Asians Human Rights Case (United Kingdom) heard
by the European Human Rights Commission on Sept. 27, 1971 for the right of East
African Asians to enter Great Britain. Press Communique, Council of Europe, c(71)22,
Oct. 1, 1971. If fully adhered to by all nations the International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination would be of assistance to minorities.
107. Nanda, A Critique of the United Nations Inaction in the Bangladesh Crisis,
49 DEN. L. J. 53 (1972).
108. N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1973, at 1, col. 1; id., Apr. 27, 1973 at 36, col. 2.
109. On March 20, 1973, Great Britain proposed, among other things, a greater
political sharing of power by the Catholic minority with the Protestant majority in
Ulster. N.Y. Times, March 21, 1973, at 16, col. 1.
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of Austrian nationality for attacks on an Italian policeman."10 The
Italian government finally arranged for a certain degree of local au-
tonomy for the area.
The second was the "Belgium Linguistic Case" between the
French speaking Belgians and the Belgian government over the lat-
ter's denial of the former's right to be educated in their own lan-
guage."' The court held in part for the French speaking children on
the basis of Article 14 of the European Human Rights Convention
which guarantees the enjoyment of language without discrimination.
On a higher level, the International Court of Justice has contin-
ued the concept of a legal existence for a group not yet a state in its
1962 opinion on the mandated territory of South West Africa:
The Administrative supervision by the League constituted the normal
security to pursue full performance by the Mandatory of the sacred trust
toward the inhabitants of the territory, but the specially assigned role of
the Court was even more essential, since it was to serve as the final
bulwark of protection by recourse to the Court against possible abuse or
breaches of the Mandate."'
These actions constitute only a small response to a most serious
problem. Yet the chances for more meaningful international respon-
ses are increasing. One reason for multilateral inaction has been the
ideology of assimilation propounded in the United Nations by the
United States. This factor is necessarily diminished as the U.S. hege-
mony in the United Nations declines. Moreover, the doctrine of as-
similation is no longer such a sacred ideal within the United States
itself, as clearly evidenced by the separatist movement and strong
activism by many Black Americans,"' Indians, Chicanos, Puerto Ri-
cans and others, and the philosophical support minority group rights
are receiving from diverse sectors of the society.
Other factors responsible for the world policy in the late 1940's
are either weakened or have disappeared altogether. Whatever Cold
War factors were important are not nearly as strong today. The colo-
nial problems which received so much attention, to the detriment of
minority rights, are for the most part solved. Finally, the bitter mem-
ories of the abuses of the League System have long since faded.
110. 4 YEARBOOK OF THE CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS-1961, at 116-83 (1962).
111. Legal News, Council of Europe c(68)27, July 23, 1968; 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERI-
ALS 825 (1969).
112. Judgment in the South West African Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Lib-
eria v. South Africa, Dec. 21, 1962, [1962-1963] I.C.J.Y.B. 84; for further develop-
ments see, South West African Cases (2d Phase), July 18, 1966 wherein Liberian and
Ethiopian claims against South Africa were rejected, [1965-66] I.C.J.Y.B. 83; also,
Advisory Opinion of the Legal Consequences for Status of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia, June 21, 1971, [1970-19711 I.C.J.Y.B. 100.
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Thus, the way is more open for international cooperation for
protection of minorities than at any point in the past 25 years. How
much action will be taken no doubt depends on how vocal national
minorities become and to what degree their problems will affect inter-
national peace and security.
VII. CONCLUSION
There has been in this century a rise and fall of minority rights
in international law. After World War II, the League and its minority
consciousness passed quickly into history. While international con-
cern for minorities is temporarily at a low point, at the very least,
minority groups remain established subjects of international law.
More importantly, they are still with us, increasingly vocal, and de-
manding their place in the national and international sun."'
It appears that the future of minorities may lie, where independ-
ence is not possible, in a form of autonomy within the particular
nation-state concerned, where its members may both maintain their
cultural heritage and participate fully in the benefits of the larger
society. Yet their preservation now rests with the individual state, a
future that, in many cases, brooks of conflict and either assimilation
or extinction. It is, therefore, apparent that international cooperation
to secure even tolerance of minorities may become necessary and
desirable in the not so distant future. This diversity within the family
of man is not something to be lightly lost. It enriches both the na-
tional and international scene. Its value has been summarized by the
French historian-philosopher, Jean Danielou:
The existence of civilizations altogether unlike our own is thus by no
means something to be resented, or extinguished. . . . The full beauty
of mankind would be diminished by the loss of China's distinctive contri-
bution, or that of the Arabs or the Negroes. Every race and every tongue
gives expression to some irreplaceable aspect of humanity. Each lan-
guage, in particular, has its own genius, its special capacity for handling
certain ideas.' 5
113. Hauser, supra note 58 at 95.
114. A recent edition of the COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AF-
FAIRS is devoted exclusively to this current interest in minorities in the nation-state.
See, Symposium, Political Integration in Multinational States, 27 J. INT'L AFFAIRS 1-
141 (1973).
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PROCEEDINGS OF THE REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
On April 28, 1973, the Regional Conference of the American So-
ciety of International Law was held in Denver, Colorado. Two topics
were presented for discussion: Transnational Control of Narcotics,
and The Prevention and Control of International Terrorism.
The conference convened at 9:00 a.m. in the auditorium of the
Law Center of the University of Denver. A welcome was extended by
Co-Chairmen Professor Ved P. Nanda of the University of Denver
and student representative Michael L. Corrigan.
I. TRANSNATIONAL CONTROL OF NARCOTICS
The morning session was chaired by John A. Moore. Chairman
Moore introduced the speaker, Gerhard O.W. Mueller of New York
University School of Law, and the panelists for the morning session:
Mr. James Burke, Deputy Regional Director, Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs; His Excellency Mothusi Mashologu, Ambas-
sador to the United States from Lesotho; Mr. Luis Kutner, Chair-
man, World Habeas Corpus; Mr. John DeGara, Visiting Professor,
University of Denver, Graduate School of International Studies; and
Ms. Cathy Lewis, a student at the University of Denver College of
Law.
Summary of Mr. Mueller's Remarks
There are four primary types of drugs in the world today: opiates,
cocaine, marijuana, and psycho-tropical substances. The following
discussion will be restricted to opiates and cocaine for these two types
of drugs create the greatest problem since they affect the life style
of the users through their addictive properties. Marijuana and the
psycho-tropical drugs are relatively inexpensive and do not necessar-
ily dominate the life style of their users.
Today there are an estimated 100,000 to 600,000 hard drug ad-
dicts in the United States. Of this number, 50 percent are believed
to be in New York City.
The social costs associated with opiate addiction are very high.
Three persons die every day from drug related causes in New York
City. The average addict has a 50 dollar per day habit. Most male
addicts steal to support their habit. Nationwide, the addict must
steal four to five times the value of his habit in order to acquire the
money necessary to purchase his drugs. Therefore, the cost per addict
will range between 150 and 250 dollars worth of goods stolen each day.
Using estimates for New York City, the total annual cost to
society from property offenses due to opiate addiction appears to be
9.125 billion dollars per year. The budget for all police forces in the
United States is 3 billion dollars per year. However, this estimate is
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probably high for two reasons. First, many female addicts support
their habit through prostitution. Second, many addicts are also push-
ers and sell hard drugs to support their habits.
The problem of drug addiction is an international one. In the
past, many countries of the world considered addiction only a prob-
lem for the United States. However, these countries are now recogniz-
ing that they also have a drug problem. In 1971, Prime Minister
Pompidou realized that France had an addict problem. In the past,
Marseilles was only a processing place for drugs; now it also harbors
addicts. In Italy, one of every four persons has tried either hashish,
L.S.D. or methedrine. In Hamburg, Germany, 25 percent of the high
school students are either using or have experimented with mari-
juana. Even the Iron Curtain countries recognize the international
scope of the addiction problem. Traditionally, alcohol was the drug
used by the workers of Eastern Europe. However, the fact that these
countries have agreed to participate in an international conference on
narcotics indicates that drugs are now finding their way behind the
Iron Curtain too.
Historically, the drug problem begins in a country as a soft drug
problem. Without any causal link implications, the hard drugs tend
to follow the soft drugs. Many countries are currently experiencing a
soft drug problem now and are fearful of a hard drug problem in the
future.
The majority of the opiates come from poppy gum, but some are
produced from the stem of the plant. The largest grower today is
India, which has an estimated 100,000 acres of opium poppy under
cultivation. The second largest area is the "Golden Triangle," an area
composed of Burma, Thailand, and Laos, with an estimated 100,000
acres under cultivation. Turkey has an estimated 35,000 acres under
production. Iran dropped out of opium production for several years,
but now has an estimated 50,000 acres under cultivation.
Growing opium is profitable for the farmers in these regions. For
this reason, it is difficult to control the supply of opiates. The average
farmer is very poor. Opium brings the highest price of all the crops
he can grow. The farmer earns approximately 100 dollars more per
acre annually by growing opium poppies than by growing other crops.
The total amount of opium produced in the world is 2,500 tons
per year. Of this amount, 1,000 tons is illegally produced. Of the illicit
production, 100 tons is produced in India. This is largely consumed
locally. The largest illicit production is in the Golden Triangle, which
produces 700 tons annually. Until recently, 70 percent of this was
consumed locally. There is now a growing concern that increasing
amounts of this production will find their way into other parts of the
world. Turkey produces approximately eight percent of the illicit
world supply, or 35 to 80 tons per year. Almost all of this is exported
to the United States.
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The traditional location for processing of opium has been France,
and in particular, Marseilles. West Germany has become a major
processor. Immense profits involved in the processing and sale of
opium have resulted in the increased traffic. The initial buyer pays
the farmer 22 dollars per kilo for the raw opium. After processing and
transportation, the same kilo sells on the street for 88,000 dollars.
This immense profit margin makes it very difficult to eliminate the
problem.
The problem of controlling narcotics requires an international
approach. In 1961, a relatively effective convention on narcotic drugs
was held. Out of this convention came several recommendations.
First, voluntary restraints on the production of drugs was urged. Sec-
ond, it was proposed that the United Nations International Control
Board be the supervisory agency. Finally, an International Commis-
sion on Drugs was to be formed. The United States applied pressure
to have some action taken. However, the other countries were less
concerned with the overall problem and, instead, urged the United
States to take some action against their major pharmaceutical
houses.
A major step forward was taken with the United Nations Proto-
col of 1972. The Protocol gave the International Narcotics Control
Board (INCB) greater inspection and supervisory powers and some
enforcement capability. In addition, money was pledged for local
control. The INCB was authorized to send international teams to
study individual countries, extradition provisions were increased,
and greater promotion, education, study and treatment programs
were proposed.
The 1972 Protocol is a very strong international convention and
strong control and enforcement provisions were included. More im-
portantly, the increased scope of the INCB will provide a much
stronger data base on international narcotics control. This data can
be used to place increasing leverage on international organizations
and individual states to more effectively control the flow of narcotics.
There are other sources of international enforcement of narcotics
control. The United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs set lim-
its on the production of narcotics and arbitration procedures. At the
present time, however, the Commission is probably not powerful
enough to be effective. The 1971 Fund for International Drug Re-
search and Education provides funds to help in the control effort. The
World Health Organization, NATO, and UNESCO are all involved
in the international control effort to some extent.
To a large extent, the problem of international narcotics control
enforcement is one of knowledge. Therefore, the first step which must
be taken is the marshalling of world opinion. Publicizing who the
"bad guys" are and what they are doing will be necessary. However,
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this should not be done too forcefully to avoid polarizing the different
states.
The second step should be the education of the world's states,
coupled with the propagation of a standard of enforcement. This will
create leverage at the international level and help achieve world coop-
eration. It is at this level that the work of WHO, UNESCO and other
regional and international organizations is so important. They can
help provide the education, or propaganda, necessary to scare coun-
tries into compliance.
There must also be periodic reporting of information on the
international narcotics problem, and the data reported must be suffi-
ciently specific to get the compliance of obdurate states. Such data
is also a check on other states and should be published to show the
degree of world compliance.
Ultimately, a new world jurisdiction may have to be created.
This would be the ideal. The jurisdiction could be either international
or regional in scope. The 1953 International Criminal Court draft
resolution should be revived and the court made an important part
of the international narcotics control mechanism.
The entire world is threatened by the scope of the international
narcotics problem. Control of the sources of natural narcotics is only
the first step. We must continue to move forward if we are to stop
production; if we simply control the opiates, new international prob-
lems involving chemical narcotics, like methadone, will arise. With-
out production controls, we will not have solved the problem, but only
substituted one problem for another.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Burke discussed the expansion of the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs in the last few years. The Bureau has consoli-
dated U.S. efforts in international control and has begun working
closely with the police forces of other countries. The Bureau's activi-
ties have resulted in an increasing awareness within the government
of the importance of international cooperation for narcotics control.
The Bureau was instrumental in the U.S. encouragement and sup-
port of Turkey's decision to reduce or eliminate opium growing
through subsidization of farmers who agree to grow other crops. Al-
though this subsidy program costs the United States 40 million dol-
lars annually, it has significantly decreased the supply of heroin flow-
ing into the United States.
Ambassador Mashologu noted that ten years ago the African
countries felt that hard narcotics trafficking was a U.S. problem.
More recently, however, these countries have become actively con-
cerned. They fear that as more pressure is placed on the traditional
narcotics growing countries to curb large scale trafficking, the prob-
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lem will be exported to other countries. This would compound the
general spread of narcotics traffic which is already affecting most
countries of the world. Lesotho is one example; since 1967 there has
been a disturbing increase in production of marijuana.
Mr. Kutner said that while it was desirable to discuss the prob-
lem, there is little world consensus on how to extinguish the source.
The problem is not really difficult. It is a simple matter of fundamen-
tal economic and social values. The system can only exist where there
are corrupt government officials. It will not be possible to eliminate
the "narco-agronomy" without a sense of honor, political responsibil-
ity, and concern for the individual. What is needed is a combined
economic, psychological and sociological approach to the problem.
Subsidizing the production of other crops as a substitute for opium
is a constructive first step.
Mr. DeGara noted that while the narcotics problem is growing
faster than the solutions, there are certain hopeful factors to be con-
sidered. First, an increasingly large amount of data is being collected.
This is highly useful for international efforts of control. Secondly,
there has been a beginning of international cooperation in the area,
exemplified by the 1961 U.N. Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the
1972 U.N. Protocol. On the other hand, more financing is needed to
implement effective programs. The U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Con-
trol is simply inadequate. Across the board more money is needed
both to promote crop substitution and to help integrate former drug
users into society. Such a two-sided approach is necessary to solve the
problem.
H. THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
The afternoon session of the Conference was opened by Chair-
man Ved P. Nanda. Putting the discussion in perspective, he noted
the lack of world consensus on defining the nature of acts which
constitute terrorism and thus the inability of the world community
to effectively cooperate. There is, he observed, a spectrum of world
opinion. At one extreme is the belief that terrorists should have no
human rights and be treated as criminals. At the other is the position
that terrorists must be treated in non-criminal ways. Dialogue, such
as the Regional Conference, is, therefore, important to help bring
divergent world views on terrorism closer together.
The Chairman then introduced the two principal speakers at the
afternoon session, His Excellency Mothusi Mashologu and Mr. Luis
Kutner, and panelists at the afternoon session: Captain Bard O'Neill
of the United States Air Force Academy; Captain R. Lenihan of
United Airlines; Gerhard Mueller; Charles Brower, Acting Legal
Adviser for the Department of State; and Mr. Patrick Vandello, a
student at the University of Denver College of Law.
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Summary of Ambassador Mashologu's Remarks
International violence begets counterviolence; terrorism occur-
ring anywhere is, therefore, a concern of the entire international com-
munity. While it is preferable to approach such a problem through a
rule of law, the pace of legal action has been too slow. It is likely that
other approaches will have to be used if we hope to control terrorism.
Although it is theoretically possible to achieve agreement among
the majority of states on some measures to control international ter-
rorism, no such agreement appears to be imminent. There are at least
four major proposals and many amendments before the U.N. General
Assembly to deal with international terrorism. As one of the most
actively concerned, Lesotho has proposed several comprehensive
amendments to draft resolutions on terrorism which have been intro-
duced in the General Assembly. But, if any resolution is to achieve
support of a majority of nations, there will have to be tough political
bargaining coupled with political accommodation among the member
states.
In general, the proposals currently before the United Nations are
too restrictive to obtain majority support. To gain acceptance, all
forms of terrorism, regardless of the parties, must be condemned. For
example, state-sponsored terrorism in South Africa should be prohib-
ited. Yet the restrictive proposals currently on the floor elevate this
form of violence to a higher status and do not call it terrorism. Thus,
any successful resolution will have to be more comprehensive in
scope.
Additionally, several new elements should be included. First,
any accord on terrorism must recognize elements of political change.
This is aimed at colonial and neo-colonial governments who deny
their people the right of self-determination. Second, the special sta-
tus of liberation movements must be recognized by the world com-
munity. Usually, liberation movements are made up of people who
have been terrorized themselves. Equity demands that terrorist
agreements not be enforced against these people. Third, a U.N. spon-
sored terrorist resolution should come out against state sponsored or
directed terrorism such as exists in South Africa. Finally, the ques-
tion of extradition and asylum must be clarified in any agreement on
terrorism, within the scope of what is to be considered terrorist acts.
The new states of the world today take a different view of terror-
ism than the older states. The new states see a value in some forms
of terrorist-type activity as a means of achieving independence, even
though they are against terrorism in other circumstances. Political
realities must be taken into account. Terrorism is a last resort which
arises when other channels of communication are closed. Therefore,
the basic requirement in achieving any resolution on terrorism is to
open up the channels of political communication among parties hith-
erto involved in incidents of international terrorism.
VOL. 3:275
PROCEEDINGS
Summary of Mr. Kutner's Remarks
Terrorism, in the form which we know today, began at the end
of World War II with aircraft hijacking. Hijacking poses a serious
threat to the international community. There is a need for interna-
tional sanctions and for cooperation between states if we are to deal
effectively with the problem. However, as of yet, there has been no
concerted effort on the part of the states of the world to responsibly
attack the problem.
Certain basic principles have been agreed upon by the com-
munity of nations. The Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal Conventions all
contain some principles of hijack prevention. This agreement, even
though largely tacit in nature, indicates a global awareness of the
problem. However, the international community is as yet unwilling,
for various economic and social reasons, to strongly attack the prob-
lem for fear of upsetting a delicate international politico-economic
relationship.
The concern over the international aspects of hijacking has led
to concern over other forms of terrorism. The individual has been
recognized as a subject of international law since the London Agree-
ment of August 1945. Also, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
recognized the rights of an individual solely because he is a member
of the family of man and entitled to human dignity.
To complete these conventions, as an additional tool in the fight
against international terrorism, the common law principle of "con-
structive notice" needs to be added. This principle presupposes infor-
mation or knowledge of a fact by a person through imputation of law
because the person could have discovered the fact by proper dili-
gence. It is clear that individual heads of state are responsible for
activities that take place within their territorial borders. This be-
comes clear when one includes the international legal principle of
territoriality which accords to the state the responsibility for persons
and activities which emanate from within the territorial jurisdiction
of that state.
The concept of constructive notice, as tempered by a standard
of reasonableness, will help the world to recognize individual criminal
liability. Also, it will help to focus world opinion on those responsible
for harboring the terrorists. Appropriately, where international laws
have been violated both individual heads of state and the states
themselves, as members of the world community by virtue of interna-
tional agreement and the Charter of the United Nations, shall be
subject to appropriate international sanctions.
DISCUSSION
Captain O'Neill discussed the political barriers in dealing with
terrorism and national liberation movements. Terrorism is generally
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only used by the weak. For this reason, the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China will not support any general international
prohibition on terrorism, because such an agreement would jeopard-
ize their relationship with revolutionary groups and the governments
harboring these groups. Also, international accord would probably
not be effective at the present time since world opinion seems to be
supporting retaliatory terrorism against the Arabs by Israel. Unless
we distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violence, no
international agreement can be effective.
Captain Lenihan was the pilot of a hijacked airplane and briefly
described the incident. He expressed the belief that the only solution
to hijacking is to boycott countries which will not prosecute hijackers
and impose stiff penalties on those hijackers. However, the United
States has perpetuated a double standard since it does not prosecute
Cubans for hijacking planes to the United States, but is all too willing
to condemn those who hijack U.S. planes to Cuba. The United States
must pursue a more consistent policy.
Mr. Mueller argued that stiffer penalties are not the answer to
the problem. Such penalties only create martyrs. In addition, most
countries are ambivalent to terrorism because they owe their origin
to it. In general, it might be more useful to use non-political methods.
Also, the use of municipal criminal laws might be helpful. Any of the
following proposals might be considered: first, terrorists could be
tried by the country which holds them; second, terrorists could be
extradicted to a requesting country; or third, terrorists could be
turned over to an international tribunal. Whichever method is cho-
sen, there must be substantial agreement for it to work.
Mr. Brower took a pragmatic approach. It is not possible to get
all forms of terrorism condemned since political realities will thwart
any such attempt. The U.S. proposal is an attempt to take some
action against terrorism which is broad enough to garner world sup-
port without being so broad as to prevent its acceptance. The article
only applies to the exportation of terrorism, but its primary intent is
to cover situations where innocent victims are the main target. This
is an incrementalist approach; start with small steps and try not to
do everything at once.
Responding to Captain Lenihan, Mr. Brower observed that boy-
cotts against countries harboring terrorists may be a violation of U.S.
domestic law. However, this action, as an alternative, does exist in
the international sphere.
Mr. Vandello expressed the belief that international control was
meaningless, since we are not able to track the origin of terrorism,
and urged municipal control instead. He further noted that Mr. Kut-
ner's principle of constructive notice could be a useful tool in these
circumstances, as it would place a burden on national leaders to
ferret out terrorists within their countries.
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III. OTHER ACTIVITIES AT THE REGIONAL CONFERENCE
Between the morning and afternoon sessions, a luncheon was
held at the Denver Hilton Hotel. The luncheon guests were greeted
by Maurice B. Mitchell, Chancellor, University of Denver. Following
the afternoon session, the Conference was closed with a reception and
banquet at the Brown Palace Hotel in honor of the participants.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY
CHARLES N. BROWER*
I am disturbed by the pronounced tendency of our international
law fraternity to bemoan the moribund state of international law.
There appears to be a widespread presumption that in practice inter-
national rules of law are largely irrelevant to high level decision-
making in governments around the world, and, therefore, that we
have failed. Since our historical puritan ethic, at least by implication,
equates failure with sinfulness, analysis quickly becomes apologia
and our discussions assume the character of an expiatory ritual.
I for one, however, believe that our profession need not act like
a timid supplicant whose very demeanor defies confidence in his
creed. I suggest that international law today, rather than falling into
disuse, is becoming a more vital force than ever before in the develop-
ment of our international relations. In order better to explain the
basis for this positive outlook I think it necessary first to expose the
false assumptions on which our self-deprecating tendencies have been
premised.
In decrying the inefficacy of international law we have concen-
trated too much on its adjudicatory aspect, and, finding an absence
of effective international machinery, have concluded that interna-
tional law must be in sad straits. Speaking conceptually, however,
institutionalized adjudicatory machinery has a quite different place
in international law than it does in municipal law. Nations, more so
than private litigants within a single country, have informal, nonjudi-
cial means of enforcement by virtue of the fact that their bilateral
and multilateral relations with one another provide a dynamic pro-
cess for the adjustment of their respective interests, including the
satisfaction of legal rights. As our experience of some hundreds of
years has proven, the absence of a comprehensive and dispositive
system of adjudication does not necessarily lead to international an-
archy. States comply with law among other reasons because it is
politic to do so. Furthermore, domestic enforcement is heavily de-
voted to adjustment of legal disputes between the sovereign and the
governed, rather than between private litigants, and it is precisely
these adjustments of legal relations which encompass a vast majority
of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. There being no interna-
tional sovereign, however, there is no international need of correspon-
ding magnitude for formalized means of redress.
* Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State. Mr. Brower's address was delivered
during the luncheon meeting of the Regional Conference of the American Society of
International Law on April 28, 1973.
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I might say, parenthetically, that a factor which tends to com-
pound the gloomy view of international law is the high rate of unem-
ployment in our chosen field. Very few of those who style themselves
as international lawyers ever have more than a modest, if even a
fleeting, chance to practice public international law. The American
Society of International Law, under whose co-sponsorship we are as-
sembled today, has over 5,500 members, yet I doubt that there are
even 550 lawyers in the country today substantially engaged in the
practice of public international law, and the vast majority of them
are employees of government or international organizations. It is pre-
cisely the lack of a widespread system of adjudication in this field
which accounts in large part for the dearth of opportunity, particu-
larly private practice opportunity; fewer lawsuits require fewer law-
yers. It is natural that a profession high in numbers relative to oppor-
tunities should exhibit signs of dissatisfaction. If the priesthood con-
sistently exceeded by tenfold the number of parishes available to be
served one would be inclined to conclude that religion was out of
style.
Lest there be misunderstanding I wish to emphasize that we at
the Department of State shall always be among the first to promote
wider acceptance for the impartial adjudication of international dis-
putes. Secretary of State Rogers clearly expressed our support for the
International Court of Justice in his address three years ago this week
(April 25, 1970) on "The Rule of Law and the Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes" before the American Society of International Law,
and we continue to pursue with vigor the policies outlined in that
address. We reject the thesis recently advanced by two notable Cana-
dian authorities' to the effect that the absence of any prospect of
international adjudication actually aids the development of interna-
tional law. I only make the point that we must consider adjudication
in perspective, and not conclude from its relative absence that inter-
national law itself is dead or even suffering reduced vitality.
It is worth remarking also that utilization of international litiga-
tion and the situation of the World Court in particular have in some
ways improved during the last few years. The Court's advisory opin-
ion in the Namibia case has restored some of its previous luster, and
it appears that judges of the Court are about to be involved simulta-
neously in a total of five cases. The fact that two such disputants as
India and Pakistan can engage in successive litigation, first the Rann
of Kutch Arbitration, then the ICJ Appeal Relating to the Jurisdic-
tion of the ICAO Council, is encouraging. The action of Belgium,
France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States in
1. Gotlieb & Dalfen, National Jurisdiction and International Responsibility: New
Canadian Approaches to International Law, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 229 (1973).
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submitting to the Arbitral Tribunal for German External Debts dis-
putes with the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the amounts
of payments due on the Young Loan - a matter that has been esti-
mated to involve up to fourteen million dollars for the dollar tranche
alone - is another hopeful sign. Only time will tell, of course,
whether these straws in the wind foreshadow a greater harvest.
If we indeed can turn away from our historical preoccupation
with the question of adjudication, we see that in recent years the role
of international law itself has been changing, and its importance in
international events has swelled. It has graduated from being a some-
what esoteric discipline, incident to the conduct of international af-
fairs, to become an important instrument of national policy in the
United States and around the world. This world-wide expansion is
abetted by a growing realization within most governments that many
of the common problems affecting States can only be solved by inter-
national cooperation. In a number of fields we in the State Depart-
ment have found that the development of international law can be
one of the primary weapons used to develop an international climate
favorable to the accomplishment of our national aims, and we are
happily participating in this considerable expansion of the role of
international law.
For example, as your program reflects, the enormity and the
seriousness of drug abuse is well recognized as one of the most critical
national social problems we are facing at the present time. Because
of the international character of drug production and commerce, it
is clearly impossible to end such abuse through national measures
alone. We have attempted to deal with this national crisis, at least
in part, through a substantial effort to broaden and strengthen inter-
national legal provisions regulating production and traffic in those
drugs. We have proceeded on the multilateral level, for example,
through amendments to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and on the
bilateral level through a series of specific agreements particularly
with States which have been the sources of raw materials for drugs.
We have been able to conclude these agreements, embodied in sol-
emn legal documents, because other States are also increasingly
aware of the dangers which spreading drug abuse poses to all coun-
tries. These international legal arrangements have already proved
valuable, and hopefully will be of continuing significance in reducing
the supply of drugs reaching this country.
Your program also includes a discussion on terrorism and I
should emphasize here two projects which are in the forefront of the
international legal struggle against terrorism, namely the Draft Arti-
cles on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Diplomatic
Agents and Other Internationally Protected Persons prepared by the
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International Law Commission under the leadership of its American
President, Mr. Richard D. Kearney, and the Draft Convention for the
Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terror-
ism prepared by the U.S. government and introduced at the 27th
General Assembly of the United Nations by Secretary of State Rog-
ers. The forerunner of both of these, of course, was the convention on
this subject prepared by the Organization of American States, which
represents a regional approach to this universal problem.
Several other examples are, I think, pertinent to drive home the
point that international law is thriving and active as a national policy
instrument. A problem of profound national, as well as international,
concern is that of environmental protection. For example, during the
past four years we have responded to the serious problem of marine
pollution with a series of multilateral agreements, including: (1) the
1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution,
and the 1971 Convention for the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation, which together provide an international sys-
tem for compensating victims of damage from vessel oil spills; (2) the
1969 Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas, which
provides for actions on the high seas by coastal States to protect their
coastlines from grave oil pollution damage resulting from serious
maritime accidents; (3) several amendments in 1969 and 1971 to the
1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the
Sea by Oil designed to strengthen controls over vessel oil discharges
and oil tanker construction; and (4) the 1972 Convention on the Pre-
vention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Mat-
ter, which regulates the disposal at sea of toxic land-generated
wastes. We hope that this work will be advanced further through the
adoption later this year of a comprehensive International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, which will regulate the
intentional or accidental discharge of all types of harmful substances
from ships, including oil, toxic chemicals, sewage and garbage.
Outside of the marine pollution area, a number of other impor-
tant legal steps have been taken to protect the world environment
following the 1972 Stockholm Conference, including: (1) the 1972
World Heritage Convention, which provided international funding
and machinery to assist governments in the restoration and protec-
tion of areas of cultural and natural significance; (2) the 1973 Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, which established controls on trade in endangered species
and their products; and (3) a series of bilateral environmental agree-
ments, including the agreement with Canada for the protection of the
Great Lakes from pollution and with the Soviet Union for cooperation
and exchange of information on environmental questions.
We have been able to conclude these agreements largely because
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we and other States have realized that our common interests are far
better served by restricting certain of our own activities, and persuad-
ing others to do likewise, than by continuing to behave in the free,
but costly, manner with regard to our environment that we had been
pursuing. States increasingly realize that broad international prob-
lems can be solved at least in part by broadly based legal agreements.
We have every reason to believe that even though the operation of
these various agreements may not solve all of our problems com-
pletely, they will make a most significant contribution to their reduc-
tion.
In the field of hijacking and aircraft sabotage, the United States,
together with other countries, has spearheaded strenuous efforts
within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) which
over the past ten years have resulted in the conclusion of the Tokyo
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Sei-
zure of Aircraft (Hijacking Convention), and the Montreal Conven-
tion for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation (Sabotage Convention). I had the pleasure of serving as
Chairman of the U.S. Delegation at the diplomatic conference which
approved the third of these conventions and I can testify to the fact
that in this very important field the development of international law
has been a major instrument for the realization of our own national
policy as well as the shared interests of many other States. The bilat-
eral agreement has a role to play here also as illustrated by the recent
hijacking agreement with Cuba, which undoubtedly has been an im-
portant factor in the recent total absence of hijackings to that coun-
try. At the present time strong efforts are concentrated on the hoped
for conclusion of an Air Security Enforcement Convention which,
together with related instruments, will be the subject of a combined
diplomatic conference and Extraordinary Assembly of ICAO to be
held this summer in Rome. In this field even the mere existence of
strong and widely publicized international law serves to help elimi-
nate the scourge which for so long has threatened the safety of inter-
national civil aviation.
For several years the United States and 90 other nations have
been engaged in the United Nations Seabeds Committee's effort to
achieve international agreement on a comprehensive new legal re-
gime for the oceans. This is one of the most extensive and ambitious
international law making projects ever undertaken. It proposes noth-
ing less than a new legal regime for the 70 percent of our world
covered by oceans. In doing so it addresses questions of the breadth
of the territorial sea, international straits, scientific research, pollu-
tion and exploitation of the living and non-living resources of the
oceans. Hopefully, these efforts will produce results at the diplomatic
conference which is scheduled to convene in New York late this year.
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While this effort is motivated in part by the traditional needs for
international regulation, there is no doubt that now, as compared to
the Geneva Conferences of 1958 and 1960, the nations involved regard
development of the law of the sea as an important way of implement-
ing their national policies with respect to fundamental economic and
defense interests.
Perhaps the most striking proof of the new political importance
of international law was presented by the Moscow Summit of last
May, where my indefatigable colleague, the Assistant Legal Adviser
for Treaty Affairs, Mr. Charles I. Bevans, presided over the execution
of nine documents in six days including agreements on strategic arms
limitation, prevention of naval incidents, scientific cooperation, envi-
ronmental matters and joint space ventures, signed by President
Nixon, Chairman Brezhnev, Secretary of State Rogers and other sen-
ior officials. Those of you who have had international legal experience
in the government will know that the bulk of such work is created by
relationships with friendly countries. Countries with whom relations
are not so friendly, and with whom we therefore do not have substan-
tial dealings, present comparatively few legal problems. Many gov-
ernments, including ours, feel increasingly that the development of
a complex array of legal relationships should be conducive to a gen-
eral atmosphere in which military conflict is less likely. As this theory
is applied, an ever increasing wealth of international legal relation-
ships results. The result is a deeper and broader network of structured
communications among States, an expanded range of institutional
bases for cooperation, leading to greater reliability and predictability
of State action, a greater number of formalized standards and chan-
nels for cooperation among States, and in time hopefully a greater
tendency to try to solve problems through international cooperation
rather than conflict.
A special word regarding international conflict is appropriate at
this point. As a profession we have tended to believe that interna-
tional lawyers are too little consulted in connection with the great
crises of war and peace. Naturally this is the area in which the most
difficulties will be confronted. Here, too, however, we may rightfully
take heart from recent experience. As is abundantly clear from the
documents and correspondence printed in recent issues of the
American Journal of International Law' the Legal Adviser was con-
sulted in a timely fashion with respect to the mining of North Viet-
namese ports announced by President Nixon on May 8, 1972, and the
President's speech on that occasion clearly bore the imprint of those
consultations. The various Protocols to the Agreement on Ending the
2. See Nelson, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Interna-
tional Law, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 836-40 (1972); also Letters from Thomas Ehrlich and
Carl B. Spaeth to John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser, Department of State, May 31 and
July 12, 1972, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 325-27 (1973).
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War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed January 27, 1973, as well
as the succeeding Act of Paris, were negotiated with the constant
personal assistance of my principal deputy, Mr. George H. Aldrich,
and we continue to be very much involved in decisions related to
lingering conflict in that area. In recent years, personnel of my office
have contributed significantly not only in this area, but in conten-
tious matters involving Berlin, the Middle East, and indeed every
region of the world. The broader concern of the Government for the
role of international law in armed conflicts is evidenced by our heavy
commitment to ongoing efforts to revise the humanitarian interna-
tional laws related to war. Quite clearly the role of the international
lawyer as action-adviser to his or her government in times of conflict
is growing along with a role in building the structure of laws and
agreements designed to reduce conflict.
As might be expected, the forces which have expanded the role
of international law tend to bring change to the profession as well. In
the past, the traditional international lawyer has been a government
employee functioning primarily as a professional specialist or techni-
cian of a high order. Legal committees of international organizations
have regarded themselves as technical bodies into which politics
should not intrude. As international law has begun to play an increas-
ingly important role as an instrument of national policy, however
those responsible for its creation and application have become more
politically astute. While government representatives in international
legal meetings still, for the most part, are highly competent jurists,
they increasingly manifest political sensitivity and talents as well.
This is a development which doubtless will prove troubling to some
who have grown to professional maturity in a more traditionalist
environment, and one which should give us all pause for thought. We
must take care that in the process of making international law not
become too politicized, that we do not, through political overexpo-
sure, impair the essential character of our chosen instrument.
With this single caveat I believe we may view the future with
justifiable optimism. International law and its practitioners now oc-
cupy an increasingly significant role in the formulation and applica-
tion of national policy and each day brings new opportunities. Private
practice lawyers, too, benefit from this expansion, reducing the prob-
lem of our professional underemployment. Of the specific fields pre-
viously mentioned at least three-environmental control, law of the
sea, and civil aviation security-impact directly on commercial inter-
ests, which increasingly will look to their legal counsel for advice on
international law. Just as the growth of domestic law has been the
hallmark of U.S. internal political development over the past de-
cades, so may international law development be a dominant charac-




FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THAILAND: THE EFFECT OF
RECENT LEGISLATION*
I. INTRODUCTION
Behind the exotic culture and visual delights of the Kingdom of
Thailand is one of Asia's more successful economies. Thailand's 35
million people have witnessed encouraging economic growth in their
country in recent years. The real per capita Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) increased from 2810 baht in 1967 to 3310 baht in 1972.' The
Kingdom has enjoyed a generally favorable, although fluctuating,
balance of payments (3970 million baht in 1972),2 but an unfavorable
balance of trade. The trade deficit has decreased since 1970, moving
from a negative 12,258 million baht in 1970 to a negative 8,508 million
baht in 1972. The country assiduously attempts to limit imports
(there is a 150 percent tax on many luxury imported goods) and
enjoys steadily increasing exports.
Traditionally, Thailand has attracted a considerable amount of
foreign investment which has continued unabated in recent years.
There is no system of registration of foreign investments, and hence
no totally reliable data as to their number and size. However, some
clue as to the relative amounts of foreign investment can be derived
from the statistics for industries which were promoted by the Thai
government under the investment incentives legislation prior to 1972.
During the period from April 1959 to June 1971, Thai investors pro-
vided 66.77 percent of the total capital in promoted industries; Japa-
nese investors3 provided 11.35 percent; U.S. investors provided 6.23
* The author is much indebted to Mr. Chira Panupong, Senior Economist, Board
of Investment, for granting a helpful interview in Bangkok, March 15, 1973. It should
be noted that this comment was written before the change of governments in Thailand
in October, 1973. The author believes that the new government will, initially, continue
the economic policies of the Thanom-Prapass regime. The long term situation, how-
ever, can only be seen as uncertain.
1. BusINESS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, The Business Outlook: Thailand, 4
BUSINEss AsIA 201 (1973). The exchange rate is 20.8 baht to 1 dollar.
2. BANK OF THAILAND, 13 MONTHLY BULLETIN 69 (1973).
3. The exact amount of Japanese direct investment is unknown, but is thought
to be much greater than that of the United States. Japanese investment has increased
in recent years as Japan has faced restrictons on its operations in Europe and else-
where. The use of the Board of Investment's data, therefore, which covers a 12 year
period, probably understates the relative extent of Japanese participation in the Thai
economy.
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percent; and Taiwanese investors provided 5.3 percent.' The esti-
mated amount of U.S. investment is 150 million dollars, 5 which is
distributed among some 200 firms doing business in the country.
During the year 1972, however, the Thai government enacted
three pieces of legislation which could have a significant impact on
foreign participation in the country's economic life, and which have
created an atmosphere of uncertainty regarding continued foreign
investment. Briefly, the Investment Promotion Act' increased the
incentives offered to selected investors. Paradoxically, the Alien
Business Act' seems to sharply restrict the participation of foreigners
in certain industries and the Alien Occupation Act' closed some occu-
pations to non-Thai nationals. The purpose of this comment is to
present and analyze these pieces of legislation, and to discuss their
effect on foreign investors.
II. THE INVESTMENT PROMOTION ACT
The Investment Promotion Act, announced on October 18, 1972,
generally provides more generous incentives to the investor than the
previous comparable legislation, which had existed since 1962.' It
should initially be noted that the benefits of both acts apply to all
investors, not merely foreigners. In the past, most investments pro-
moted by the government have been made with local capital by Thai
nationals.
To be eligible for the incentives of the Act, an investor must be
awarded a promotion certificate by the Board of Investment (BOI),
which is responsible for administering the Act. The certificate, ob-
4. BOARD OF INVESTMENT, INVESTING IN THE DYNAMIC GROWTH OF THAILAND 64
(1972).
5. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Establishing a Business in Thailand, OVERSEAS BusI-
NESS REPORTS, OBR 72-038 (August, 1972) at 5. This compares with $900 million in
Indonesia, $710 million in the Philippines, $310 million in Singapore, $200 million in
Malaysia, and virtually none in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, Market Profile for the Far East, OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS, OBR 72-054
(September, 1972).
6. National Executive Council Announcement No. 227, Investment Promotion
Act (October 18, 1972); COLLECTION OF LAWS PERTAINING TO INVESTMENT PROMOTION
compiled by Investment Services Division, Office of the Board of Investment, Thailand
(March 1973) [hereinafter cited as Investment Promotion Act].
7. National Executive Council Announcement No. 281, Alien Business Act (Nov-
ember 26, 1972); COLLECTION OF LAWS PERTAINING TO INVESTMENT PROMOTION compiled
by Investment Services Division, Office of the Board of Investment, Thailand (March
1973) [hereinafter cited as Alien Business Act].
8. National Executive Council Announcement No. 322, Alien Occupations Act
(December 13, 1972); COLLECTION OF LAWS PERTAINING TO INVESTMENT PROMOTION com-
piled by Investment Services Division, Office of the Board of Investment, Thailand
(March 1973) [hereinafter cited as Alien Occupations Act].
9. Promotion of Industrial Investment Act (1962), as amended in 1965 and 1969.
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tained by filing an application0 with the BOI, qualifies one as a,
"promoted person." A promoted person must be a limited company
(corporation) or a cooperative." Investors currently receiving the in-
centives of the 1962 legislation may request any of the benefits which
they do not presently receive by applying for a new certificate under
the 1972 Act. 2 The ultimate decision with respect to the issuance of
the promotion certificate and the extent of the benefits awarded lies
with the BOI.11 Some of the criteria which it considers important are
employment, the potential production of foreign exchange, the loca-
tion of the industry and the time of the application.
4
The general incentives available under the Investment Promo-
tion Act are classified as guarantees, permissions, tax reductions and
exemptions, and protections. Additional incentives are available if
the promoted person locates the activity in specified areas of the.
Kingdom, or if the business is export oriented.
A. Guarantees
The government will not engage in an activity which is compe-
titive with that of the promoted person,' 5 although the Thai govern-
ment has traditionally been rather active in both the agricultural and
the industrial sectors." This guarantee, which was also included in
the 1962 Act, appears to have largely been the result of a World Bank
Mission which recommended in 1959 that private investment be en-
couraged, and the Thai government's perception that its high degree
of activity might frighten away potential foreign investors. 7 The gov-
ernment still provided an average of 31 percent of the total gross
domestic fixed investment during the period of 1959-1969,1 and con-
tinues to operate a number of businesses with notorious inefficiency.
The guarantee against competition from the government can, there-
10. Board of Investment form 9.1.
11. Investment Promotion Act, supra note 6, art. 12.
12. Id. art. 37.
13. At unspecified intervals BOI issues lists of specific activities eligible for pro-
motion. A 1973 BOI announcement listed such activities as mining, metals, ceramics,
chemicals and chemical products, mechanical and electrical equipment, construction
materials, textiles, service and miscellaneous industries. Announcement of the Board
of Investment Number 1/2516, List No. 1/2516, January 9, 1973.
14. Interview with Mr. Chira Panupong, Senior Economist, Board of Investment,
Bangkok, Thailand, March 15, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Interview].
15. Investment Promotion Act, supra note 6, art. 15.
16. See generally, J. INGRAM, ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THAILAND 1850-1970, at 139-44,
(1971) [hereinafter cited as INGRAM]. Despite assertions by conservative Thai political
leaders that Dr. Pridi Phanomyong's Economic Plan of 1933 was "Bolshevism" [D.
WILSON, POLITICS IN THAILAND 17 (1962)], the debate over government operation of
industry has seldom been ideological.
17. INGRAM, supra note 16, at 231.
18. Id. at 230.
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fore, be of some value to the foreign investor.
The enterprise of a promoted person will not be nationalized.,9
However, this has never been a threat to the foreign investor in Thai-
land. Additionally, exportation of the goods produced by a promoted
person is permitted. 0
Foreign currency may be remitted abroad if it represents invest-
ment capital from a foreign country, a foreign loan or interest ther-
eon, or profit from the promoted activity on obligations assumed as
a result of the promoted activity. These remittances may, however,
be restricted during periods of adverse balance of payments to a
yearly rate no lower than 20 percent for capital and 15 percent for
earnings after the promoted person has engaged in business for two
years. 2' Being elevated to a guarantee from its former status as a
"right," this provision presumably implies a higher degree of protec-
tion. Although there is no absolute right to repatriate all funds, the
investor can rely on Thailand's healthy balance of payments posi-
tion.22 Also, most foreign firms have in the past had little problem
with remittances.2 This felicitous circumstance should continue as
the Kingdom's economy develops.
B. Permissions
The promoted person may own land in the Kingdom. 24 This pro-
vision seems to be directly aimed at foreign investors, since aliens,
in general, are not permitted to own real property in the absence of a
treaty. While Thailand has such treaties with most industrial coun-
tries, none exist between Thailand and the United States.
2 5
Alien Skilled Workers and experts may be brought into the coun-
try in excess of ordinary immigration quotas. The Thai immigration
law stipulates that no more than 200 immigrants per year from any
single country may enter Thailand. As might be expected, applica-
tions from nationals of the countries which export large amounts of
capital to Thailand greatly exceed this annual quota.
C. Tax reductions and exemptions
The promoted person is granted an exemption from import du-
19. Investment Promotion Act, supra note 6, art. 15 (2).
20. Id. art. 15(4).
21. Id. art. 15(3).
22. Thailand's balance of payments was 1.21 billion dollars in total reserves at the
end of February 1973, as compared with 0.99 billion dollars a year earlier; STATISTICAL
OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 27 MONTHLY BULLETIN Or STATIsTrcs 237 (May, 1973).
23. 3 BUSINESS ASIA 344 (1972).
24. Investment Promotion Act, supra note 6, art. 16.
25. CHARLES KIRKWOOD AND ASSOCIATES, THAILAND BUSINESS-LEGAL HANDBOOK 64
(1969).
26. Investment Promotion Act, supra note 6, art. 17.
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ties and business taxes on machinery required for the promoted activ-
ity, provided that such machinery is not produced in Thailand. 7 The
Thai business tax is a gross receipts tax payable by the manufacturer
or importer. It should be noted that the machinery which has been
exempted from import duties and business taxes cannot be used for
purposes other than the conduct of the promoted person's business, 0
unless permission is granted by the BOI. 29
Additionally, the promoted person is exempted from payment of
income tax for a period of three to eight years from the date net
income is derived from the business.3 0 This provision places a great
amount of discretion in the BOI and the criteria are the same as those
used in the decision to grant a certificate or promotion. This exemp-
tion, however, is a benefit which may be omitted from the package
of incentives at the discretion of the BOI.
3 '
D. Protections
The importation of products competitive with those produced by
the promoted person may be prohibited,3 or the import duty on com-
petitive products may be increased.3 3 As an alternative, "special fees"
up to 50 percent of an item's cost may be imposed on imported goods
competing with products of the promoted person.3 4 These protective
provisions enable the BOI to award a virtual monopoly position if it
so chooses.
E. Additional incentives
Thailand has arrived at a point in its development at which it
can enjoy a degree of selectivity with respect to foreign investments.
This desire to select foreign investments is manifested in the Invest-
ment Promotion Act by special incentives given to industries located
outside the Bangkok metropolitan area or industries that are export-
related.
In addition to the incentives granted to all promoted persons for
enterprises located in "investment promotion areas," the BOI may,
at its discretion, grant any or all of the following benefits:
(1) A reduction of import duty and business tax of up to 50
percent of the collectable rate on imported raw materials to be used
27. Id. art. 18.
28. Id. art. 21(1).
29. Id. art. 22.
30. Id. art. 20.
31. Id. art. 26.
32. Id. art. 24(1).
33. Id. art. 24(2).
34. Id. art. 27.
35. These areas have not yet been delineated, but it is thought that they will
include most of the country, except the capital city of Bangkok.
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by the promoted activity."
(2) A reduction of the business tax of up to 90 percent of the
collectable rate on the sale of goods produced by the promoted person
for a period of up to five years. 7
(3) A deduction of twice the costs of the transportation, elec-
tricity and water from gross income in the determination of the in-
come tax."
(4) A deduction from net income of 25 percent of the costs of
construction and installation of facilities used in the promoted busi-
ness. This deduction is in excess of normal depreciation. It may be
used in one year, or may be allocated over a period of up to ten years
commencing from the date net income is first derived from the enter-
prise.
3 9
(5) A reduction of 50 percent of the normal corporate tax rate
for a period of five years commencing from the date at which the
normal tax holiday, which is granted as an ordinary incentive, ex-
pires." A business locating in an "investment promotion area" may,
therefore, receive favored income tax treatment for a period of up to
13 years from the year at which a profit is made.
At the discretion of the BOI, export-related businesses may be
granted the following special incentives:
(1) Exemption from import duty and business tax on raw mate-
rials which are used in the promoted activity;
4 1
(2) Exemption from import duty and business tax on items
which the promoted person imports for re-export;
42
(3) Exemption from export duty and business tax on items
which the promoted person exports;
43
(4) A 2 percent reduction of that part of net income attributa-
ble to an increase over the previous year's net income which is a result
of export."
F. Distinguishing features of the old and the new
Although most of the incentives offered under the current legisla-
36. Investment Promotion Act, supra note 6, art. 23(1).
37. Id. art. 23(2).
38. Id. art. 23(3). This is a classic infrastructure-building device and is needed in
a country in which transportation, electricity and water are either inadequate or lack-
ing in many places.
39. Id. art. 23(4).
40. Id. art. 23(5).
41. Id. art. 25(1).
42. Id. art. 25(2).
43. Id. art. 25(3).
44. Id. art. 25(4).
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tion were present in the 1962 Act, there are some important changes.
One of the more significant differences between the new act and the
former one is that under the new legislation there is no express classi-
fication of industries with respect to their importance. The Act
merely states that the BOI may designate an investment as promoted
if it is "of economic and social importance to the nation.""4 Article
11 of the Act also specifically excludes certain activities from eligibil-
ity for promotion."
The provision relating to the repatriation of earnings has been
raised from the "rights and benefits" section of the former law to a
"guarantee" in the new act. This move has been well received by
foreign investors since it eliminates some of the "uncertainty" of the
prior legislation.47 The income tax provisions are more favorable. The
maximum tax holiday available under the 1962 act was five years
compared with eight years under the present legislation.
The provisions which allow extra incentives for businesses in
rural areas and those which are designed to increase Thailand's ex-
ports are all new. The special incentives to export industries are
designed to improve the country's trade balance. It is submitted,
however, that both these moves are propitious. Too much has been
made of the limited Communist insurgency4" in Thailand's rural
areas, but, despite the exaggeration, positive action by the Thai gov-
ernment to develop the country outside Bangkok is a welcome move.
A significant aspect of the new legislation is the substantial in-
crease in authority which it gives the BOI. The former Act divided
promoted industries into three groups which were ordered in decreas-
ing importance to the development of the country and which received
decreasing benefits. The new Act eliminates this classification and
allows the BOI to specify the extent to which the discretionary bene-
fits, for example, the length of the income tax holiday, will be
awarded. The new authority has admittedly placed an initial strain
on the BOI's resources. 9 It is submitted, however, that placing more
authority in the hands of the BOI indicates a flexibility and a poten-
tial for selectivity which is desirable as Thailand's development con-
tinues.
45. Id. art. 11. Examples of important areas are transportation, fishery, agricul-
ture, animal husbandry, industry, production of goods for export, export trade, tour-
ism, organization and improvement of land for industrial purposes, and repair and
maintenance of machinery used in the above activities.
46. Id. Those activities excluded from eligibility for promotion are banking, finan-
cial institutions, and "normal" trading businesses.
47. 3 BUSINESS ASIA 343 (1972).
48. See, e.g., L. LomAx, THAIAND, THE WAR THAT IS, THE WAR THAT WiLL BE
(1967).
49. Interview, supra note 13.
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The new Act shows that, in addition to the desire for domestic
investment, Thailand continues to desire helpful foreign investment.
The Act has many of the same provisions as incentive legislation of
the country's neighbors,50 which generally offer the same economic
advantages to the foreigner as does Thailand.
III. THE ALIEN BUSINESS ACT
The Alien Business Act, announced on November 24, 1972, re-
stricts the participation of aliens in certain industries. It is a piece of
legislation which, at first glance, seems to contradict the attitude of
the Thai government as expressed in the Investment Promotion Act.
On its face, it merely prohibits majority ownership of a rather short
list of businesses by aliens. The dilemma for the foreign investor,
however, is not this limitation, but rather the confusion which the Act
has caused with respect to the continued welcome reception of foreign
investment in the Kingdom. The term "alien" is defined by the Act
as a natural person, 51 or a juristic person whose ownership is more
than 50 percent alien.52
In general, the Act divides the restricted businesses into three
categories. Those businesses which appear on List A of the Annex to
the Act may be operated for a period of two years following the date
of the Announcement.5" At that time the firm must either cease oper-
ations or become 51 percent owned by Thai nationals. The businesses
on List A are generally very basic enterprises carried on in any coun-
try.
54
The Act provides that businesses on List B may continue to be
operated indefinitely by aliens, but that no new businesses may be
initiated.5 5 Those businesses which are allowed to continue operation
may not increase production or distribution at a rate in excess of 30
percent annually, 56 nor may they open new branch offices without the
50. See, e.g., Malaysia, Investment Incentives Act, 1967, as amended, 1969, 1971,
in INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DIsPuTEs, INVESTMENT LAWS
OF THE WORLD, Section 5:2A-1.1 (1972); Republic of Vietnam, Law No. 4/72 in 11 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 883 (1972); Philippines, R.A. 5186, in Bengzoan, National Treatment
of Americans in the Philippines: Parity Rights, Retail Trade, and Investments, 3 INT'L
LAW 339 (1969); Indonesia, Law Concerning Investment of Foreign Capital, Act No. 1,
year 1967, in INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, INVEST-
MENT LAWS OF THE WORLD, Chapter 5 (1973).
51. Alien Business Act, supra note 7, art. 3.
52. Id.
53. Id. art. 30(2).
54. Alien Business Act, Annex, List A. The complete List A is as follows: rice,
farming, salt farming, trade in native agricultural products, trade in real estate, ac-
countacy, law, architecture, advertising, brokerage, auctioneering, barbering and
building construction.
55. Alien Business Act, supra note 7, arts. 4, 30(2).
56. Id. art. 30(2).
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consent of the Director General of the Department of Commercial
Registration.57 The businesses on List B are somewhat more numer-
ous than those on List A,5" but still not so numerous as to have more
than a very mild effect on the amount of foreign investment which
the country is willing to receive.
Businesses on List C55 are also subject to the 30 percent annual
limitation on production or distribution increases, 0 but new busi-
nesses within this category can, at least, begin operation upon obtain-
ing a license from the Department of Commercial Registration. 1 This
license is granted automatically to businesses which have received a
Certificate of Promotion from the BOI. 2 The Department of Com-
mercial Registration may, however, impose any or all of the following
conditions upon granting the license:
(1) specification of the debt/equity ratio to be used in the capi-
talization of the business;"3
(2) specification of the amount of capital which is to be im-
ported for the operation of the business; 4
(3) specification of the amount of capital contributed by Thai
nationals which must be in the business' capital structure;
5
(4) specification of the ratio between Thai and foreign workers
to be employed by the business.6
Aliens who operate businesses in violation of the Act are punish-
able by a fine of between 30,000 and 500,000 baht, and will receive a
court order to discontinue the business.67 Additionally, shareholders
or partners of alien juristic persons who fraudulently evade the re-
quirements of the Act are punishable to the same extent. 8
57. Id.
58. Alien Business Act, Annex, List B. The more important businesses on List B
are as follows:
agricultural production; production of sugar, beverages, medicine, ce-
ment and plywood; most retail trade; hotels; the sale of foods and bever-
ages; and trade in natural ores.
59. Alien Business Act, Annex, Lict C. The List C includes:
all wholesale trade, except that in List A; all export trade; retail trade in
machinery, engines and tools; production of animal feed, vegetable oils,
textiles, glass containers and paper; mining; all services, except those on
Lists A and B; and all construction, except building construction.
60. Alien Business Act, supra note 7, art. 30(2).
61. Id. art. 5.
62. Id. art. 6.
63. Id. art. 8(1).
64. Id. art. 8(2).
65. Id. art. 8(3).
66. Id. art. 8(4).
67. Id. art. 26.
68. Id. art. 28.
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The problem for the foreign investor, particularly the U.S. inves-
tor, is not the prohibitions of the Act, but the fact that it has created
so much confusion. At this stage, no one knows whether the Act is
an indication of a trend towards increased economic nationalism or
merely a rational preservation of certain basic industries for Thai
nationals. The extent to which the law will be enforced is still a
matter of doubt. Corruption is something which this comment cannot
even begin to discuss. The 30 percent growth limitation for businesses
in Lists B and C also presents a subject of confusion, since it gives
an obvious advantage to a new business which receives a license over
an old business whose growth is restricted.
The U.S. investor faces an even more confusing problem. Thai-
land and the United States have a treaty69 under which U.S. busi-
nesses are to receive the same treatment as Thai businesses in the
Kingdom. The status of the Act, vis-a-vis the treaty, is finclear as to
what will happen to the U.S. businesses when the treaty expires in
1978.
It appears that the Alien Business Act was announced as a re-
sponse to the large and burgeoning Japanese ownership of business
in Thailand. 0 There is no doubt that prior to the legislation there had
been public expression of resentment against the substantial Japa-
nese involvement in the Thai economy. In 1972, there was a demon-
stration in front of a large Japanese department store and an abortive
attempt to boycott Japanese products." There was also a strike by
Thai workers at a Japanese construction company protesting the
strict Japanese work rules. 72 These actions are uncharacteristic of
Thais, and indicate the extent of the fear of Japanese domination of
the economy.
The foregoing suggests that the Act will not be as strictly en-
forced against U.S. businesses as against those of Japanese aliens.
Nonetheless, U.S. investment has decreased substantially since the
announcement of the Act.73 Necessary changes and clarification of the
Act will, almost certainly, be forthcoming.
In all, the Act is best seen as only a slight closing of the door to
foreign investment, and one which is probably not intended to have
a significant effect on the participation of U.S. investors in the Thai
economy. Thailand is a country which still needs the infusion of
foreign capital and which stands to benefit from the rapidly increas-
69. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations with Thailand, May 29, 1966,
[1968] 19 U.S.T. 5843; T.I.A.S. No. 6540.
70. BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 9, 1972, at 44.
71. The New York Times, Nov. 25, 1972, at 41, col. 1.
72. BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 9, 1972, at 44.
73. The Wall Street Journal, July 27, 1973, at 30, col. 1.
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ing growth of Southeast Asia. It is difficult to imagine that xeno-
phobia in the country will cause it to reject foreign investment.
IV. THE ALIEN OCCUPATIONS ACT
The Alien Occupations Act, which was announced on December
13, 1972 and became effective on March 14, 1973, prohibits aliens
from working in any of 39 occupations, and requires all aliens to
obtain a license from the Department of Labor. Like the Alien Busi-
ness Act, it has contributed to the atmosphere of uncertainty con-
cerning foreign investment in the Kingdom. However, the Act's im-
portance is not nearly as great, nor is it intended to be, as that of the
Alien Business Act.
The licensing provisions, which caused some confusion shortly
after the Act became effective (some 370,000 aliens had to obtain
licenses), were primarily administrative, and of little importance to
the foreign investor. However, some of the proscribed occupations
listed in the Act are currently being held by foreigners, and the prohi-
bition against employing new aliens in these tasks could have an
effect on foreign investors.
It should be noted that aliens already employed in one of the 39
prohibited jobs on March 14th were allowed to continue working in
them. The list of proscribed occupations includes such unlikely tasks
as the making of Thai musical instruments, cigarette making by hand
and alms-bowl making." Those prohibited occupations in which a
foreign investor might find it necessary to employ aliens are construc-
tion and civil engineering, architecture, law, accounting and "broker-
age." Aliens who work illegally in one of the 39 banned jobs are
subject to five years imprisonment 5.7 Foreign diplomats and their
employees are exempted from the Act,'7 as are people performing
temporary tasks and those who are "allowed by the Royal Thai Gov-
ernment to perform [duties] or execute [tasks] in the Kingdom."
'77
The banning of foreign participation in certain occupations is not
a new event in Thailand, nor is it a new situation that most of the
prohibited jobs are not highly paid. The interpretation given the Act
by the Ministry of the Interior, which has the task of enforcing it, is
still unsettled, as is the degree to which the law will be enforced. It
is clear, however, that foreign investment has declined substantially
since the inception of the Alien Business Act and the Alien Occupa-
tions Act .7 The latter legislation must, therefore, be seen as a con-
74. The Bangkok Post, March 15, 1973, at 1, col. 3.
75. Alien Occupations Act, supra note 8, art. 28.
76. Id. art. 2.
77. Id. art. 3.
78. Numerous projects have been either suspended or cancelled. The Wall Street
Journal, July 27, 1973, at 30, col. 1.
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tributing factor to the general atmosphere of uncertainty which exists
in the Kingdom, although its real importance is not especially signifi-
cant.
V. CONCLUSION
Taken together, the three pieces of legislation present the foreign
investor with a situation which is confusing and uncertain. The In-
vestment Promotion Act encourages private investment, while the
Alien Business Act concurrently restricts foreign ownership of busi-
nesses in certain industries. The apparent contradiction is, however,
not a contradiction at all, but rather an indication that, although
Thailand still welcomes foreign investment, the government now be-
lieves that a more selective investment policy is in the country's best
interest. Most of the businesses in which foreign control is prohibited
are the kinds of basic activities which are properly reserved to local
nationals. In any event, the extent of foreign participation in most of
the restricted areas is minimal.
The problem is that while the government still desires an inflow
of foreign capital, it has created an atmosphere of uncertainty which,
until clarified, will dissuade new foreign investment. It is unfortunate
that the Alien Business Act has caused this situation, and a speedy
resolution of the uncertainty should be effected by the Thai govern-
ment.
It is suggested that the legislation will not, ultimately, have a
deleterious effect on either the status of the foreign investor in Thai-
land or upon the country's growth. In the future, the Thai govern-
ment will probably continue to encourage private investment, includ-
ing that of foreigners, and display a greater degree of selectivity with
respect to both the existence of foreign investments and the extent
to which they will be promoted. This selectivity will be manifested
by the extent of foreign ownership granted under the Alien Business
Act and by the more flexible incentives utilized under the new Invest-
ment Promotion Act. The latter Act will, almost certainly, be modi-




SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-Anaconda Co. v. Corporaci6n del Cobre, 55
F.R.D. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 2735 (1973).
In the latter part of 1969, the Chilean Exploration Company
(CHILEX) and the Andean Copper Mining Company (ANDES)
transferred all of their assets and liabilities to two separate Chilean
corporations. Together with the Anaconda Company, each sold 51
percent of the stock in their various Chilean mining interests to one
defendant, Corporaci6n del Cobre (CODELCO), which made pay-
ment by promissory notes guaranteed by another defendant, Corpo-
raci6n de Fomento de la Producci6n (CORFO). In July of 1971, the
Allende government, by constitutional amendment, I nationalized the
Chilean mining industry. Involved in the nationalization were the
CODELCO and CORFO interests, as well as the remaining 49
percent interest of each of the three plaintiffs. CODELCO, now a
state agency, is responsible for operating and managing the mines.
2
Although Chilean nationalizations have been the subject of
much comment and litigation, the three plaintiff mining companies
involved in this case did not challenge the legality of the action.
Instead, they brought suit in the U.S. District Court to recover on the
promissory notes and attached two million dollars the defendants had
on deposit in U.S. banks.
The defendants moved to vacate the order of attachment giving
three arguments in support of their motion. First, they contended
that sovereign immunity prevented suit against them without their
consent, since the corporations were "organic parts of the Chilean
state that . . . were created to, and do, carry out governmental func-
1. Chile: Constitutional Amendment Concerning Natural Resources and Their
Nationalization (July 15, 1971), Law 17,450, conveniently found in 10 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1067 (1971) [hereinafter cited as the Nationalization Amendment].
2. For a closer examination of incidents leading to and occurring throughout this
nationalization period in Chile, see generally Expropriation Symposium: Proceedings
of the 1972 Regional Conference of the American Society of International Law at the
University of Denver College of Law, 2 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POLICY 125 (1972); Landau,
Economic and Political Nationalism and Private Foreign Investment, 2 DENVER J.
INT'L L. & POLICY 169 (1972); Schlesser, Recent Developments in Latin-American
Foreign Investment Laws, 6 INT'L LAWYER 64 (1972); Thome, Expropriation in Chile
under the Frei Agrarian Reform, 19 AM. J. COMp. L. 489 (1971); Wesley, Expropriation
Challenge in Latin America: Prospects for Accord on Standards and Procedures, 46
TOL. L. REv. 232 (1971); Santa Maria, Perspectives on Spanish American Legal Norms
Governing Mining Concessions, "Chileanization, "and the Concensus of Vida del Mar,
11 VA. J. INT'L L. 177 (1971); Doman, New Developments in the Field of
Nationalization, 3 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POLITICS (1970).
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tions (jure imperii)."3 Second, since the plaintiffs had already sub-
mitted their claim to a special Chilean tribunal,4 attachment should
not have been granted while the matter was sub judice there.5 Finally,
they urged vacation as an exercise of judicial discretion.
Judge Metzner, trying the case, initially held that the case could
be decided on procedural grounds alone, without addressing the con-
tentions of the defendants, since, under New York law,6 an attach-
ment may be vacated only after the defendant has made an appear-
ance and these defendants had not done so. The judge did not stop
there, however, and his holdings with respect to the contentions of the
defendants form the most interesting aspect of the opinion.
The basic question confronting the court was whether the at-
tached property was that of a foreign government and, therefore,
subject to sovereign immunity,7 or a foreign government engaged in
commercial activities,8 or a foreign corporation subject to the laws of
3. 55 F.R.D. 16, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
4. Nationalization Amendment, supra note 1, at 1069. The Amendment provides
for the establishment of a "Tribunal for hearing appeals on the amount of compensa-
tion determined by the Comptroller General utilizing a specific formula provided in
the amendment, to be paid to corporations whose interest was expropriated. The
Amendment also states that there is "no appeal available against its (the Tribunal's)
decision."
5. The case referred to has since been resolved by the Tribunal. Copper Tribunal
Decision, Diario Oficial (Aug. 1972), conveniently found at Special Copper Tribunal
Decision on the Question of Excess Profits of Nationalized Copper Companies, 11 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1013 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Copper Tribunal Decision].
6. New York CPLR § 6223 Vacating or Modifying Attachments:
. . * If, after the defendant has appeared in the action, the court deter-
mines that the attachment is unnecessary to the security of the plaintiff
it shall vacate the order of attachment. Such a motion shall not of itself
constitute an appearance in the action.
New York law is applied here in accordance with Rule 64, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure providing that attachment for the purpose of jurisdiction and execution "are
available under the circumstances and in the manner provided by the law of the state
in which the district court is held."
7. New York and Cuba Mail -S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684
(S.D.N.Y. 1955). Plaintiff sought to recover damages sustained by its vessel by attach-
ing funds of the Republic of Korea on deposit in various New York banks. Inasmuch
as the Department of State filed a statement, recognizing that "under international
law property of a foreign government is immune from attachment and seizure," the
Court complied with the request and granted the motion to vacate the attachment.
8. Harris and Co. Advertising Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So.2d 687 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1961). Here, attachment of government funds deposited in various local banks
was upheld:
It would not be compatible with the principle of judicial powers of a
sovereign nation if funds deposited as private funds. . . used in business
type activities here, would be clothed in a vail radiating foreign sover-
eignty.
See also Pacific Molasses Co. v. Conrite de Ventas de Mulin de la Repiiblica Domini-
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the United States.' This distinction between activity which is govern-
mentally oriented and that which is commercially oriented forms the
essence of a sovereign immunity defense.'0
There are two ways to raise the question of sovereign immunity
once the merits of the controversy have been placed in issue. Either
the State Department may assert such immunity, or the claim may
be made by an accredited diplomatic representative of the foreign
state." An assertion by the State Department is usually determi-
native of the issue," as courts will generally not exercise their juris-
diction so as to embarrass the executive branch.' 3 This procedure is
not an "abrogation" of judicial power.'4 However, in the instant case
there was no intervention by the State Department. The issue was
raised only by the affidavit of the Chilean Ambassador. The court
was thus left to its own discretion in determining the merits of the
claim.'
5
cana, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 30 Misc. 2d 560 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1961); National City
Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324
U.S. 30 (1945). See generally S. SUCHARITHUL, STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADE ACTIVITIES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 347-50 (1959); T. QUITLARA, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY 254-309 (1970).
9. The distinction between public acts (acta jure imperii) and private acts (acta
jure gestionii) is the foundation for the holding in the present case and will be discussed
in greater depth, infra.
10. The issue is often solved by treaty provisions which preclude the assertion of
sovereign immunity in the commercial disputes. Some examples are:
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany (signed Oct. 29, 1954), art.
18, para. 27 U.S.T. 1839, 1859, T.I.A.S. No. 3593, 273 U.N.T.S. 3,26;
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United
States and Italy (signed Feb. 2, 1948) art. 24, para. 6, 63 Stat. 2255,
T.I.A.S. No. 1965; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation be-
tween the United States and Iceland (signed Jan. 21, 1950) art. XV, para.
3, 1 U.S.T. 785, 796, 797, T.I.A.S. No. 2155, 206 U.N.T.S. 296, 288.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 71(1)(b) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
12. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945); The Schooner Ex-
change v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); Compalija Espafiola de Nave-
garian Martina, S.A.V. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 64 (1938).
13. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943). See also United States
v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209 (1882).
In such cases the judicial department of this government follows the
action of the political branch, and will not embarass the latter by assum-
ing an antagonistic jurisdiction.
14. New York and Cuba Mail S.S., supra note 7, at 685,
• . . This course entails no abrogation of judicial power, it is a self-
imposed restraint to avoid embarrassment of the executive in the conduct
of foreign affairs.
15. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisara General de Abastecimi6ntos y Trans-
portes, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Victory Transport];
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, supra note 12, at 34; Ex parte Republic of Peru, supra
note 13, at 587; Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 533 (1920).
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In reaching his decision, Judge Metzner relied upon the distinc-
tion between jure imperii and jure gestionis.'" This distinction is the
basis of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, 7 and the policy
followed by the State Department since 1952.' 8 In its determination,
the court attempted to find the characteristics of a corporation which
would qualify, or disqualify, it for immunity. It looked to the Restate-
ment (Second) of Foreign Relations Law which states that the im-
munity of a foreign state "extends to. . . a corporation created under
its laws and exercising functions comparable to those of an agency of
the state."1 9 Adopting the Restatement comment, the court agreed
that the term "agency" means "a body having the nature of a govern-
16. Victory Transport, supra note 15, at 360. See also National City Bank v.
Republic of China, supra note 8; Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Instit.,
260 App. Div. 189, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 825 (1st Dept. 1940), Et Ve Blik Kuruna v.B.N.S. Int'l
Sales Corp., 240 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
17. In contrast to the restrictive theory generally used today, is the classical theory
espoused by Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange, supra note 10. The
usual point of reference for the change from the classical to the restrictive is the
eloquent dissent of Justice Mach in The Pesaro, 277 F.472 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), where he
differentiates between commercial and war vessels of governments. Recently, legal
scholars have moved toward a third theory which would virtually remove sovereign
immunity as a defense. Schmitthoff, The Nineteenth Century Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity and the Importance of the Growth of State Trading, 2 DENVER J. INT'L L. &
POLICY 199 (1972).
18. Letter of Acting Legal Adviser, Jack B. Tate to Department of Justice, May
19, 1952, 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952):
• . . the Department feels that the widespread and increasing practice on
the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities makes nec-
essary a practice which will enable persons doing business with them to
have their rights determined in the courts. For these reasons it will
hereafter be the Department's policy to follow the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign govern-
ments for a grant of sovereign immunity.
For comment on the "Tate letter" see Dubrovir, A Gloss on the Tate Letter's Restric-
tive Theory of Sovereign Immunity, 54 VA. L. REv. 1 (1968); Bishop, New United
States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 93 (1953); Comment,
Restrictive Sovereign Immunity, the State Department and the Court, 62 N.W.U. L.J.
397 (1967).
19. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, at § 66. Additionally, the RESTATEMENT provides
immunity to the following areas of a foreign state:
(a) the state itself;
(b) its head of state and any person designated by him as a member of
his official party;
(c) its government or any governmental agency;
(d) its head of government and any person designated by him as a
member of his official party;
(e) its foreign minister and any person designated by him as a member
of his official party;
(f) any other public minister, official, or agent of the state with respect
to acts performed in his official capacity if the effect of exercising jurisdic-
tion would be to enforce a rule of law against the state ...
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ment department or ministry,"2 and that "great weight must be
given to the fact that the foreign state considers the corporation to
be performing the functions of a governmental agency.""
On the other hand, the court noted, if a corporation is permitted
to be sued in its own country, in the same manner as a private corpo-
ration, immunity becomes highly questionable." Additionally, when
a foreign government engages in commercial activities outside the
traditional areas of government functions, the corporation, or sepa-
rate governmental entity, should be reachable.2
Relying upon the opposing affidavits, Judge Metzner found sev-
eral points against the claim of sovereign immunity. First, if the
corporations were indeed immune, then it would not have been neces-
sary for the government of Chile to join them as a party in the pro-
ceedings in the Chilean courts.24 Secondly, the terms for delivery of
the notes were in accordance with the laws of the State of New York
and the parties to the notes considered the New York office of CO-
DELCO as the domicile of the corporation. This led to the conclusion
that the defendants were not entitled to sovereign immunity.
The defendants urged application of the Victory Transport case,
where legislative acts, such as nationalization, were found to be pub-
lic acts, and sovereign immunity was granted even in the absence of
State Department suggestion. 2 However, Judge Metzner pointed out
20. Id. Comment. Reiterated in the Comment is the previous discussion stating
that:
In determining whether the agency is in fact a part of the government,
the views of the government creating the agency are given great weight,
but are not necessarily conclusive.
See also Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolier Instil., supra note 16; United
States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929)
[hereinafter cited as United States v. Deutsches].
21. Id. Reporter's Notes. Judge Metzner points out that this argument is favorable
to the defendants' point of view.
22. Id. Reporter's Notes. Judge Metzner points out that this argument is favorable
to the plaintiffs' point of view.
23. United States v. Deutsches, supra note 21; Coale v. Socit6 Co-operative
Suisse dis Charbona Basle, 21 F.2d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). See also The Harvard Re-
search in International Law Art. 23, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 451, 700 (1935):
A State may permit orders or judgments of its courts to be enforced
against the property of another State not used for diplomatic or consular
purposes: (a) When the property is immovable property; or (b) When the
property is used in connection with the conduct of an enterprise...
24. Copper Tribunal Decision, supra note 4.
25. Victory Transport, supra note 15, at 360. It is stated that public acts are
generally limited to the following areas:
(1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien;
(2) legislative acts, such as nationalization;
(3) acts concerning the armed forces;
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that the nationalization occurred in July of 1971,26 whereas the sale,
for which the notes were issued, occurred in 1969. This prior obliga-
tion of CODELCO, therefore, was not affected by the nationalization.
The second argument urged by the defendants was that since the
plaintiffs had submitted their claims to a special Chilean court, the
matter was sub judice and the attachment should have been vacated.
This was handled rather summarily. The Special Copper Tribunal"
was established to hear appeals from those affected by nationaliza-
tion on the amount of compensation decided upon by the Comptroller
General.2 In making the decision, the Comptroller General arrived at
a negative sum. 9 This negative sum provides a unique area of set-off
for any claims against the Chilean government by those, such as the
plaintiffs, who have claims arising outside the nationalization
scheme. After joining CODELCO as a party in the appeal before the
Special Copper Tribunal, the government further asserted that any
obligation on the notes should be paid out of that compensation. The
court found it incomprehensible that the defendants could assert that
this matter was being seriously contended in Chile.
The defendants final argument urged the exercise of judicial
discretion to vacate the order. The defendants raised three grounds
which they thought rendered the exercise of judicial discretion appro-
priate. First, since the claim was for one hundred million dollars and
the attachment was on a mere two million dollars, which would not
afford the plaintiffs much relief, the attachment should have been
removed. Secondly, the attachment would have damaged trade be-
tween Chile and the United States and, therefore, have adversely
affected the U.S. balance of payments. Finally, the attachment
would have had a deleterious effect on the economy of Chile. Judge
Metzner found the arguments ludicrous, difficult to believe, and pro-
perly within the sphere of the State Department. The court then
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity;
(5) public loans.
26. Nationalization Amendment, supra note 1.
27. Nationalization Amendment, supra note 1, at 1069 (see note 3.). For further
information on the structure of the Tribunal see Regulations of the Special Copper
Tribunal, 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 147 (1971).
28. Id., see also note 3. As pointed out by Judge Metzner compensation was
determined by the Comptroller using the formula of the value of the mines less "excess
profits," rights to mineral deposits, and the value of property in poor condition. Ac-
cording to the Amendment, the "President of the Republic" is "empowered to order
the Comptroller General . . . to deduct all or part of the excess profits earned by the
nationalized companies" as determined by the President. Nationalization Amend-
ment, supra note 1, at 1069.
29. Decree Concerning Excess Profits of Copper Companies (Sept. 28, 1971), 11
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1235 (1971).
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INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD:
THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Compiled and edited by the International Centre for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publica-
tions.
1973
5 volumes, $75 per volume, including loose-leaf maintenance for the
first year.
Every once in a while a solid accomplishment shows up in the
painfully slow process of international institution building, and this
is one of them. The International Centre for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID), an arm of the World Bank, has put together
a systematic, computerized collection of the investment laws of the
developing countries which is unique, practical and well-executed.
Lawyers, scholars and government representatives concerned with
international investment should find this publication very useful.
The first two volumes appearing in 1973 cover ten countries each.
Three more volumes are in progress. All are in loose-leaf form, and
ICSID is forming a network of competent authorities in each country
to keep the material current. The publication covers only countries
that are members of ICSID, which, unfortunately, excludes most of
Latin America. The system should eventually be expanded to include
non-member countries as well.
The laws (along with the relevant portions of constitutions, regu-
lations, and treaties) are systematically arranged, making it possible
to find material on a particular aspect of investment law under the
same section number for each country. There is also a detailed con-
cordance, but there is no editorial or interpretive material; all of it is
primary source material in English or, in some cases (as with some
African countries), in French.
This material has, until now, been unavailable in complete and
reliable form to prospective investors, government representatives,
and scholars. In developing countries, the typical process for finding
current legal materials has been to visit the country and make the
rounds of the ministries asking for copies of current legislation. They
are often not available in English, and rarely compiled in retrievable
form in official volumes. With this new ICSID service, governments
can scrutinize the regulatory policies and methods of other countries,
investors can make an initial analysis of their legal situation with
much greater certainty from their home office, and scholars will have
materials for comparative study which would otherwise be nearly
impossible to obtain.
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At first glance the system seems complex and ponderous. There
is a mass of headings and decimalized section numbers which take
considerable study and skill to manipulate. But this should not be a
problem for anyone with a serious purpose. As is, it is a valuable tool.
Its ultimate value, however, depends on how well it is maintained.
Although good publications do exist which include editorial com-
ment as well as a discussion of economic and business factors (e.g.,
Business International's services), only this collection publishes the
complete texts of primary legal materials. One useful improvement,
however, would be the addition of typical contracts used in various
kinds of investments in each country.
It is encouraging to see this spark of creative leadership from the
World Bank. It would be easy to administer ICSID as an inert cham-
ber prepared and waiting for the use of disputing parties, should they
be so inclined. But, the best way to settle investment disputes is to
minimize ignorance and misunderstanding about the ground rules for
investment. There is no more logical a center for creative initiatives
than ICSID. Respect for the activities of the World Bank is growing
steadily and this sound publication from ICSID is a further example
of the Bank's valuable contributions.
Donald W. Hoagland*
* Partner, Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colorado.
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